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As an economist, I often find myself defending “bad guys”—
companies outsourcing American jobs, gas stations gouging 
consumers with high prices, Wal-Mart undercutting small retailers 
with low prices, Mexican immigrants sneaking into our country, the 
Chinese fixing their exchange rate, American companies opening 
sweat shops abroad, foreign companies dumping cheap goods onto 
our markets, and pharmaceutical companies profiting off other 
people’s sickness and misfortune. Sometimes I feel like a defense 
attorney for economic criminals.
Unlike real defense attorneys, however, I get clients that are 
mostly innocent. The study of economics provides a cogent defense 
for these alleged evil doers.
Greg Mankiw (2006)
Despite the enormity of recent events, the principles of economics 
are largely unchanged. Students still need to learn about the gains 
from trade, supply and demand, the efficiency properties of market 
outcomes, and so on. These topics will remain the bread-and-butter 
of introductory courses.
Greg Mankiw (2009)
From 2003 to 2005, Gregory Mankiw was the chairman of the Council 
of Economic Advisers for President George W. Bush. In 2006, he 
became an economic adviser to Mitt Romney, a role he maintained 
during Romney’s 2012 presidential bid. He is a professor of economics 
at Harvard and was paid a $1.4m advance to write his best-selling 
textbook Principles of Economics. Economic giant Paul Samuelson once 
claimed, “Let those who will, write the nation’s laws if I can write its 
textbooks” (quoted in Chandra, 2009). Despite student protests at the 
narrowness of Mankiw’s teaching—in 2011, students walked out of 
his principles course in protest over his “limited view of economics” 
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(Concerned Students of Economics 10, 2011)—it is this version of 
the discipline that has been largely taught in classrooms around the 
United States. As we will demonstrate throughout this book, Mankiw’s 
unshakeable belief in the efficiency of the market system reflected the 
dominant trend in the field of economics after the late 1970s.1
A standard list of economic goals and priorities would include 
stable growth, price stability, full employment, and the efficient 
allocation of resources. Some might even add to this list an environ-
mentally sustainable economy and a reasonably equitable distribution 
of wealth and income. But the evidence suggests that the post-1970s 
period in the United States can be characterized as one of instability 
and inequality relative to the “Golden Age” that preceded it. After 
the 2008 collapse, critics inside and outside economics accused those 
dominating the profession for the last three decades of behaving like 
an “ostrich with its head in the sand,” suffering from “groupthink,” and 
promoting “Zombie” economics. While there is some truth to each of 
these claims, we believe they all miss the central charge.
We will argue that the economists of this era who rose to 
prominence (like Mankiw) did so not because of their contributions 
to the standard list of economic goals, but primarily because of their 
contribution to corporate profits and the wealth of the business class. 
An efficient, healthy economy shared by all was never a likely outcome 
of the policies advocated by those who had the power to assert their 
own interests. And those possessing that power got their way with the 
help of the economics profession. This period in American history, 
including the post-2008 years, has been an unqualified success for the 
American business class. While economics is ostensibly guided by 
commitments to scientific rigor and objectivity, this boon to business 
was the predictable result of the specific policy recommendations of 
those that came to dominate the profession.
How Do “Bad” Economic Ideas Develop?
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when 
they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than 
1  The term “economics” in this book means the academic and professional 
fields of economics, not trends in the actual economy.
prophets and profits
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is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. 
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from 
any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are 
distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few 
years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly 
exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas … 
soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for 
good or evil.
John Maynard Keynes (1936, p. 383)
Keynes’s eloquent account of the importance of economic ideas has 
been widely used by economists across the ideological spectrum to 
explain the influence that the profession wields. He suggests that it is 
the “gradual encroachment of ideas” that influences policy. Keynes also 
seems to be suggesting that “wrong” or even “evil” ideas of an “academic 
scribbler” can come to dominate the profession and influence “madmen 
in authority.” Indeed, after the economics profession appeared to fail 
so miserably during the economic crisis that started in 2008, critics 
from inside and outside the discipline queued up to point out how 
wrong (or even evil) economics had become.
If outsiders think the economics profession is a homogeneous 
discipline where consensus is easily achieved and genuine debate an 
infrequent visitor, there has been strong criticism of the profession 
from within, especially since the 2008 economic meltdown. Jeffrey 
Sachs has been a professor at Columbia and Harvard. He is a special 
adviser to the UN on its Millennium Development Goals. He has 
been very critical of recent trends in economics: “What I know about 
our training, since the early 1980s, the way we train people to think has 
left them, in mainstream economics and, I would say in mainstream 
politics, has left them almost unable anymore to distinguish the surface 
from the underlying reality” (Sachs, 2008). People who would view 
themselves as slightly further on the fringes of mainstream economics 
have been even more critical (for a more complete look at economists’ 
opinions on their colleagues’ work, see Box 1.1). An important theme 
of this book is that these internal criticisms were seldom heard, and 
even more rarely paid attention to, between the late 1970s and the 
2008 crisis. Further, there were important limitations to the criticisms 
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of those economists, like Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz, who did 
manage to make their objections heard.
Academic observers from outside the field of economics have 
been even more scathing. Akeel Bilgrami, a philosophy professor at 
Columbia University claimed that
… economics is perhaps about the worst offender among disciplines 
in inuring itself in alternative frameworks of thought and analysis. 
In fact, I would venture to say that I have never come across a 
discipline which combines as much extraordinary sophistication and 
high-powered intelligence with as much drivel. (Bilgrami, 2008)
In the wake of the 2008 economic collapse, even the popular media 
vilified the profession. Headlines in the New York Times argued that 
Box 1.1 Economists on economics
The 2008 crisis has resulted in some serious soul-searching within 
economics. Much of the self-criticism revolved around the very narrow 
nature of what it means to study economics after 1980.
Perry Mehrling, a professor of economics at New York’s Columbia 
University says his graduate students are growing increasingly frustrated 
by the tendency to “define the discipline by its tools instead of its subject 
matter … they find little relationship between the mathematical models 
in class and the world outside the door” (quoted in Basen, 2011).
Robert J. Shiller, an economist at Yale, claimed that the reason the 
profession failed to foresee the financial collapse was “groupthink”: 
“Wander too far and you find yourself on the fringe. The pattern is 
self-replicating. Graduate students who stray too far from the dominant 
theory and methods seriously reduce their chances of getting an academic 
job” (quoted in Cohen, 2009).
Willem Buiter, a London School of Economics professor and a 
former member of the Bank of England monetary policy committee 
was especially scathing: “The typical graduate macroeconomics and 
monetary economics training received at Anglo-American universities 
during the past 30 years or so may have set back by decades serious 
investigations of aggregate economic behavior and economic policy-
relevant understanding. It was a privately and socially costly waste of 
time and other resources. Most mainstream macroeconomic theoretical 
innovations since the 1970s … have turned out to be self-referential, 
inward-looking distractions at best. Research tended to be motivated 
prophets and profits
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academic economists were not sufficiently repentant for their role 
in creating the economic crash, with headlines like “Ivory Tower 
Unswayed by Crashing Economy,” and “How Did Economists Get 
It So Wrong?” Other publications were in a more punitive mood. The 
Financial Times wanted to “Sweep Economists Off Their Throne,” 
and The Atlantic opted for the corporal “Will Economists Escape a 
Whipping?” Canada’s national newspaper, the Globe and Mail weighed 
in with “Economics Has Met the Enemy, and it is Economics.” The 
fact that it is almost impossible to imagine another area of academics 
being the subject of such irate headlines underscores both the level of 
genuine anger at the failings of the profession, but also the fact that 
Keynes was right in claiming that it had so much influence.
The focus of all these critics is that those dominating the profession 
won the war of ideas to the detriment of society. How could ideas and 
by the internal logic, intellectual sunk capital and aesthetic puzzles 
of established research programs, rather than by a powerful desire to 
understand how the economy works—let alone how the economy 
works during times of stress and financial instability. So the economics 
profession was caught unprepared when the crisis struck” (Buiter, 2009).
James K. Galbraith, an economist at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of 
Public Affairs at the University of Texas, and long-time critic of orthodox, 
mainstream economics, was not optimistic about these criticisms leading 
to any real change in the discipline: “I don’t detect any change at all.” 
Academic economists are “like an ostrich with its head in the sand.” “It’s 
business as usual,” he said “I’m not conscious that there is a fundamental 
re-examination going on in journals” (quoted in Cohen, 2009).
The most systematic and, perhaps, damning indictment of the state of 
modern economics can be found in Australian economist James Quiggan’s 
book, Zombie Economics (2010). Like Galbraith, he is pessimistic that the 
flaws in economics that were revealed by the 2008 crisis will lead to any 
real change in the discipline: “Economists who based their analysis on 
these ideas contributed to the mistakes that caused the crisis, failed to 
predict it or even recognize it when it was happening, and had nothing 
useful to offer as a policy response.
Three years later, however, the … reanimation process has taken place 
in the realm of ideas. Theories, factual claims, and policy proposals that 
seemed dead and buried in the wake of the crisis are now clawing their 




policies that proved to be such an abject failure come to dominate 
the economic landscape? Surely, some “academic scribbler” influencing 
“Madmen in authority” is not an acceptable explanation of the 
evolution of ideas or policy. Keynes mystified the origin of these ideas 
and, more importantly, trivialized the means by which they rise to 
the top. His implication that there is an evolutionary and progressive 
character to the development of ideas obscures the existing power 
structure in society. Marx’s reflection on an earlier era is a better place 
to begin if one is looking for a conceptual framework to understand 
how ideas take hold in society. Marx argued that once the economic 
system of capitalism became dominant in the nineteenth century, 
economic debate was
… no longer a question, [of ] whether this theorem or that was 
true, but whether it was useful to capital or harmful, expedient 
or inexpedient, politically dangerous or not. In place of disinter-
ested inquirers, there were hired prize fighters; in place of genuine 
scientific research, the bad conscience and the evil intent of 
apologetic. (Marx, 1873, p. 25)
This is not to suggest that Marx’s “prize fighters” of intellectual ideas 
are being dishonest with themselves or the public. Rather, their ideas, 
in which they no doubt genuinely believe, are promoted, popularized 
and enacted into policy by those who stand to benefit from them.
Unlike Keynes, who insists that the contest for intellectual 
dominance is a contest of ideas, Marx argues that it is a contest of 
power. Economic ideas, and the policies that arise from them, have 
profoundly different impacts on different groups in society. It is, 
therefore, in any group’s interest to promote those ideas from which 
it will benefit, while discrediting those that are harmful. The question 
then becomes, what is the capacity for different groups to promote 
certain ideas and dismiss others? This depends, most obviously, on 
the financial, political and institutional resources that they can bring 
to bear but also on their coherence as a group and their ability to act 
in concert. 
As Marx also suggests, ideas are not formed, disseminated and 
popularized in a context-free intellectual vacuum. Instead, the ideas 
that come forward, the extent to which they are believed, and whether 
prophets and profits
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they will be adopted as policy are influenced by the social and economic 
contexts in which they emerge. This could be seen in the fallout from 
the 2008 crisis. After the economic collapse, there was much more 
opportunity for critics of the prevailing economic wisdom than was 
the case prior to the crisis. The ideas of the critics had not changed. 
Economists like Shiller and Galbraith had been railing against some 
of the more conservative of the dominant economic ideas, and the 
policies that stemmed from them, for years without being given a great 
deal of credence until the crisis. Yet, the lack of real change within 
economics departments, or in public policy, also demonstrates that 
it is not only economic conditions that influence ideas. As Quiggan 
suggested, economic policy that was thoroughly discredited in the 
eyes of many by the economic crisis still appears to rule the day. 
This demonstrates that it is not simply economic conditions, broadly 
speaking, that influence economic ideas, but the way in which those 
economic conditions affect the material interests of those groups in 
society that have the capacity to influence the intellectual climate.
The economics profession has a lot to answer for. After the late 
1970s, the ideas of influential economists have justified policies that 
have made the world more prone to economic crisis, remarkably less 
equal, more polluted and less safe than it might be. We seek to explain 
why a particular type of economist became so influential, especially 
from the late 1970s, and demonstrate the damage that their policies 
have wrought. 
Since the 1970s, a dominant group of famous economists have 
swayed the direction of the discipline, and the policy that it influences, 
with easily identified distributional consequences. Starting with 
Milton Friedman, we trace the intellectual history of a common core 
of economic assumptions and beliefs about using the autonomous 
individual as the centerpiece for economic analysis, a commitment to 
formalized modeling, faith in market forces and the failure to recognize 
power relationships in society. We trace the rise of this dominant trend 
in the discipline by examining the works of its most famous adherents 
to demonstrate the limits of the mainstream economists’ models and 
show how implementation of these ideas created the economic context 
for many of the economic difficulties that we face today. While these 
economists have helped create an economic policy environment 
that has proved catastrophic for many, it has also proved remarkably 
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beneficial for the privileged minority, which partly explains why their 
ideas were greeted with such enthusiasm.
The Book in Brief
Chapter 2 examines how certain ideas came to dominate the discipline 
itself and the broader policy debate in society. Why do some ideas 
become accepted, institutionalized and popularized while others are 
ignored? We argue that economic knowledge is not a Darwinian 
process where superior ideas overcome their inferior predecessors. 
Rather, the ideas that dominated the discipline were shaped by a 
correlated combination of commitments to idealized techniques, 
methodological individualism and the market. Further, the adoption 
of certain economic ideas over others has been more a result of the 
imperatives of the economic environment of the time, and the institu-
tional clout mustered by those who benefit from economic policy, than 
a battle of academic ideas taking place in a context-free vacuum of 
abstract intellectual debate. As a result, for over three decades, income, 
status and Nobel prizes have been the reward for those who created 
and justified economic policy that has had debilitating effects on the 
majority of citizens while benefitting a privileged minority.
Chapter 3 provides a concise review of the current economic state of 
affairs in the United States. This chapter lays out the economic trends 
that are the result of enacting the economic ideas documented in the 
rest of the book. The last 35 years have featured stagnating incomes 
for most Americans alongside large income gains for the rich, creating 
growing inequality. For the privilege of modest income gains, US 
families are working longer hours and are subject to worrying envi-
ronmental conditions. Finally, what limited successes there were in the 
post-1980 economy were based on the inevitably shaky foundation of 
household debt, which came crashing down in the 2008 crisis.
Chapter 4 starts our individual case studies with Milton Friedman 
(Nobel Prize 1976), the godfather of the so-called “conservative 
counter-revolution” in economics. His writing followed two streams. 
One was the academic work, sometimes with Edmund Phelps 
(Nobel Prize 2006). His natural-rate-of-unemployment hypothesis, 
monetary theory, and views on fiscal policy all contained the message 
that government should not interfere with the macroeconomy. 
prophets and profits
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The second was his more popular work railing against government 
regulation and defending the free market. We argue that once you 
translate the algebra and jargon, Friedman’s ideas served the interests 
of American business at the expense of the rest of society. As with 
the other economists in this book, we will examine the distributional 
consequences of Friedman’s ideas.
Chapter 5 discusses the works of Gary Becker, James Buchanan, 
Sam Peltzman, George Stigler and Gordon Tullock, five economists 
who provided a novel intellectual justification for Friedman’s fear 
of government intervention in the economy. George Stigler (Nobel 
Prize 1982) is best known for developing the Economic Theory of 
Regulation, also known as “capture,” in which interest groups and 
other political participants will use the regulatory and coercive powers 
of government to shape laws and regulations in a way that is beneficial 
to them, rather than for whom those laws were designed to help.
Becker won the Nobel Prize (1992) for “having extended the 
domain of microeconomic analysis to a wide range of human behavior 
and interaction, including nonmarket behavior.” Former Treasury 
Secretary and current Harvard University President Lawrence 
Summers, claimed it “was the most overdue prize they’ve ever 
given.” Becker is most famous for applying the assumptions of the 
rational, maximizing individual to problems that were, prior to Becker, 
considered outside the realm of economics, like crime, the family, and 
discrimination. Relevant here is his analysis of interest groups lobbying 
for government favors.
James Buchanan (Nobel Prize 1986) and Gordon Tullock expanded 
on this in what became known as “Public Choice” interest group 
theory, which argues that government intervention leads to waste in 
the economy. Public choice created the intellectual justification for the 
elimination of regulations by arguing that the government solution 
will inevitably be worse than the market failure it was designed to 
solve. By ignoring corporate economic and political power, public 
choice introduces a misleading bias into the analysis of how public 
policies are determined and the appropriate solution to capture.
Robert Lucas (Nobel Prize 1995), Neil Wallace, Thomas Sargent 
(Nobel Prize 2011), Finn Kydland (Nobel Prize 2004) and Edward 
Prescott (Nobel Prize 2004) are the subject of Chapter 6. Taken 
together, these economists advanced a macroeconomic theory that, at 
the profit doctrine
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its heart, contained two ideas that became very influential in economic 
policy. The first is that Keynesian fiscal policy was ineffective given 
the inherent efficiency of markets. The second is that the economy 
performs best when it is most “flexible.” Essentially, this means that 
the price mechanism is able to fluctuate as freely as possible, which is 
accomplished in practice by eliminating labor market impediments to 
downward wage movements, such as minimum wages, favorable union 
rules, and unemployment benefits. These theories cannot explain the 
prolonged periods of economic downturn. Critics have ridiculed the 
interpretation of the Great Depression offered by these economists. 
Franco Modigliani mocked these economic ideas for implying that, 
“What happened to the United States in the 1930s was a severe attack 
of contagious laziness!” (Modigliani, 1977, p. 6). Paul Krugman con-
temptuously described their explanation of the Depression as the 
“Great Vacation” (Krugman, 2009e).
Chapter 7 looks at the connection between economics and financial 
crises. According to the World Bank, there have been 117 systemic 
banking crises worldwide since the late 1970s (Caprio, 2003). These 
recurrent crises occurred during a period in which the financial sector 
became a much larger component of economic activity and there 
was a decline in regulatory oversight. The ideas of three economists 
contributed substantially to these trends. Robert C. Merton and Myron 
S. Scholes (Nobel Prize 1997), or the “Newton of modern finance,” 
developed the formula for opening up the options and derivatives 
markets. Eugene Fama (Nobel Prize 2013) is famous for the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH), which stated that assets are accurately 
priced and financial bubbles practically, if not entirely, impossible. 
According to James Crotty, the ideas of these authors led to the light 
regulatory approach of what he termed the New Financial Architecture 
(NFA), but they are “based on patently unrealistic assumptions and … 
no convincing empirical support. Thus, the ‘scientific’ foundation of 
the NFA is shockingly weak and its celebratory narrative is a fairy tale” 
(Crotty, 2009, p. 564). Deregulation of the financial sector and the 
creation of exotic financial instruments created a very profitable policy 
environment for the financial sector. It was also directly responsible 
for the 2008 crisis.
Lawrence Summers and Alan Greenspan are the subjects of 
Chapter 8. Summers and Greenspan have not garnered economic fame 
prophets and profits
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because of their ideas, but because they have translated the ideas of 
others into public policy. Greenspan was the chairman of the Federal 
Reserve of the United States from 1987 to 2006. Summers was the 
deputy secretary of the Treasury until 1999 when he was promoted 
to secretary of the Treasury in the Clinton administration. He was a 
professor of economics at Harvard and was president of that university 
between 2001 and 2006. From 2009 to 2010, he was the director of 
the Obama Administration’s National Economic Council. What have 
they done in these positions of power? Their policy perspective on the 
financial sector over which they have ruled, has been, to put it kindly, 
flexible. They manipulated interest rates and altered regulations to 
serve American corporate interests at home and abroad, contributing 
to rising profits, falling wages and one publicly funded financial crisis 
after another, culminating in the 2008 financial meltdown.
The Conclusion examines the work of two economists, Paul 
Krugman (Nobel Prize 2008) and Joseph Stiglitz (Nobel Prize 2001), 
who are perhaps the most famous opponents of neoliberal economics 
from within the mainstream of the discipline. On one hand, Krugman 
and Stiglitz demonstrate that economics is not a homogeneous field, 
in which all scholars toe the neoliberal line. There are important 
and influential dissenters. On the other hand, the manner in which 
the academic work of Krugman and Stiglitz relies on mainstream 
economic methods creates some important problems for their ability 
to accurately explain the economy since the 1970s. In addition, despite 
the renown of these authors, even they would have to admit that 
their suggestions have been largely ignored in the post-1980 world, 
leaving them increasingly frustrated by the direction of economic 
policy. Although neoliberal economists do not have a monopoly on 
economic ideas and there are numerous dissenting voices, from the 
more mainstream opinions of Krugman and Stiglitz to the more 
radical theories of Minsky, these alternatives are unlikely to become 
actual policy unless the influence of business in the political system 
can be drastically reduced.
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The Contest of Economic Ideas: 
Survival of the Richest
Introduction
The evolution of the economic discipline has been portrayed in two 
very different ways. The first, and probably most popular, explanation 
is that economic thinking has followed a Darwinian process of 
survival of the fittest. According to this explanation, ideas are held 
because they provide the best explanation of the functioning of the 
economy given the state of the art in the discipline. When a newly 
minted idea comes along that can better explain the functioning of 
the economy, the superior idea will be widely adopted. Through this 
constant replacement of inferior theories with superior alternatives, 
the frontiers of knowledge are extended. This approach is taken by 
some of the leading scholars of the history of economic thought, for 
example Mark Blaug’s (1997) Economic Theory in Retrospect, perhaps 
the primary text in the field. According to this view, economic theory 
advances as intellectual ideas clash in the academic arena and the 
superior defeat the inferior. Many scholars of the discipline would 
probably prefer a more gradualist analogy, along the lines of which 
each new generation of economists stands on the shoulders of giants, 
but the general notion of the advance of ever better ideas in an always 
improving discipline is a fairly accurate reflection of this perspective.
The second approach argues that prevailing economic thought is 
not so much a triumph, no matter how gradual and plodding, of good 
ideas over bad in the isolated world of the ivory tower. Rather, what 
is considered “good” or “bad” in terms of which economic ideas are 
formulated, accepted and adopted, is influenced by attempts to solve the 
actual economic problems of the day. This is the approach favored by 
people like Robert Heilbroner (1999) in his seminal book The Worldly 
Philosophers (apparently the second best-selling economics book of all 
the contest of economic ideas
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time), which connects the ideas of great economists with their life and 
times. In the words of John Kenneth Galbraith, “the enemy of the 
conventional wisdom is not ideas but the march of events” (Galbraith, 
2001, p. 24). Perhaps the most famous example that best fits this 
explanation is that of J.M. Keynes, who formulated a theory on the 
cause of, and cure for, long-lasting economic stagnation in The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. The book was published in 
1935, when the wealthy capitalist countries were suffering through 
the decade-long Great Depression, which the economics profession 
(or to be more precise, the mainstream of economics) could neither 
explain nor solve. Keynes’s theory was not “correct” or “incorrect.” The 
usefulness of what became known as Keynesian economics is still one 
of the major debates within economics today. However, it did arrive in 
precisely the right economic context.
We would argue that a more accurate, alternative explanation of 
what becomes “accepted wisdom” in the discipline is a slightly more 
complicated process. In keeping with those who have followed on 
Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientif ic Revolutions (1962), we would 
argue that circumstances play a significant role in the direction of 
intellectual inquiry. However, it is not narrowly the economic context 
described in the previous paragraph that defines circumstances. Rather, 
this more broadly involves three factors.
First, there is an element of truth to the first “advance of academic 
ideas” approach, but it is less the advance of better ideas over their 
inferior predecessors than it is the increasing technification of the 
discipline in its attempt to become the most scientific of the social 
sciences, marked by the increasing use of mathematics and statistical 
empirical techniques. Whether this amounts to an advance is more 
open to debate. The discipline of economics is to be commended 
for its commitment to seeking chains of reasoning as well as the 
mathematical and statistical quest for a rigorous understanding of how 
the world actually works. We will argue, however, that the economists 
who ascended in the discipline after 1980 did not tether their technical 
chains to anything that actually resembles a capitalist economy. To 
borrow a phrase from Anwar Shaikh, in his article “The Poverty of 
Algebra,” “the so-called rigor of their algebra merely disguises the true 
condition of their theory: rigor mortis” (Shaikh, 1979).
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The second factor is the economic context. As already noted, 
economic ideas are not formulated, accepted and adopted in a vacuum 
of intellectual debate isolated from the outside world. Rather, as 
the second approach recognizes, economics (and its conversion into 
economic policy) does attempt to actually solve economic problems 
of the day. However, in any given economic context, which ideas will 
win the debate about what is causing the problem and, therefore, 
what solution will provide the cure, is not always straightforward. For 
example, Keynes was not the first economist with a credible theory of 
the Great Depression. Michal Kalecki’s work preceded Keynes, and 
provided “a more rigorously constructed, coherent, and general system” 
(Feiwel, 1975). Yet, it was Keynes’s ideas that came to dominate the 
profession and economic policy after World War II, not Kalecki. We 
would argue that the reason for this is that Kalecki’s ideas were based 
on a class analysis that placed profits at the center of his theory, and 
contained statements like “The capitalist system is not a ‘harmonious’ 
regime, whose purpose is the satisfaction of the needs of its citizens, 
but an ‘antagonistic’ regime which is to secure profits for capitalists” 
(Kalecki, 1991); these ideas were not as palatable to those in a position 
to make economic policy. The reason that Keynes became a household 
name while Kalecki was doomed to academic obscurity had less to do 
with the inherent inferiority of Kalecki’s ideas and more that his ideas 
were more offensive to those with economic and political power.
Third, in relation to the second point, those with economic and 
political power can influence the dominant economic ideas by using 
their financial clout to fund institutions that foster and disseminate 
economic ideas from which they will benefit. Formulating and 
popularizing economic ideas is not merely an academic exercise. 
Rather, any set of ideas benefits from financial support, which can 
facilitate the formulation and dissemination of ideas in a number of 
ways. Financial support can fund research positions at universities. 
It can finance research institutes that can solicit and popularize 
certain ideas over others. It can pay for popularizing these ideas by 
contributing to book publishing and writing opinion pieces. It can 
pay to lobby politicians to get ideas turned into policy. This is not to 
suggest that only ideas backed by the financial clout of the economic 
elite will ever be heard. Rather, it is to suggest that in the contest 
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of economic ideas, finance, and the institutional capacity that finance 
creates, makes for a somewhat uneven playing field.
The rest of this chapter will attempt to flesh out how this three-part 
explanation can explain the evolution of the economics profession 
since the late 1970s.
Scientific Pretension
Both defenders and critics of the current state of the discipline agree 
that economists wield considerable influence on the intellectual and 
policy worlds. Yet, this was not always the case. Prior to World War II, 
the profession was still in its infancy in the US, and economics did not 
enjoy the prestige (or perhaps infamy) that it does today. Economists 
were not frequently sought out to advise on public policy matters, and 
often when they were, they lacked a “concert of opinion” (Bernstein, 
2001, p. 39). This started to change thanks to the contributions of 
Keynes and the transformation of the discipline during World War II.
Ironically for a discipline associated with analyzing the market 
mechanism, economics found its feet as a social science under the 
state-centered decision making of national defense. This was part of a 
very explicit policy of the American Economics Association (AEA), 
which wanted economics to be of service to the war effort (Bernstein, 
2001, p. 85). It was during World War II and its Cold War aftermath 
that economics started to develop a “concert of opinion” and a more 
unified set of tools with which to investigate economic matters. 
During the war, linear programming was especially valuable to the 
Navy. The US Department of Defense was also optimistic that the 
field of game theory could be applied to military situations (Fullbrook, 
2005). It was under the Air Force, and its close relationship with 
the RAND Corporation, that the mathematical solutions of general 
equilibrium were developed. The Department of Defense publications 
commended economists Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu for 
“modeling of conflict and cooperation whether it be [for] combat or 
procurement contracts or exchange of information among dispersed 
decision nodes” (Fullbrook, 2005).
The same mathematical rigor was applied by Samuelson to Keynes’s 
theories in the US. Although there was much in Keynes’s work that 
was inimical to formalization, Samuelson succeeded in developing 
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a mathematical “Keynesian” model of the economy that became 
the “concert of opinion” that was so desired by pre-war economists. 
However, in restricting Keynes’s ideas to a series of malleable 
equations, Samuelson lost much that was valuable in Keynes. For 
Samuelson, instability in the capitalist economy, and therefore the 
need for government stabilization, is caused by real world obstacles 
to the proper functioning of the market, like wages that are rigid 
rather than flexible. While this could be used to support the case for 
Keynesian policy, it also could be, and was, used by more conservative 
economists to argue that rather than stabilization, a better policy 
would be to eliminate the rigidities in the economy, by reducing the 
power of unions or getting rid of employment insurance benefits, for 
example. What Samuelson lost in his quest for formalization was 
Keynes’s core idea that even when functioning at its best, the market 
economy was inherently unstable, not because of inconvenient (and 
perhaps correctable) obstacles, but due to the unpredictable behavior 
of investors (Smith, 2010, p. 41). Samuelson’s formalization involved 
purging Keynes’s more profound critiques of the economic system. 
Edward Fullbrook described Samuelson’s version of Keynes as “like 
a Henry Miller novel without sex and profanity” (Fullbrook, 2005).
The trend to a more formalized, mathematical profession became 
even more pronounced after the 1970s. Mathematical rigor has come 
to be a prerequisite for publication in many of the more prestigious 
journals and it dominates the training of graduate students at the elite 
universities. The more important journals, like the American Economic 
Review (AER), the flagship journal of the AEA, declared that they 
would stop publishing in the less than rigorous fields of philosophy 
and history, which were, unsurprisingly, precisely the areas in which 
there was the most skepticism about the direction of the discipline. 
The lack of opportunity to publish in the leading economic journals 
then created a deterrent for emerging scholars considering pursuing 
these areas of study. The inability of existing academics in these areas 
to publish in the supposedly leading journals was also used as proof 
of their inferiority (Mirowski, 2010). As more focus was being placed 
on mathematical prowess, students were not being trained to examine 
actual economic problems or institutions (Hodgson, 2004). One 
survey of economic graduate students from the “top” US programs 
found that while 65 percent felt that “being smart in the sense of 
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problem solving” was important to their career success and 57 percent 
considered “excellent in mathematics” crucial, only 3 percent thought 
that “having a thorough knowledge of the economy” was beneficial 
(Klamer & Colander, 1990). This commitment to rigor has served 
economists well. It has made it the most “scientific” of the social 
sciences and has created precisely the type of “unified” disciplinary 
structure that economists had been craving. Economists earn higher 
salaries than their colleagues in the other social sciences and are more 
sought after in the public realm from newspapers to the civil service to 
expert testimony (Fourcade et al., 2015, p. 110). As Richard Freeman 
wrote in 1999, “[S]ociologists and political scientists have less powerful 
analytical tools and know less than we do, or so we believe. By scores 
on the Graduate Record Examination and other criteria, our field 
attracts students stronger than theirs, and our courses are more math-
ematically demanding” (Freeman, 1999, p. 141).
Economists’ desire to shape their field in a manner that mimics 
the physical sciences was reflected in the number of physicists 
migrating into economics. There had been a fairly steady stream of 
physicists into economics since the turn of the twentieth century, 
but the number increased considerably after 1980 when the end of 
the Cold War reduced opportunities in that discipline. The fact that 
physicists often did not even need to take any economic training to 
switch academic worlds illustrated the extent to which economics 
had become a discipline of models (Mirowski, 2010).1 This would 
suggest that formalism and rigor in economics have evolved to be an 
end to themselves rather than a tool to advance the understanding 
of real-world economic problems. This has not gone unnoticed, even 
among some of the leading lights of the profession. In 1984, Wassily 
Leontief, Nobel Prize winner and former president of the AEA 
stopped writing articles in protest over the abstract theorizing that 
had come to dominate the discipline. His principle complaint was that 
those who wanted to study the manner in which the economy really 
functioned were marginalized and called for a profound rethinking of 
how economic research was conducted (Smith, 2010, p. 42).
1  Many of these physicists were responsible for creating the complicated 




According to historian of economics Roger Backhouse, increased 
rigor introduced a subtle bias into modern economics after the 1970s. 
Economic conclusions were taken seriously when they were mathe-
matically derived from fully specified assumptions. However, in order 
to keep the mathematical models tractable, patently false and often 
misleading simplifications became commonplace. For example, one 
might reasonably question whether economists actually ever truly 
believed in the assumptions of perfect competition and individual 
rational optimization, or whether they were devices employed to 
permit rigorous analysis of manageable models. In macroeconomics, 
a number of simplifying assumptions also emerged: people take 
advantage of all the information available to them, they are infinitely 
farsighted and they are representative agents (that is, that all people 
are homogeneous). As was the case with microeconomics, these were 
not selected because they were in any way deemed to be realistic, but 
because they facilitated rigor. Yet all of these assumptions introduce 
a bias towards “conservative” or free market solutions to economic 
problems (Backhouse, 2005, p. 383; Varoufakis, 2011). So, what 
appears on the surface to merely be an eminently practical decision to 
create a rigorous yet manageable model of economic activity tended to 
produce results that were unintentionally biased against government 
intervention. The quest for scientific rigor does not inevitably require 
these kinds of narrow assumptions and much of the economic 
discipline has moved away from them in its modeling. However, for 
an influential period during the 1970s and 1980s, these were the 
commonplace assumptions.
One study examining the incentives that face academic economists 
argued that although economists are “very honest people who chose their 
career because they were motivated by noble goals such as the quest for 
truth,” like any other profession they respond to the incentive structures 
in their jobs (Zingales, 2014, p. 151). For example, because of the obvious 
requirement of getting published and the central role played in this 
process by editors of prestigious journals (through selecting referees 
and even overruling them), if editors are pro-business, then articles are 
likely to reflect that bias. Although this begs the question of why editors 
might be pro-business, it would create an incentive for academics to, 
no doubt unconsciously, tailor their research so that it is more likely to 
get published. (Luigi Zingales suggests that they might enjoy sitting 
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on corporate boards, but other possibilities could be imagined, from 
the lucrative fees of the corporate lecture circuit to personal ideology. It 
could equally be the more hidden bias of assumptions and techniques 
discussed above.) His litmus test of pro-business bias is the extent 
to which articles support the current level of executive compensation. 
Articles that support the current level, or an increase, in executive 
compensation are considered to have a pro-business bias. Zingales 
finds that three of the most prestigious economic journals: Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Journal of Political Economy and American Economic 
Review have a clear pro-business bias, compared to the larger sample of 
144 most downloaded articles on the subject from the Social Science 
Research Network (Zingales, 2014, p. 135).
The pro-free market bias was perhaps more pernicious because it was 
also deeply hidden. The development of a formalized, mathematical 
analysis of the economy was very valuable for the profession. It was an 
important comparative advantage over other social sciences and created 
the impression that economics was a non-ideological discipline, aimed 
at providing positive, scientific answers to policy questions. Of course, 
the absence of politics is much more illusion than reality:
Even more to the point the rigor and scientific precision that 
economists claim are characteristic of their discipline serve to 
silence through the substitution of arguments over ends with those 
over means, the genuine political debate that has (and will) always 
surround economic policy formulation as a whole. (Bernstein, 2001, 
p. 191)
The turn towards a more formal economics, with strict simplifying 
assumptions, also moved the discipline away from what Robert 
Heilbroner and Richard Milberg termed macroeconomic foundations. 
They argue that, ironically, in ignoring the social forces, like power and 
values, which influence behavior, “for all practical purposes they have 
eliminated the individual” (Heilbroner & Milberg, 1995, p. 84).
The development of the human psyche, from the earliest moments 
of infancy on, takes place through the gradual ingestion and incor-
poration of the individual’s surroundings from its earliest familial 
influences through its exposure to innumerable influences on other 
individuals directly or indirectly. Thus the concept of the individual—
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the analytical focus of so much conventional social science—appears 
most clearly in the form of a unique distillation of social influences. 
In Marx’s profound words, the individual appears as “the ensemble 
of social relations” (Heilbroner & Milberg, 1995, p. 86).
By divorcing the individual from the macrofoundations from which 
it is formed, economics has forsaken the responsibility for studying the 
crucial social influences on people’s behavior.
Perhaps most important among these neglected macrofounda-
tions is the role of the economic system itself. As Heilbroner and 
Milberg claim, a discussion of medieval life without acknowledging 
how it was shaped by the feudal system would be considered a strange 
omission, yet the nature of the capitalist system is rarely discussed 
in modern economic enquiry (Heilbroner & Milberg, 1995, p. 6). 
The economic system in which people currently operate creates a 
specific class structure in which power is not distributed equally. It 
creates greater rights and privileges for some than for others. Yet, the 
underlying social order created by capitalism is not a usual subject 
of enquiry in mainstream economics. Further, the fact that capitalism 
is, itself, a social construction, rather than a natural state of affairs, is 
rarely considered.
Material Interests and Economic Conditions
Economists may revel in arcane mathematical formulas and complex 
statistical tests but these are rarely purely academic exercises with no 
bearing on economic reality. Economic theory, and its corresponding 
policy, does attempt to deal with the prevalent economic conditions. 
But how the economic “problems” of the day are defined and what 
the “solutions” to those problems might be is not usually straightfor-
ward. It is exceedingly rare for economists to identify an uncontested 
theory or policy that could be construed as being in the public interest 
in the sense that it would benefit all of society. Rather, theories or 
policies tend to benefit some in society at the expense of others. So, 
the particular economic conditions that are seen as a problem and the 
specific solutions to that problem will have important distributional 
effects. This means that the material interests of different groups in 
society will be differentially impacted by the policies supported by the 
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state of the art in the economic discipline. The corollary of this is 
that different groups will have a material interest in getting certain 
economic policies implemented.
Of the differing groups in society, the corporate sector is arguably 
the most powerful. Corporations are not in the business of producing 
our goods and services, but in the business of making profits. Without 
enough profits, they shut down their factories, mines, stores, farms 
and banks. Without profits, they do not invest in new machines or 
hire more workers. Maximizing profits is not a matter of morals or 
ethics for firms, but a condition of survival. The “circuit of capital” 
demands that businesses first must be concerned with acquiring the 
least expensive inputs. Second, they must make use of these inputs 
in a production process that ensures a competitive price in the 
marketplace. Next, they must be able to market these products in order 
to be able to sell them. Lower-cost capitalists will drive higher-cost 
capitalists from the market by reducing prices and having more profits 
to invest for the next round of production and sales. The firm that 
is able to introduce techniques that lower costs has profits available 
to invest in new techniques, which enables it to successfully compete 
with rivals. Without competitive profits, research and development, 
investment and advertising all become impossible and the fate of the 
firm is sealed. This also implies that profits are not only crucial for 
firms, but also for the economy more generally. When profits are low, 
firms are unwilling to invest or hire, creating economic malaise. Any 
explanation of economic conditions that fails to place profitability at 
the center of the analysis is missing the main story.
Samuel Bowles, David Gordon and Thomas Weisskopf once 
wrote that profits are the spoils of a three-front war that firms must 
continuously wage with their workforce, the government, and other 
companies (especially those from other countries) (Bowles et al., 
1986). The conflict with their workers is over containing wages while 
at the same time convincing them to increase productivity as much as 
possible. The struggle with the government is over the extent to which 
the state will impact a firm’s bottom line by altering its costs through 
such things as regulations, taxes, subsidies, or its revenues, through, for 
example, government purchases. This places the firm in conflict with 
a wide variety of citizens who expect the government to undertake 
various profit-constraining activities, from those who pressure the state 
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to implement environmental protection; to those who think that the 
government has a responsibility to provide for the collective good with 
respect to health, education and welfare. The third and final front is a 
battle with other firms to reduce any input costs and increase revenues 
from product sales. On this front, firms may have an important ally 
in their national governments, which attempt to tilt the rules of the 
international economy in favor of their own firms. This can be done by 
changing trade rules, altering exchange rates, or using military force.
The dominant economic ideas after World War II were very 
different from those which thrived after 1980. The post-war policy 
environment was conditioned by the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
a trauma so grave that it forced a dramatic reconsideration of how the 
economy functioned. Unemployment rates of over 25 percent, mass 
poverty and widespread bankruptcy cried out for both an explanation 
of economic collapse and a remedy to prevent it from happening again. 
The Keynesian explanation of the Depression appeared to provide 
both the diagnosis and the cure. The Depression, Keynes argued, was 
caused by deficient demand. When firms decreased their investment, 
workers were laid off. Unemployed workers’ decreased their spending, 
reducing sales for firms, cutting profits and forcing further reductions 
in investments, creating a vicious cycle from which it was difficult 
to escape. Keynes’s cure was to maintain incomes and, therefore, 
demand, through government job creation. As a sweeping general 
statement, the dominant post-war macro reflected Keynes’s belief that 
governments could (and should) use fiscal policy—use of the tax and 
spending powers of government, and monetary policy—the power of 
the central bank (The Federal Reserve—Fed—in the US) to influence 
interest rates, to smooth business cycle fluctuations and maintain 
a low level of unemployment. In addition, the need to maintain 
consumption created an important justification for government 
benefits for the unemployed. The double-digit unemployment rates of 
the Depression also destroyed the facile argument that those without 
work deserved no financial assistance since those who truly wanted a 
job could find one. Finally, the collapse of so many firms, especially in 
the banking industry, created a justification for state regulation to limit 
the more risky and detrimental activities of companies. The crisis of 
the Depression could be interpreted as the economic context in which 
government intervention became acceptable.
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We would argue that the post-war intellectual climate within 
economics was not just down to internal debates among academic 
scribblers, or the inherent superiority of Keynesian ideas, but the power 
of different interests in the US to promote certain economic ideas. The 
very fact that high levels of employment should be an economic goal 
reflected a different balance of power between groups in the economy. 
Low unemployment tilts the playing field in wage negotiations in 
favor of workers and away from business because there are fewer 
desperate, unemployed laborers with whom the gainfully employed 
have to compete. In short, when unemployment is low, workers have 
a stronger hand because they know that they will be harder to replace. 
In the decades after World War II, tight labor markets (and other 
pro-worker changes to labor market institutions like the Wagner 
Act, which made it easier to form unions) did cause a rise in wages 
during this period. We would argue that it is no coincidence that 
this was a period in which labor, organized into politically powerful 
industrial unions, enjoyed much more clout than was the case in the 
post-1980s economy.
Yet, as we shall see later, Keynesian full employment was not 
completely antagonistic to profits. The unique characteristics of the 
post-World War II decades made it possible to have increases in both 
wage and profits. First, productivity was increasing rapidly because of 
technological innovation in production. This meant that each worker 
could produce more in each hour of work. This reduced costs per unit 
and created the opportunity for wage increases without cutting into 
profits. It also created the need for a mass market for US products. 
The second factor was a lack of international competitors for the US 
after the European economies were decimated during the war, with 
the result that increased demand by the US workforce was likely to be 
purchased from US-based companies. Thus, the broad-based income 
gains that were, in part, due to high employment, played an important 
role in maintaining profits as well.
Keynesian stabilization policy aimed at maintaining low 
unemployment was only one of many examples of what was one of 
the dominant strands of economic thought during this period—
identifying areas in which markets fail and prescribing corrective 
government action, much of which reduced the latitude of firms to 
pursue profits unhindered. This reflected a balance of power between 
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different groups in society in which labor held greater relative strength 
than was the case after 1980. However, this is not to say that these 
policies were antagonistic to business. Business in the US flourished in 
the 1950s and 1960s, with profit rates that were superior to those even 
in the boom years after 1980. As we pointed out in the Introduction, 
there was a remarkably diverse menu of economic ideas, like those 
of Kalecki, which could have risen to prominence in the wake of the 
Great Depression and World War II. The fact that it was the ideas of 
the liberal version of Keynes (as opposed to those either to the “right” 
or “left”) that came to dominate both economic ideas and government 
policy reflected the balance of power between historically relatively 
powerful labor and perpetually powerful business.
So, how were the economic problems of the late 1970s defined and 
who benefitted from the solutions? The conventional story of the 
downfall of Keynesian economics, with its emphasis on the ability 
of government to successfully stabilize the macroeconomy, is that it 
could not cope with stagflation. The late 1970s saw the twin evils of 
high unemployment and high inflation stalking the US. Traditional 
Keynesian policy (or to be a bit more precise, the Samuelson variant of 
Keynes), which focused on manipulating aggregate demand through 
fiscal and monetary policy, would inevitably exacerbate one of these 
problems if it attempted to combat the other. Using expansionary 
policy to alleviate unemployment would stoke the inflationary fires. 
Attempting to reduce inflationary pressures through contractionary 
policy would throw people out of work. Keynesian stabilization policy 
was discredited when it had no answer to the economic dilemmas of 
the day. This is very much a tale of the limitations of economic theory 
being shown up by the march of real world events.
There is an element of truth to this story. Traditional Keynesian 
policy cannot deal simultaneously with inflation and unemployment. 
Yet it is only a partial truth. Stagflation was a problem, but it was 
more a symptom than the disease itself. The underlying problem was 
a decline in corporate profitability and the challenges to capitalist 
power that had emerged through the 1960s and 1970s. From the end 
of World War II to roughly the late 1960s, the US corporate world 
enjoyed strong profits. However, starting around 1965, corporate 
profits fell precipitously for almost twenty years (Duménil & Lévy, 
2004, pp. 24–8). It was this fall in profits that created the economic 
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turmoil in the US. High rates of unemployment, low investment and 
sluggish economic growth were the inevitable result. Not coinciden-
tally, the anti-inflationary policies that were chosen to get out of the 
stagflation problem were precisely those that also restored profitability 
for American business.
The causes of the fall in profits is the subject of much debate in 
heterodox economic circles (Brenner, 2006; Duménil & Lévy, 2011; 
Pollin, 2003; Shaikh, 2011), but what is much more universally 
accepted is that starting around 1980, business and government took 
active measures to restore profits, creating what became known as 
“neoliberalism” (Duménil & Lévy, 2012). At the national level, these 
policies are most closely associated with Ronald Reagan in the US, 
Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Brian Mulroney in 
Canada. Broadly speaking, neoliberalism marked a profound shift 
in the economic underpinnings of countries, which shifted power to 
business in several ways (a more detailed account of the economic 
results of these policies can be found in Chapter 3). First, by abandoning 
traditional Keynesian demand-side stabilization in favor of monetarist 
policy aimed at controlling inflation with high interest rates, low levels 
of unemployment were jettisoned as a policy goal, putting downward 
pressure on workers’ demands. Second, a supply-side program of 
reducing progressive tax rates (designed to create incentives for 
investment, savings and work) redistributed after-tax income to the 
rich. Third, to further reduce costs to firms, the regulatory role of the 
government was greatly reduced, and where it still existed, traditional 
bureaucratic regulation was replaced with cost-benefit analysis and 
market solutions. Finally, the welfare system and labor market were 
reformed by, among other things, policies reducing the power of unions 
and making government benefits to the unemployed more miserly. 
This was euphemistically known as “flexibility,” but the distributional 
effects against labor and for business should be obvious ( Jenkins & 
Eckert, 2000, p. 313). To this list of national policies we could add the 
international trend to eliminate barriers to trade and financial flows, 
forcing workers in the US to compete with lower-wage labor in the 
developing world, while capital was free to find the location in which 
it could earn the highest return (Duménil & Lévy, 2012).
These neoliberal policies shifted economic risks from either the 
state or the firm to workers. For example, reduced unemployment 
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benefits transfers the downside risk of economic instability from the 
government to labor. Similarly, limiting the power of unions reduced 
workers’ job security, making them more likely to face dismissal, 
moving risk from firms to workers. These changes represented a 
dramatic reversal of the historical trend of increasing social protection 
for workers from the vagaries of the labor market. Yet, as John Quiggan 
pointed out, while workers were expected to shoulder more of the 
risk in the labor market, risk was being reduced for businesses and 
their executives. This was most obvious in the massive government 
bailout of the financial industry which was deemed “too big to fail,” 
but the same socialization of corporate risk was extended to the auto 
industry as well. Even before the economic collapse, CEOs earned 
stock options that would yield massive payoffs when the company did 
well, but would not penalize them when the firm performed poorly 
(Quiggin, 2010, pp. 16–18).
Most of the economists profiled in this book provided theoretical 
justification for these policy changes. As Michael Bernstein argued:
As the Keynesian consensus of the post war era dissolved, and 
as it was replaced by an increasingly detached social theory that 
actively condemned governmental activism in the marketplace, 
the economics profession became less and less an engaged social 
scientific community and the public service and more and more 
a mouthpiece for a particular, interest-based agenda … No longer 
ministers to statist power, many economists reinvented themselves 
as privy councillors to private wealth. (Bernstein, 2001, p. 173)
This is not to suggest that economists were “in the pocket” of business. 
Nor is it suggesting that all of these economists were fundamen-
tally right-wing (although many of them were). Rather, it suggests 
that of all the economists, and all of the economic ideas that were 
bandied about, during this period the majority of the ones that rose 
to prominence—that came to dominate policy and earn disciplinary 
kudos—were those that favored business (see Box 2.1).
The economists that we discuss below played an important role 
in legitimizing the neoliberal policies that reversed the profitability 
decline of the 1970s. This marked an important departure not just 
for the structure of the economy but also the economics profession, 
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which, as Bernstein pointed out, favored Keynesian policies prior to 
the 1970s. It also marked an important divergence from the older 
tradition of classical liberalism, most commonly associated with 
writers like Adam Smith, which had a strong mistrust of corporate 
power despite its support of free markets. According to University of 
Notre Dame economist Philip Mirowski, in contrast to their classical 
liberal predecessors, a hallmark of neoliberal economics is that 
“Corporations can do no wrong, or at least they are not to be blamed 
if they do” (Mirowski, 2009, p. 438). This transformation was not an 
accidental windfall for the business community, but, rather, was the 
result of some quite deliberate planning.
Institutional Support
Economists must surely recognize that there is a market for ideas. The 
choice of research topics, the results of that research, and the dissem-
ination of findings all depend, to some extent, on the financing that 
is available for different areas of study. Ideas are bought and paid for 
more than they are “free floating,” despite policy intellectuals’ frequent 
claims to the contrary ( Jenkins & Eckert, 1989). It was no accident 
Box 2.1 An excerpt from “The Social Responsibility of Business  
is to Increase its Profits,” by Milton Friedman, New York Times 
Magazine, September 13, 1970
When I hear businessmen speak eloquently about the “social responsi-
bilities of business in a free-enterprise system,” I am reminded of the 
wonderful line about the Frenchman who discovered at the age of 70 
that he had been speaking prose all his life. The businessmen believe 
that they are defending free enterprise when they declaim that business 
is not concerned “merely” with profit but also with promoting desirable 
“social” ends; that business has a “social conscience” and takes seriously 
its responsibilities for providing employment, eliminating discrimina-
tion, avoiding pollution and whatever else may be the catchwords of the 
contemporary crop of reformers. In fact they are—or would be if they 
or anyone else took them seriously—preaching pure and unadulterated 
socialism. Businessmen who talk this way are unwitting puppets of the 




that the dominant ideas in economics reflected the changing sources 
of institutional support.
In its formative years during and after World War II, various 
branches of the government—particularly the military—were generous 
donors to the economics profession. The Navy funded the work of 
Arrow and Debreu. The Department of Defense, more generally, was 
another important source of funding for economics research. Finally, 
the RAND Corporation (which received funding from the Air Force 
to help US defense policy) provided funding for specific scholars, 
established “Defense Policy Seminars” at the largest US universities 
in the 1950s and 1960s, and started a graduate fellowship program 
in 1965 (Bernstein, 2001, p. 99). These sources of funding fostered a 
statist discipline that was obviously not adverse to an active role for 
government.
Yet, the institutional environment in which the economics discipline 
was emerging was also sensitive to its role during the Cold War. 
Economic research that hinted at radicalism or was critical of capitalism 
was not welcomed in a context that was particularly sensitive to 
anything that might be supportive of the communist cause. Like other 
areas of society, economics had its own anti-communist purge. This 
operated, in part, through the passive mechanism of lack of support. 
Funding for left-wing or radical research was non-existent, making 
economists interested in career advancement unlikely to follow this 
path. Yet it was not merely the subtle influence of financial incentives 
that operated during the Cold War. The more Inquisition-oriented 
tactics of the McCarthy era were also used. At universities, tenure 
and promotion were denied for those undertaking radical research. At 
the Council of Economic Advisers, security checks were performed 
on graduate students and new employees in case they were ever 
associated with suspicious characters (Bernstein, 2001, p. 107). There 
was certainly an explicit attempt to keep anything that looked vaguely 
Marxist out of the pages of the American Economic Review (AER). 
Editor Paul Hoffman rejected a paper that he flagged as worryingly 
radical in order to stem what he felt would be a torrent of “revised and 
unrevised Marxism” in the AER should the paper be accepted. James 
Washington Bell, the secretary treasurer of the American Economics 
Association (AEA) took a more patronizing tone, saying that he was 
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“inclined to believe that any apostle [of Marx] must be mystical and 
incomprehensible” (quoted in Bernstein, 2001, p. 106).
If it was government that provided the financial resources for 
the development of the discipline prior to 1970s, business became a 
much larger force in the post 1970 world. Networks of conservative 
economists had, of course, been around well before this watershed 
date, but they were much less influential. Perhaps the most famous was 
the Mont Pelerin Society, founded at a 1947 conference (in the Swiss 
resort of Mont Pelerin, of course) and organized by Friedrich Hayek 
to discuss what he saw as the worrying domination of Keynesian and 
Marxist planning at the expense of economic freedom. The initial 
meeting was attended by many economic heavyweights (some of whom 
will appear in the pages that follow), including Ludwig Von Mises, 
Milton Friedman and George Stigler. Yet despite Hayek’s dream of 
combating statist ideas with the intellectual superiority of free market 
economic theory, it is broadly accurate to say that Friedman, Stigler 
and the rest of their free market colleagues failed to impact policy until 
the economic crisis of the 1970s.
Essayist Lewis Lapham dates the concerted effort to organize and 
fund Mont Pelerin-style ideas in the US to a 1971 call to arms called 
“Attack on the Free Enterprise System,” written by Lewis Powell for 
confidential circulation to the Chamber of Commerce. In it, Powell 
warned that
… survival of what we call the free enterprise system lies in 
organization, in careful long-range planning and implementation, 
in consistency of action over an indefinite period of years, in the 
scale of financing available only through joint effort, and in the 
political power available only through united action and national 
organizations. (Quoted in Lapham, 2004).
Several now well-known businessmen took up the call including 
newspaper magnate Richard Mellon Scaife, weapons and chemical 
manufacturer John Olin, Vicks Chemical’s Smith Richardson, beer 
baron Joseph Coors, and the Koch brothers (one of whom, David, ran 
as the vice presidential candidate for the Libertarian Party in 1980) 
who made their money in oil. Coors and Scaife combined to provide 
the start-up cash for the Heritage Foundation in 1973 and the Koch 
the profit doctrine
30
family financed the Cato Institute in 1977 (Lapham, 2004). These 
new organizations joined with previously established institutions like 
the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) in an effort to turn the tide 
of ideas toward what they would call the “free market.” The fact that 
they received generous financial support and institutional direction 
from business should also provide some indication of just who would 
benefit from their economic ideas.
Two sociologists, J. Craig Jenkins and Craig Eckert, who have 
studied what they call the “new conservative economics,” discovered 
that different institutions specialized in different policy areas. 
The AEI, for example, was the driving force behind promoting 
monetarism to combat inflation, fiscal conservatism, and the 
Government Regulation Program that promoted deregulation. The 
Heritage Foundation backed the supply-side economic policies of 
corporate tax reduction and deregulation. The Hoover Institution 
concentrated on criticizing social welfare programs like social security 
and income maintenance ( Jenkins & Eckert, 2000). This is not to 
say that all of these organizations were always pulling in the same 
direction. There are, theoretically, potential conflicts between the 
balanced budgets advocated by a fiscal conservative and the sharp tax 
reductions of supply siders. However, despite these differences, a quick 
comparison of the policies implemented in the neoliberal era and 
those promoted by these institutions should suffice to demonstrate 
their remarkable success.
If there remains any doubt about who was directing these institutions 
or who benefitted from their research and advocacy, a quick glance at 
their boards of directors should put these to rest. Important business 
groups like the Business Roundtable, the Chamber of Commerce, 
and the National Association of Manufacturers cooperated with these 
institutes and there was considerable cross-pollination of boards. 
In fact, of the 287 policy directorships in these organizations, 82.5 
percent were held by 221 corporate officers and private entrepreneurs 
( Jenkins & Eckert, 2000, p. 325).
Funding also flowed from the business to these organizations. The 
Scaife Foundation donated around $20 million to Heritage in the 
17-year period between 1985 and 2002. Total donations from business 
foundations to Heritage totaled $45 million during this period 
(Backhouse, 2005, p. 380). Of course, individual companies like AIG, 
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Philip Morris, Lockheed Martin and Exxon Mobile also contributed. 
The big donor to the AEI (which had grown to be worth $50 million 
by 2009) was the Bradley Foundation, with lesser contributions from 
Olin, Scaife and Exxon. The Koch families’ money went largely to 
the Cato Institute to which Scaife and Olin also contributed (Media 
Matters, n.d.). Even though millions of dollars have been lavished on 
these organizations to influence the direction of economic policy, in 
the grand scheme of research foundations, institutions like the AEI 
are not among the biggest players. For example, the assets of the Ford 
Foundation were over $9 billion in 2002 compared to the Bradley 
Foundation’s more modest $500 million, while the big recent mover in 
the conservative foundation world has been the Walton Foundation—
established by Walmart founders Sam and Helen Walton—which 
is focused largely on educational donations, with assets of over $1 
billion in 2009 (Media Matters, n.d.). Rather, the success of these 
organizations was their single-minded use of the funds that they 
did attract.
Of course, it is also important to get ideas translated into policy. 
The growing impact of the conservative think tanks during this period 
is difficult to empirically capture but some scholars have attempted 
to quantify their influence. Perhaps the best study on this front 
was conducted by Andrew Rich. He used three measures to assess 
think-tank influence during the 1990s: a survey of congressional staff 
and journalists, the number of times they testified before Congress 
and the number of times they were cited in a newspaper. According 
to Rich’s survey, in 1993 the top five think tanks with the “greatest 
influence on the formulation of public policy in Washington these 
days” were Brookings, Heritage, AEI, Progressive Policy Institute and 
Cato. By 1997, those same institutes occupied the top five positions, 
but the pecking order had changed in favor of the more conservative 
organizations. Heritage had moved up to the top spot, with Cato 
third and AEI fourth (Rich, 2004, p. 81). Sixty-eight percent of the 
survey respondents claimed that conservative think tanks had a greater 
influence than liberal think tanks, while only 5 percent argued that 
liberal think tanks wielded greater influence (Rich, 1997). Rich also 
found that between 1991 and 1999, conservative think tanks testified 
before the House or Senate almost one-and-a-half times more often 
than liberal or centrist organizations (Rich, 2004, p. 94). Conservative 
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think tanks were also “substantively” mentioned in newspapers almost 
four times more frequently than their non-conservative counterparts 
during these years (Rich, 2004, pp. 93, 95). 
While influencing what constitutes economic common sense can 
shape the political landscape through changing the ideas of the voting 
public and policy-making elite, more direct political influence was 
also helpful for business after 1980. Conservative think tanks have 
been successful in placing people in a position to advise presidents, 
particularly those from the Republican Party, increasing the likelihood 
that economic ideas will be converted into economic policy. Reagan’s 
presidential campaign relied heavily on conservative think tanks to 
provide intellectual approval for his policies. This was coordinated by 
Martin Anderson, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and key 
Reagan policy adviser, who believed that gathering a team of intel-
lectuals who would be “co-signing the ideas” of the candidate would 
dramatically increase his credibility (Abelson, 2009, p. 136). Once in 
power, the Reagan administration drew heavily from the think tanks 
that helped formulate his campaign platform. Between 1981 and 
1988, nearly two hundred members of conservative think tanks went 
to work for the Reagan government. Hoover (55), Heritage (36) and 
AEI (34) were particularly large sources of personnel for the Reagan 
team (Abelson, 2009, p. 138).
It was during the Reagan years that the Heritage Institute came 
to prominence as a policy force in Washington. After Reagan was 
elected in 1980, Heritage presented its report, Mandate for Leadership, 
containing policy proposals cobbled together from its own research 
and that of other like-minded think tanks, to Edwin Meese III, who 
commented that the government would “rely heavily on it.” By 1982, 
Edwin Feulner, the head of Heritage, claimed that more that 60 
percent of the proposals in the report had been, or would be, adopted. 
Although it is likely that Feulner was overstating the impact of the 
document, it did become known as the “bible” of the Reagan adminis-
tration (Abelson, 2009, p. 139).
Business groups also responded to Powell’s 1971 call by organizing 
themselves more coherently to more clearly express their policy 
preferences and to coordinate lobbying activity. For example, the 
Business Roundtable was founded in 1972. Its founding document 
identified rising wages as a source of declining profits in the early 
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1970s. Its membership grew through the 1970s so that by 1979, it 
included nearly seventy of the top one hundred financial and non-
financial corporations in the United States. It advocated for reductions 
in corporate taxes, increasing the retirement age, and cutbacks in 
environmental legislation. It opposed consumer protection advocated 
by Ralph Nader and legislation to improve the bargaining power of 
unions, especially the Labor Law Reform Act of 1978. In March 1981, 
the Business Roundtable publicly endorsed Ronald Reagan’s entire 
economic program including tight monetary policy, and cuts to taxes, 
social spending and regulations (Kotz, 2015, p. 72).
A particularly transparent example of the influence of business 
lobbying on politicians is the American Legislative Exchange 
Program (ALEC) founded in 1973. ALEC is not really a research and 
policy organization like those mentioned previously, although it does 
produce research reports and policy studies. Rather, its main role is to 
craft “model” bills and resolutions that can be easily turned into law 
by sympathetic politicians, mostly at the state level. ALEC’s funding 
comes from the by now usual suspects in the business foundation 
world including Schaife, Coors and Koch, but also draws considerable 
funding from individual firms. Its list of corporate donors is a virtual 
who’s who of corporate America, from General Motors to Bank of 
America to Microsoft to McDonald’s. Donor firms acquire veto power 
of the wording in the legislation cooked up by ALEC (Nichols, 2011). 
In one year alone (1999–2000), ALEC claims to have introduced a 
remarkable 3,100 individual pieces of legislation. Its recent activities 
include: the Automatic Income Tax Reduction Act, which would 
provide an automatic biennial tax rate decrease; the Public-Private 
Fair Competition Act, which would establish whether state agencies 
compete “unfairly” with the private sector, and the anti-union Right 
to Work Act, which removes employee’s obligation to pay union dues 
(Rogers & Dresser, 2011). ALEC’s bill pipeline was not confined to 
these areas, but extended to writing legislation on the environment, 
public schools, and health care. ALEC bills have been successfully 
adopted, sometimes word for word, at the state level. One might 
claim that this was politics “by business, for business,” rather than any 
romantic, inclusive notions of “the people.”
Business could certainly consider its institute money well spent in 
terms of economic output. Influential books like Milton Friedman’s 
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Free to Choose were published. A positive deluge of newsletters and 
ready-for-print newspaper op-ed pieces from institutes like the 
Heritage Foundation and the AEI promoted neoliberal economic 
ideas on a wide variety of topics. Talking points were produced for 
sympathetic media figures like Bill O’Reilly (Lapham, 2004). In the 
words of Backhouse, “Funding to liberal causes has been as large, if not 
larger, but it has been less narrowly focused on achieving specific goals” 
(Backhouse, 2005, p. 381).
Conclusion
The story of how economic ideas evolve over time is not a simple one. 
It is not just that superior ideas overtake more primitive ones. Nor 
is it a matter of real-world events providing the counter-evidence to 
force a reconsideration of the dominant economic ideas of the day. 
Rather, economic evolution has been the result of a combination of 
forces. First, the discipline itself has (perhaps unconsciously) created 
a conservative, free market bias with the particular assumptions and 
methods that it has chosen to employ in its quest for rigor. Second, 
economic ideas have evolved since the 1970s in a manner that 
supported neoliberal policies that have restored business profits after 
their decline prior to the mid-1980s. Third, it was no accident that 
economic theory developed in this way. The US business community 
invested in organizations that created and disseminated research 
that supported these neoliberal changes. According to University 
of Chicago Professor Richard Posner, “modern economics is, on the 
one hand, very mathematical, and, on the other, very skeptical about 
government and very credulous about the self-regulating properties of 
markets” (Cassidy, 2010c). Although the economists who developed 
the ideas that justified this direction in the discipline were no doubt 
often doing so ostensibly to improve the lot of all of society, the next 
chapter will demonstrate that the results of the neoliberal era unam-
biguously favored a particular subsection of society: the business class.
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The Consequences of Economic Ideas
There’s class warfare, all right, but it’s my class, the rich class, that’s 
making war, and we’re winning. (Warren Buffett, 2006, quoted in 
Stein, 2006)
Introduction
The last chapter suggested that three separate but interrelated factors 
contributed to a neoliberal or conservative bent to economic policy 
after about 1980. The bulk of this book is devoted to putting names 
to these abstract economic ideas by looking at the particular theories 
and affiliations of the most famous economists of this generation. 
However, before we get into the esoteric world of economic theory, it 
is worthwhile to provide a bit of evidence of the economic conditions 
that have been wrought by neoliberal economic ideas. Remember that 
neoliberal economic ideas came to prominence during a period of 
economic malaise, particularly in the US (and other Anglo economies), 
but felt around the world. The promise of these economic ideas was 
that they would lead America (and the other countries that followed 
this advice) out of stagflation and back to prosperity. The actual 
result could be much better described as tremendous prosperity for a 
minority, and long-term stagnation for the rest. This is true not only 
in terms of the most obvious measures, like income, but is also true in 
terms of important non-income components of economic well-being 
like economic stability, job security and a clean environment.
The US: Neoliberal Decline
In the previous chapter, we asserted that neoliberal economic policy 
was very good for profits and helped business in the US bounce back 
from the doldrums of the 1970s. Figure 3.1 shows data on the profit 
rate for the US. The graph shows clearly that the profit rate declined 
through the 1970s and then recovered after the early 1980s. This was, 
the profit doctrine
36
of course, part of the promise of neoliberal economic ideas. Their 
policies were aimed at restoring profits, although they were often not 
particularly explicit about this goal. Yet, these policies were not only 
supposed to increase profits, they were also supposed to deliver benefits 
much more broadly to the population at large. It is here that the effects 
of neoliberal policy diverge so dramatically from its promise.
The partial restoration of profitability did not quite bring the US 
back to the halcyon days of economic growth that existed prior to 
1970. In his defense of all things Keynesian, Keynes: The Return of the 
Master (2009), Robert Skidelsky provides a telling contrast in world 
growth rates. Average annual global economic growth prior to 1973 
was 4.8 percent. Between 1980 and 2009, this rate had fallen to 3.2 
percent. The US followed a similar pattern. From 1950 to 1973, real 
economic growth averaged 4.2 percent per year. From 1980 to 2007, 
this dropped to 3 percent (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2012). So, 
even by this broad measure of economic success, the neoliberal policies 
in vogue after 1980 were not as successful as the more interventionist 
policies enacted following World War II.
The US: Growth Through Exploitation
The economy looks even worse when we examine where the gains 
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Figure 3.1 US profit rate, percent
Source: Duménil & Lévy, 2005.
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the economy is divided up between different groups in society. One 
of the most obvious divisions is between profits and what is paid 
to workers. During the “Golden Age” prior to 1980, the gains were 
shared between profits and wages, in part because the labor market 
context, like lower unemployment and higher unionization, created 
a more even balance of power between employers and employees. 
As productivity increased, wages increased at roughly the same rate. 
When neoliberal policies started to be introduced after 1980, the gains 
from production started to go far more to profits than to wages and 
benefits for workers.
Some of the architects of these policies were quite frank about their 
goals. In the UK, Alan Budd, professor of economics at the London 
Business School and chief economic adviser to Margaret Thatcher, 
described in astonishingly candid terms what occurred during the 
1980s, stating that contractionary monetary policy and neoliberal 
fiscal policy were seen by the Thatcher government as
… a very good way to raise unemployment. And raising 
unemployment was an extremely desirable way of reducing the 
strength of the working classes. … What was engineered—in 
Marxist terms—was a crisis of capitalism which re-created the 
reserve army of labor, and has allowed the capitalist to make high 
profits ever since. (Cohen, 2003)
Reflecting on American workers’ lack of willingness to bargain or 
strike for higher wages, and the higher profits that resulted from 
this trend, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan referred to 
them as “traumatized” (quoted in Perelman, 2011, p. 48), even after 
unemployment fell in the US through the 1990s:
Increases in hourly compensation … have continued to fall far short 
of what they would have been had historical relationships between 
compensation gains and the degree of labor market tightness held 
… As I see it, heightened job insecurity explains a significant part 
of the restraint on compensation and the consequent muted price 
inflation … The continued reluctance of workers to leave their jobs 
to seek other employment as the labor market has tightened provides 
further evidence of such concern, as does the tendency toward longer 
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labor union contracts. The low level of work stoppages of recent 
years also attests to concern about job security … The continued 
decline in the state of the private workforce in labor unions has 
likely made wages more responsive to market forces … Owing in 
part to the subdued behavior of wages, profits and rates of return on 
capital has risen to high levels. (Greenspan, 1997)
There are a number of ways to measure the impact of neoliberal policies 
on the power of workers in the labor market. The percentage of the 
workforce that was unionized declined steadily during this period. 
Another, related, measure is the willingness and ability of workers 
to go on strike to back their demands for higher wages and better 
working conditions. Between 1966 and 1974, there was an average of 
352 work stoppages involving at least a thousand workers, per year. 
After 1981, workers became much less militant. In the decade of the 
2000s, the most strike-filled year was 2000 in which there were only 
39 large walkouts. In 2009, there were five (Perelman, 2011, p. 49). 
Even in the low unemployment years prior to 2008, workers in the 
US were cowed into passivity; after the economic collapse, they were 
even quieter.
The lack of power for workers in the neoliberal labor market had 
predictable effects on the distribution of income between profits and 
wages. According to economist Lester Thurow, US real per capita 
GDP rose 36 per cent from 1973 to 1995, yet the real hourly wages 
of non-supervisory workers declined by 14 per cent (1996, p. 2). Joel 
Rogers, director of the Center on Wisconsin Strategy, calculated that 
if wages had tracked productivity since 1980 as they had after World 
War II, “median family income in the U.S. would be about $20,000 
higher today than it is” (Tasini, 2006). Even during the economic 
boom period from 2001 to 2006, workers did not gain nearly as 
handsomely as business. Wages and salaries grew at a modest 1.9 
percent per year after adjusting for inflation during this period, while 
corporate profits after inflation increased by 12.8 percent annually. 
As a result, in 2006, wages and salaries made up a smaller percentage 
of total national income (51.6 percent) than at any point in the past 
77 years. Even if benefits, like health care, are tacked on to wages to 
calculate overall compensation, the broad trends remain the same. 
Overall compensation increased at 2.5 percent a year after inflation, 
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a much slower rate than is usually the case during economic booms, 
so that it stood at 64 percent of national income in 2006, the second 
lowest it has been since 1968 (the lowest was 1997) (Aron-Dine & 
Shapiro, 2007, pp. 1–2).
The growth of corporate profits relative to worker compensation 
is also reflected in a growing inequality between the very rich and 
the rest of society. Figure 3.2 shows that between 1967 and 2009, the 
share of total income that was earned by the wealthiest 20 percent of 
the population increased from 44 percent to 50 percent, the other 80 
percent of the population took home a lower share of income. The real 
gains have come at the very top of the income spectrum. In fact, the 
higher up the income spectrum, the larger the gains during this period. 
The top 5 percent of earners saw their share of income increase from 
17 to 22 percent. According to inequality experts Thomas Piketty and 
Emmanuel Saez, between 1973 and 2000, the average income of the 
bottom 90% of US taxpayers fell by 7%. Incomes of the top 1% rose by 
148%, the top 0.1 % by 343%, and extremely well off in the top .01% 
rose by an amazing 599% (Piketty & Saez, 2003). CEO compensation 
has followed this trend. In 1965, the average pay of the CEOs at the 
top 350 US firms (ranked by sales) stood at about 20 times the average 
compensation of their workers. Figure 3.3 shows that this ratio 























































Figure 3.2 US share of income by quintile




to around 400 times in the late 1990s. Despite some moderation since 
those heady days for business bigwigs, CEOs take home over 200 
times the compensation of their average worker (Mishel, 2012).
Figure 3.3 US ratio of CEO to worker compensation: 1965–2010
Source: Mishel, 2012.
The distribution of wealth in the US has been even more unequal 
than the distribution of income. For example, in 2009, the top 10 
percent of earners earned 47 percent of the income. However, this 
pales in comparison to the 73 percent of the net worth (all assets minus 
all liabilities) held by the top 10 percent. Somewhat surprisingly, this 
inequality in wealth has worsened after the 2008 economic crisis. While 
discussions about a declining stock market and a poorly performing 
business sector might have provided the impression that the rich were 
a bit hard done by after 2008, the decline in the value of the housing 
market was much more severe, which has a larger impact on families 
with less wealth, since their major asset is usually a home. As a result, 
between 2007 and 2009, the wealthiest 20 percent of households saw 
their wealth decline by 16 percent, on average, per year. The bottom 
80 percent (the rest of the population) had reductions in wealth of 25 
percent annually in this period (Allegretto, 2011, p. 3). The average 
wealth of the top 1 percent of the population stood at 225 times the 
median in 2009, up from 125 in 1962, and the highest ratio in history 
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The growing disparity in incomes and, therefore, ability to consume, 
was not lost on Citigroup. In a 2005 note to its investors, it described 
the US (along with Canada and the UK) as a “Plutonomy–an economy 
powered by the wealthy.” In a plutonomy, income and consumption 
are so unevenly skewed toward the richest that there is really no 
such thing as an average “US consumer.” Rather, there are two very 
distinct types of people, the very small group of elite at the top and 
the rest. According to Citigroup analysts, successful companies will be 
those that market to the rich, whose income and wealth were rapidly 
Box 3.1 The raging Cajun
Stagnating wages and growing inequality were an inevitable result of 
economic policy that transferred power away from labor and to business 
in an effort to restore profitability in the US. The only silver lining for 
most working families was that after the mid-1990s, unemployment was 
very low, so getting a job (no matter how poorly paid) was easier than 
it had been, and their wealth was increasing courtesy of rising housing 
values. The economic crisis of 2008 wiped out both of those positives, 
as unemployment jumped to 10 percent and the bottom fell out of the 
housing market. Former Clinton political strategist James Carville, the 
man credited with the perplexingly famous catchphrase “It’s the economy 
stupid,” was appalled by the lack of concern for the vanishing wealth of 
the middle class (a precarious situation that his candidate did a great deal 
to create) in elite policy circles after the 2008 crash:
… the recent economic crisis left the average American family in 
2010 with no more wealth than in the early 1990s, erasing almost two 
decades of accumulated prosperity.
It is a depressing state of affairs when about two-thirds of our 
fellow citizens are caught in an economic trap that is wrecking their 
lives financially and emotionally.
And the reaction to all of this has been limp at best … The point 
here is that we are reading the most significant economic story of our 
time and its effect on the psyche of the people who should know better 
is minimal.
The big scandal in America is that our middle class is shrinking, 
and no one seems to care. Maybe someone somewhere somehow 
should consider doing something else.
James Carville, “What if the rich lost 40% of their wealth?”, 
CNN.com, June 14, 2012
the profit doctrine
42
expanding, in contrast to firms that serviced the stagnant income of 
the poor. Their advice to investors was to concentrate on luxury brands, 
including Porsche, Hermes, Bulgari and Burberry (Kapur et al., 2005).
The Condition of the US Family:  
I Owe My Soul to the Company Store
“You work three jobs? … Uniquely American, isn’t it? I mean, that 
is fantastic that you’re doing that.” 
President George W. Bush to a divorced mother 
of three in Omaha, Nebraska in 2005
The trends in income and wealth inequality would be troublesome 
even if worker compensation was growing at a reasonable rate, but at 
least in that case workers could console themselves that they might 
be falling further behind the executive class, but at least they were 
improving their lot over time. However, gains for labor have been very 
modest and have only been possible by sacrificing other, non-work, 
activities. By the mid-2000s, it was not uncommon for men to work 
more than 60 hours a week and women to work more than 50. A 
growing number of people took on two or three jobs. All told, by the 
2000s, the typical American worker worked more than 2,200 hours a 
year—350 hours more than the average European worked, more hours 
even than the traditionally industrious Japanese. It was many more 
hours than the typical American middle-class family had worked in 
1979—500 hours longer, a full 12 weeks more. Americans now sleep 
between one and two hours less than they did in the 1960s (Reich, 
2010, p. 86). According to the Brookings Institution, what increase in 
incomes there were for the median American family were the result 
of increased hours worked, which went up by 26 percent between 
1975 and 2009, mostly as a result of women doubling the hours of 
paid employment that they put in during this period (Greenstone & 
Looney, 2011).
Yet, even increased hours at work have not alleviated the income 
stagnation for the American family. Higher expenses have eroded the 
increase in incomes that longer work days made possible. Elizabeth 
Warren argues that the cost of two cars, health insurance, mortgage 
payments, day care, and other necessities meant that a two-income 
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family in 2006 had $1,500 less discretionary income than their sin-
gle-income counterparts of the previous generation (Warren, 2006). It 
is true that some of them bought houses beyond their means, but by 
Warren’s account they were not suckered into luxury consumption, but 
desperate to maintain their historical standard of living.
With workers facing stagnant or falling real wages, longer hours 
and increasing economic fragility, borrowing became an increasingly 
attractive option. Companies found that extending credit was a lucrative 
addition to their usual business of profiting by actually producing 
goods and services. Households found themselves trapped in a vicious 
cycle of growing debt, of two very different types. Mortgage debt was 
induced by the dream of home ownership coupled with historically 
very low interest rates, meaning that high debt could be justified by 
lower debt payments. The second type of debt, like that on credit 
cards or payday loans, carried punitive interest rates, resulting in much 
higher payments per dollar of debt. Overall debt levels began to rise 
rapidly around the mid 1980s, when it stood at about 60 percent of 
income. By 2007, the ratio of total debt to personal disposable income 
topped out at 138 percent before falling slightly to 128 percent in 
2009 (Allegretto, 2011, p. 21). Even the reduced interest payments on 
debt made possible by low interest rates could not compensate for the 
overall increase in debt. The US household debt-servicing ratio, the 
percent of income spent on debt payments, hovered between 11 and 
12 percent from early 1980 to 2000. However, after 2000 that ratio 
Box 3.2 Were-wolf hunger
Writing during an earlier period of capitalist development, Karl Marx 
was concerned that, in the absence of counter-acting tendencies, like 
increased power for labor, companies might well literally work their 
employees to death. He wrote in Capital that
… in its blind unrestrainable passion, its were-wolf hunger for surplus-
labour, capital oversteps not only the moral but even the merely 
physical maximum bounds of the working-day. It usurps the time for 
growth, development, and healthy maintenance of the body. It steals 
the time required for the consumption of fresh air and sunlight … 




increased steadily, to 14 percent in 2008 (Shaikh, 2010). While the US 
population, in general, was falling further in debt, this was dispropor-
tionately true for workers. In 2007, 86 percent of families in which the 
head of the household was working for someone else carried debt in 
the US, compared to 77 percent of all families. A larger percentage of 
working-class families (54 percent) also carried some credit card debt 
relative to the general population (46 percent) (Baragar & Chernomas, 
2012). Debt to finance consumption is a widespread feature of the 
economic reality for US workers in the twenty-first century. In return, 
a larger portion of the money wage is now handed over to the financial 
sector through the increasingly habitual interest (including mortgage) 
payments of households.
US Instability
Stagnant wages and growing debt were problems not only for the 
increasingly stressed and overworked individuals that suffered under 
the post-1980 economic structure. Those same conditions also 
sowed the seeds for the economic collapse of 2008 in the wake of the 
mortgage market meltdown. For many analysts, the crisis itself was 
caused by the collapse of the housing market but this is an incomplete 
explanation for two reasons. First, the collapse of the housing market 
was, in part, driven by the low household incomes. US workers facing 
stagnant real wages and the longest work week in the industrialized 
world resorted to borrowing to maintain their consumption, including 
their homes. Business found it profitable to extend extraordinary levels 
of credit to households as a complement to increasing profitability in 
the sphere of production. In addition to firms traditionally involved in 
lending like banks, other companies, from supermarkets to car makers, 
jumped on the creditor bandwagon. The result was a dramatic increase 
in worker indebtedness and the instability that would inevitably follow 
when those bills came due. The first sign of the impending crisis was 
triggered by highly indebted households contracting their spending. 
The resulting reduction in sales created excess fixed capital capacity 
for business, which responded with a rapid decline in investment. 
The financial crisis that erupted in 2008 contributed to the decline 
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in investment as expectations for future profitability collapsed and 
credit contracted.1
Second, the housing market and subsequent financial collapse were 
the result of the deregulatory policies that were a crucial part of the 
post-1980s policy environment.2 This was not some external “shock” 
to the economic system, but a result of the profit-seeking behavior of 
firms in a deregulated industry in the context of stagnant household 
incomes. The entire tragic episode can essentially be summarized 
in a few sentences. Loans were being made to increasingly risky 
customers, on increasingly speculative terms. Worse, the banks that 
made the loans earned income through commissions, as opposed to 
the more traditional method of having the loan repaid, because they 
sold the mortgages on to others in bundled securities. As families 
started to default on what they thought was going to be their dream 
home, the banks and investment firms that had purchased mortgage-
backed securities found themselves holding badly overvalued assets 
(Hudson, 2009).
However, a more complete explanation would have to explain why 
these loans were being made. Much of the fragility in the US mortgage 
market stemmed from the expansion of subprime mortgages. A 
subprime mortgage is granted to applicants whose credit rating is too 
poor to qualify for a conventional loan. Because these applicants are 
higher risk than more creditworthy customers, the interest payments 
charged by lenders were correspondingly higher. While in retrospect 
offering expensive loans to marginal borrowers seems like a recipe for 
disaster for lender and borrower alike, it was being done in a broadly 
favorable economic climate. US monetary policy created a prolonged 
period of historically low interest rates, making debt more attractive 
and creating a long-term increase in the value of housing. House prices 
increased by 51 percent between 2000 and 2005, which was twice 
1  For a more complete discussion of how the structure of the US economy 
created the 2008 crisis see Kotz, 2009; McDonough et al., 2010; McNally, 
2010; Duménil & Lévy, 2011 and Varoufakis, 2011. For a more general 
explanation on the role of money and monetary policy on economic 
stability, see Lavoie et al., 2010.
2  For more on the role of finance in the economic crisis, especially the role 
of the rise of new financial instruments and speculative investments, see 
Minsky, 1986; Spotton Visano, 2006; Crotty, 2009; Martin, 2011).
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the growth of the next best five-year period for the previous thirty 
years (Getter et al., 2007, p. 1). As long as housing prices continued 
to increase, a borrowers’ growing wealth would compensate for their 
rising mortgage payments and lenders would have a valuable asset in 
the event that the borrower defaulted on their mortgage and the lender 
foreclosed. In this environment, the value of subprime mortgage loans 
increased from $160 billion in 2001 to $600 billion in 2006.
However, subprime mortgage loans, which were outside of federal 
regulatory oversight, contained an average mortgage debt payment-
to-income ratio of 40 percent, well above federal guidelines (Getter 
et al., 2007). As the subprime market expanded, increasingly marginal 
borrowers were enticed with increasingly suspect interest schemes. 
For example, an adjustable rate mortgage offers a low “teaser” interest 
rate for the first couple of years, and then increases to above market 
rates for the rest of the payback period. An interest-only mortgage 
delays the payment on the principle for a specified period of time, 
allowing the borrower to only pay the interest costs. After this period, 
of course, the compressed payments on the principle greatly increase 
the monthly payments. Because the total payments for these kinds 
of subprime mortgages were considerably higher than a conventional 
mortgage, they were very profitable as long as they were repaid. 
Precisely because these subprime mortgages were more lucrative 
than their conventional counterparts, people that would have often 
qualified for conventional loans were given subprimes. Of course, the 
higher payments increased the likelihood that they would default. 
This problem was exacerbated by the flexible interest rates on many 
of these loans. When interest rates started to rise in 2007, mortgages 
that were barely manageable for many people became impossible. 
The default rate on subprime mortgages increased from 10 percent 
in 2004 to 17 percent in 2007 (Mortgage Bankers Association, 2007). 
As people began to default and fewer buyers were looking for homes 
in a higher interest rate environment, housing values began to sag. 
The decline in housing values piled on the financial distress for many 
families, since often the amount of their mortgage exceeded the now-
decreased value of their home.
The economic crisis of 2008 was not an unexpected shock to an 
otherwise stable system. Rather, the crisis in the housing mortgage 
market and the economic crisis that followed were fostered by limited 
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income gains for families who took on increasing debt loads to purchase 
housing and other consumer goods. Firms in a deregulated lending 
industry profited handsomely from extending increasingly large 
loans to increasingly marginal borrowers. From this perspective, the 
economic crisis of 2008 was born in the labor market and deregulatory 
policies that were hallmarks of neoliberal economic policy.
The US Environment
It is not only the cold, hard world of income and consumption that 
has turned against most Americans since the 1980s. In terms of the 
more difficult to quantify, but nevertheless important, areas of social 
protection there has been a remarkable turn for the worse. Post-1980 
economic policy, with its stress on supply-side solutions, resulted in 
a withdrawal of state regulatory oversight in both specific industries, 
like the financial sector, accounting and the media, and protective 
regulation, like the environment and worker safety. Governments 
employed a number of crafty tactics to reduce their regulatory 
role without the drastic, and perhaps politically unpopular, step of 
eliminating an entire agency. Especially during the Republican 
presidencies of Reagan and George W. Bush, agencies were 
seeded with executive-level appointees who did not have a strong 
commitment to protective regulation, creating a much more collab-
orative approach with business. In addition, budgets were slashed to 
make monitoring and enforcement increasingly difficult. This resulted 
in a dramatic decline in both the willingness and ability to uphold 
regulatory rules. Between 1981 and 1984, the budgets of regulatory 
agencies in the United States fell by 11 percent overall. To focus on 
the pollution example specifically, the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (EPA) budget fell by 35 percent. The staff of the EPA was 
reduced from 14,075 to 10,392. Its referrals to the Justice Department 
for the prosecution of violators fell by 84 percent and the number of 
enforcement orders fell by 33 percent (Blyth, 2002, pp. 181–5).
The whittling away of the regulatory state did not end in the 
mid-1980s. After inflation, the EPA’s budget fell 25 percent between 
2004 and 2009 (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2008, p. 19). In 
2010, The President’s Cancer Panel pointed out that, although every 
year between one and two thousand new chemicals are created and 
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introduced into industrial processes, “only a few hundred of the more 
than 80,000 chemicals in use in the United States have been tested for 
safety.” The Panel also criticized US regulatory oversight of chemicals, 
which it argued was hindered by a lengthy list of impediments, 
including “inadequate funding and insufficient staffing,” “weak laws 
and regulations, and undue industry influence” (Reuben, 2010, p. ii). 
The EPA monitors chemicals under the Toxic Substances Control 
Act (TSCA). But it did not require companies to perform toxicity 
tests (in fact, it discouraged them, because if the tests were positive 
the company must report it). The EPA required the testing of only 1 
percent of commercial chemicals in the late 2000s, regulated only five 
and has not attempted to ban one since 1991 (Reuben, 2010, p. 22).
Assessing overall pollution statistics is difficult because they are 
very heavily impacted by changes in industrial structure and swings 
in economic activity. Countries that produce more services and less 
manufacturing will use less energy and have lower emissions. When 
economies boom, energy use and pollution will increase, all else being 
equal, since more is being produced. Despite these difficulties, there 
is little question that the US (and its North American neighbor, 
Canada) is a ravenous energy user, even compared to countries that 
have comparable standards of living like Sweden and Germany (see 
Table 3.1). Although the US did manage to reduce its amount of 
energy use per capita during the boom times between 1997 and 2007, 
its overall energy use continued to increase. Further, part of the reason 
for the decrease in US energy use was not due to any active energy use 
strategy but because of the decline in manufacturing taking place in 
the country. It is no coincidence that the big mover in energy use per 
person, China, saw a rapid increase in manufacturing exports to the 
US during this period. A very similar story could be told about CO2 
emissions (see Table 3.2). The US (along with Canada) emits far more 
CO2 pollution than other wealthy nations like Sweden and Germany. 
Its emissions have been declining, although not as much as Sweden or 
Germany, and much of this decline is due to the changing industrial 
structure in the US, which is increasingly buying its manufacturing 
goods from Third World locations like China.
The US not only makes a disproportionate contribution to global 
problems, like climate change, it also has a number of more local envi-
ronmental hazards. Further, environmental problems are not distributed 
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evenly across income groups. It is most often the less affluent members 
of the working class that live in hazardous proximity to environmental 
dangers. Louisiana is the poorest state in the union. It is also famously 
home to “Cancer Alley,” a 150-mile stretch between Baton Rouge and 
New Orleans that contains 150 petrochemical and chemical facilities, 
and as its name suggests, has the highest cancer mortality rate in the 
US (Katz, 2012, p. 102). Another study ranked the environmental 
hazards from a wide variety of industrial sources in 368 communities 
in Massachusetts. All but one of the 15 most “intensively burdened 
towns” had an average household income of under $40,000. There was 
also a pronounced racial gradient. Only 20 towns in Massachusetts 
had a non-white population of over 15 percent. Yet of these 20 towns, 
nine were among the 15 most burdened. The study concludes that “the 
communities most heavily burdened with environmentally hazardous 
industrial facilities and sites are overwhelmingly low-income towns 
and/or communities of color” (Faber & Krieg, 2002, p. 286).
Table 3.1 Energy use per capita
 Tonnes of oil equivalent  Percent change, 







Source: International Energy Agency.
Table 3.2 CO2 emissions per capita







India 1.37 +28.8 
Source: International Energy Agency.
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US Exceptionalism: It Doesn’t Have To Be Like This
While other nations have faced the same global economic context, 
they have not adopted the neoliberal package with the same fervor as 
the US. Interestingly, the countries that have taken a more skeptical 
approach to neoliberal economic policy have performed better than 
the US in many ways.
The World Economic Forum (WEF) is a Geneva-based foundation 
whose annual meeting of chief executives and political leaders, held in 
Davos, Switzerland is a gathering of the truly rich and powerful. The 
WEF is funded by a thousand corporations, each of which has annual 
revenues of more than $1 billion. Every year, the WEF produces its 
Global Competitiveness Report, which ranks the competitiveness of the 
world’s economies. The top ten countries of World Economic Forum 
Growth Competitiveness Index Rankings for 2011 in rank order were: 
Switzerland, Sweden, Singapore, the US, Germany, Japan, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Canada (Schwab, 2010, p. 15). What was 
most interesting about this list was how many of these countries have 
strong rules that explicitly resist the neoliberal economic policy agenda 
by using government intervention to regulate industry, strengthen the 
power of workers in the labor market, and redistribute incomes. This 
is not a one-year anomaly, European countries that have been more 
cautious about neoliberal policy than the US (especially the Nordic 
nations) have fared well in the WEF competitiveness rankings year 
after year. In 2005, the report lauded these nations for the quality of 
their public institutions, budget surpluses, low levels of corruption and 
high degree of technological innovation. Although these states had 
high taxes and a strict regulatory framework, they were characterized 
as having “excellent macroeconomic management overall,” according 
to Augusto Lopez-Claros, chief economist at the WEF:
Integrity and efficiency in the use of public resources means there 
is money for investing in education, in public health, in state-of-
the-art infrastructure, all of which contributes to boost productivity. 
Highly trained labor forces, in turn, adopt new technologies with 
enthusiasm or, as happens often in the Nordics, are themselves 
in the forefront of technological innovations. In many ways the 
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Nordics have entered virtuous circles where various factors reinforce 
each other to make them among the most competitive economies 
in the world, with world class institutions and some of the highest 
levels of per capita income in the world. (Lopez-Carlos, 2005)
Recall that the main, stated objective of neoliberal policy was to restore 
the economy to glowing health after the doldrums of the 1970s. We 
have seen that in terms of economic growth, the period after 1980 
was not as strong as the pre-1970 period. Importantly, growth was 
also not unambiguously superior to countries that pursued other, less 
austere, regimes. Table 3.3 compares the economic growth of the US 
to a few of the nations that have resisted neoliberal economic policies 
for different time periods. The table only contains data up to 2008, so 
it does not include the disastrous economic impact of the post-2008 
economic crisis, which hit the US particularly hard, so this presents the 
best possible case for the US and its neoliberal policies. Yet, whether 
we take the longer-term period from 1980 to 2008 or the supposed 
boom period of the early 2000s, the US does not really outperform 
these other nations. The neoliberal economists that came to dominate 
the discipline argued that policies to increase workers’ power in the 
labor market or redistribute income were luxuries that would slow 
economic growth. Yet, research has shown that this theorized trade-off 
between equality and efficiency does not exist. A 2002 OECD report 
concluded that there is no evidence that equality affects GDP “one 
way or another” (Arjona et al., 2002, p. 28). Neoliberal economic policy, 
with all of its attendant inequalities, wage stagnation and decreased 
social mobility, does not produce higher growth rates than nations that 
do not impose these maladies on themselves.
Table 3.3 Economic growth: percent change in real GDP per capita, PPP
 1980–2008 1990–2008 2000–08
Denmark 64.21 34.14 7.80
Germany 62.18 30.58 11.61
Sweden 68.44 39.61 17.68
United States 68.80 35.00 8.75 




The US cannot claim a great advantage over other nations when 
it comes to economic growth, but the score is more unambiguous on 
social measures. Unfortunately for the US, its record shows that it is 
unambiguously inferior. In a nation that celebrates the “rags to riches” 
story of social mobility, where anyone can be president, the difference 
between a son’s income and his father’s in the US was the third lowest 
of twelve OECD nations, behind only Italy and the UK (another 
neoliberal paragon) in 2010. Three of the top four socially mobile 
nations, as measured by the intergenerational difference in income 
between a father and his son, were Denmark, Norway and Finland 
(OECD, 2010, p. 185). According to the report, “redistributive and 
income support policies are associated with greater intergenerational 
social mobility” (OECD, 2010, p. 184). Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show that in 
more social democratic economies, like Sweden, which have followed 
a very different macroeconomic model, there is more equality and less 
poverty while still maintaining a competitive and vibrant economy. 
Table 3.4 shows the percentage of the population that has incomes 
below the poverty line. Table 3.5 uses the Gini coefficient to measure 
inequality. A Gini of zero would represent complete equality, where 
every person in the country received the same income. A Gini of 1 
would represent complete inequality, where one person received the 
entire income in a nation. So, the closer the Gini is to zero the more 
equal the income distribution in a country.
The US also scores very poorly in terms of social justice. In 2011, the 
OECD report on social justice ranked the US 27 out of 31 countries, 
ahead of only Greece, Chile, Mexico and Turkey. (OECD, 2011, p. 
8). The score was compiled by looking at how well counties fared on 
six measures: poverty prevention, access to education, labor market 
inclusion, social cohesion and non-discrimination, health, and inter-
generational justice. The US didn’t rate very highly on any of these 
measures. Its best ranking was a modest 16th in both labor market 
inclusion and social cohesion. It was a particular laggard (29th) in the 
area of poverty, which the OECD described as “alarming” (OECD, 
2011, p. 7).
The top five places in the social justice ranking went to Iceland, 
Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. Further, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) Commission on Social Determinants of Health 
argued that “Nordic countries, for example, have followed policies that 
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encouraged equality of benefits and services, full employment, gender 
equity and low levels of social exclusion.” This, said the Commission, 
“is an outstanding example of what needs to be done everywhere.” 
According to Sir Michael Marmot, the Commission Chair, health 
policy needs to focus on “creating the conditions for people to be 
empowered, to have freedom to lead flourishing lives” (WHO, 2008). 
You might call it the triumph of the Nords.
Table 3.4  Poverty rates before and after taxes and transfers:  
total population
Country Mid-1980s Mid-2000s
 Before After Before After
Sweden 26% 3% 27% 5%
United States 26% 18% 26% 17% 
Note: The poverty rate is defined as 50 percent of the current median income.
Source: OECD StatExtracts Income Distribution—Poverty.
Table 3.5  Gini coefficients before and after taxes and transfers:  
total population
Country Mid-1980s Mid-2000s
 Before After Before After
Sweden 0.4 0.2 0.43 0.23
United States 0.4 0.34 0.46 0.38 
Source: OECD StatExtracts Income Distribution Inequality.
Conclusion
It is not accurate to say that the economic hard times were a result 
of the 2008 crisis. In the US prior to 2008, businesses, and the rich 
people who own them, did very well but the rest of the nation suffered 
through what passed for an economic recovery after the malaise of 
the 1970s. Inequality increased and wages stagnated. Families worked 
longer hours and fell further in debt. A more accurate statement would 
be that even during the boom period, the spoils of economic growth 
were going to a very few people who were already very well to do, 
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while everyone else either gained very little or were actually worse off. 
Moreover, the very neoliberal policies that created this inequality and 
income stagnation played a crucial role in weakening the economy so 
that it was susceptible to crisis. This catalogue of failure is the legacy of 




Milton Friedman: The Godfather of 
the Age of Instability and Inequality
Introduction
Milton Friedman died on November 16, 2006 at the age of 94. 
When people pass away, they are usually feted with hyperbolic praise, 
but Friedman’s posthumous accolades were remarkable even by the 
standards of the most glowing of obituaries. The Economist described 
him as “the most influential economist of the second half of the 20th 
century … possibly of all of it” (The Economist, 2006a). Fed Chair Alan 
Greenspan said “There are many Nobel Prize winners in economics, 
but few have achieved the mythical status of Milton Friedman” 
(Formaini, 2002). One of the most transcendent assessments came 
from a conservative finance professor at the University of Chicago, 
John H. Corchane, who claimed that “he was in part responsible for 
ending inflation, giving us 20 years of growth and lifting six billion 
people out of poverty” (Waldie, 2008). Even well-known liberal Paul 
Krugman conceded that “I regard him as a great economist and a great 
man” (Krugman, 2007e).
Friedman is most closely associated with the University of Chicago, 
where he spent most of his career. In fact the term “the Chicago School” 
of economics has come to describe not only the economics department 
at Chicago but also a certain kind of economist, particularly inclined to 
follow in Friedman’s footsteps. Not coincidentally, there is considerable 
overlap between the two. His influence in Chicago was such that after 
his death the economics department named a prestigious research 
institute in his honor: the Milton Friedman Institute for Research 
in Economics (in 2011 it was merged with the Becker Center on 




Yet, it would be a gross understatement to claim that Friedman 
had a few critics. Naomi Klein’s bestseller The Shock Doctrine (2008) 
singled out Friedman as the chief villain among the rogue’s gallery of 
the economics profession. An entire chapter of her book is dedicated 
to Friedman and the Chicago School’s association with the brutal 
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet and other bits of nastiness in Latin 
America. Another book, Not So Free to Choose (Rayack, 1987) (a take 
on Friedman’s famous Free to Choose) is entirely dedicated to demon-
strating that Friedman played fast and loose with real-world evidence 
in order to defend the indefensible consequences of his economic 
policies. After the economic crisis of 2008, self-declared centrist and 
MIT economic legend Paul Samuelson crowed, “today we see how 
utterly mistaken was the Milton Friedman notion that a market system 
can regulate itself ” (Samuelson, 2009). Joan Robinson of Cambridge 
University offered what perhaps, to a Friedman supporter, would be the 
most unkind cut of all, stating that “insofar as he offers an intelligible 
theory, it is made up of elements borrowed from Keynes” (Robinson, 
1971, p. 87). Krugman also moderated his “great man” eulogy with 
“Friedman was wrong on some issues, and sometimes seemed less than 
honest with his readers” (Krugman, 2007e).
Although there is considerable debate about whether his ideas were 
effective or desirable, there is much less controversy about whether 
they were influential. In the words of Krugman:
A number of economists played important roles in the great revival 
of classical economics between 1950 and 2000, but none was as 
influential as Milton Friedman … By the century’s end, classical 
economics had regained much though by no means all of its former 
dominion, and Friedman deserves much of the credit. (Krugman, 
2007e)
Most scholars see Friedman as working in two very different spheres: 
academic and policy. His more academic work revolved around his 
macroeconomic theories on the permanent income hypothesis and 
adaptive expectations. It was in this area that he received the Nobel 
Prize in 1976 “for his achievements in the fields of consumption 
analysis, monetary history and theory and for his demonstration of the 
complexity of stabilization policy” (Nobelprize.org, 1976). His public 
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policy pronouncements were a relentless assault on what he saw to 
be iron-fisted governmental interference with the liberty of the free 
market. According to Krugman, “there was Friedman the economist’s 
economist, who wrote technical, more or less apolitical analyses 
of consumer behavior and inflation … [and the] looser, sometimes 
questionable logic of his pronouncements as a public intellectual” 
(Krugman, 2007e).
So, there are three opinions on how to interpret Friedman’s legacy. 
One preposterously suggests that he was responsible for lifting 6 billion 
(almost everyone on earth) from poverty. The second portrays him as 
a rigorous academic economist whose enthusiasm for the free market 
led him to abandon his lofty academic principles while tilting at the 
windmills of government intervention in the realm of public debate. 
And a third holds him responsible for his contribution to the instability, 
inefficiency and inequality that characterized the past 35 years or so 
of US economic history. We will argue that, of these options, the third 
comes closest to the truth. Although Friedman’s academic ideas were 
dressed up in the impressive rigor that was so attractive to the economic 
discipline, there was very little to distinguish it from his more policy-
oriented ideas, Krugman’s claims notwithstanding. They were all 
part and parcel of the same project: to remove business-constraining 
government from the economic realm. Despite Friedman’s claims 
about the broadly distributed benefits of these ideas, in practice they 
had the impact of contributing significantly to the 35-year ascendance 
of the business class and the concomitant economic problems that we 
summarized in Chapter 3.
Friedman’s Macroeconomics or the Big Picture
The Great Depression, like most other periods of severe 
unemployment, was produced by government mismanagement 
rather than by any inherent instability of the private economy. 
(Milton Friedman, 1962, p. 38)
Friedman’s theoretical macroeconomic world rests on three interrelated 
ideas: the significance of how much money is in circulation, which is 
the responsibility of the state (monetarism), the theory that workers 
and firms form their expectations of wages and prices based on their 
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past experience with inflation or deflation (adaptive expectations), and 
the idea that an economy has a rate of unemployment to which it will 
tend in the long run (the natural rate of unemployment). 
The interrelationship between these concepts can be seen in 
Friedman’s explanation of the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
According to Friedman (and Anna Schwartz, the co-author of A 
Monetary History of the United States), the root cause of the Great 
Depression (rebranded as the Great Contraction in Friedman and 
Schwartz) was a decline in the money supply. The basic story is that 
when banks failed in the US, the reduction in the money supply caused 
prices to fall—deflation (Friedman & Schwartz, 1963). The downside 
of falling prices is difficult to explain to people for whom it is a rarely 
experienced phenomenon. Recent economic history is characterized 
almost exclusively by some level of inflation, with deflation only rearing 
its head under extreme economic duress, and even then, only for very 
brief periods of time. However, Friedman’s adaptive expectations 
theory implied that deflation can lead to economic collapse.
The fundamental problem with deflation, according to Friedman, 
was that it sent out the wrong signal to workers in the labor market. 
Friedman (and co-author Edmund Phelps of Columbia University) 
argue that workers know their exact nominal wage because they 
can see their paycheck, but they suffer what economists call “money 
illusion” because they form their expectations about price changes 
based on past price behavior, when prices were higher. This leads them 
to believe that the purchasing power of their wages (their real wage) 
has gone down when their nominal wages drop, but, in fact, it has 
not because prices are also falling (Gordon, 1979 [1976]; Modigliani, 
1977). Soured on the labor market by this apparent decline in real 
wages, workers chose to quit their jobs in large number. Friedman’s 
theory of the Great Depression was summarized by economist John 
Harvey of Texas Christian University:
Workers, not realizing because of money illusion that the cost of living 
has declined (and that firms’ offer is therefore not unreasonable), 
quit their jobs. And that, apparently, is how unemployment rose to 
25% in the 1930s: the money supply fell, lowering prices, leading 
firms to offer lower wages, and causing workers to voluntarily quit 
their jobs! (Harvey, 2012)
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There are a few important implications of this interpretation of the 
Depression (and other, similar but less catastrophic downturns). First, 
unemployment was voluntary. Workers became unemployed because 
they quit their jobs or reduced their work hours, thinking that their 
real wage had declined. This is very much a vision of the labor market 
characterized by voluntary decisions by workers. If they think that their 
wages are falling below an acceptable level, they simply choose not to 
work. A second implication is that government was responsible for the 
economic crisis. While it was private for-profit bank failures that led to 
the decline in the money supply, “the Federal Reserve system forced or 
permitted a sharp reduction in the monetary base,” so that the quantity 
of money fell by one-third (Friedman, 1968). For Friedman, it was 
the government’s job to bail out the economy by providing enough 
money to avoid deflation so that workers wouldn’t suffer from money 
illusion—an example of Robinson’s view of Friedman relying on 
Keynes. (For critics, it is ironic that Friedman—the great free market 
advocate—proposed a statist solution to the Great Depression.) 
Government inaction and confused, self-destructive workers caused 
the Great Depression. Third, Friedman and Schwartz presented 
an interpretation on the causes of the Depression to rival Keynes’s 
once dominant theory that the economic failure was brought on by a 
decline in demand. While Keynes argued that depressions could not 
be rectified by monetary policy alone, but required the strong action of 
fiscal policy, along with a long list of regulations, including restrictions 
on trade, Friedman’s theory implied that intrusive government action 
to stimulate demand and regulate the economy was unnecessary. The 
only tonic necessary was sensible monetary policy.
The same theoretical constructs can be used to explain why the 
monetary authority should not use active monetary policy to lower the 
unemployment rate. According to Friedman, there exists a “natural” 
rate of unemployment in the labor market that will result in wages 
rising at a “normal” rate. Expansionary monetary policy can push 
employment above the natural rate by decreasing interest rates, which 
will encourage investment and consumption causing employment and 
output to increase. For Friedman, this increase in employment can 
only be temporary and at the price of increased inflation. In the short 
run, each individual firm will be under the impression that the increase 
in general demand is an increase in demand particular to its product 
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and respond by producing more and selling at a higher price. It also 
means that the firm is willing to pay higher nominal wages to attract 
labor. As long as employers think that the increase in price of their 
product is greater than the nominal wage increases, they will think that 
their profits are increasing and be willing to hire more workers and 
produce more output. Workers see this increased nominal wage and, 
under the money illusion, falsely see it as increase in their real wage 
since they base their price expectations on lower past prices rather 
than the new higher ones, so they are willing to work more in response 
to the increased demand for their labor (Friedman, 1976). Of course, 
this positive impact on output and employment is only temporary. As 
workers come to realize that the price level is rising along with their 
nominal wages, they will incorporate this new information into their 
bargaining and ask for higher nominal wage increases. Firms will also 
realize that what they took for an increase in their own price is, in 
fact, a general price increase. Firms will then reduce their output and 
workers will reduce their supply of labor, returning the economy to the 
“natural” rate of unemployment but at a higher price level. So, in the 
long term, expansionary monetary policy will only increase the price 
level (Friedman, 1968). As a result, monetary policy should create 
a stable level of inflation, not attempt to influence employment or 
output: “Money matters a great deal for the development of nominal 
magnitudes, but not over the long run for real magnitudes” (Friedman 
& Heller, 1969, p. 47). The general conclusion is that “fine tuning has 
been oversold” (Friedman & Heller, 1969, p. 46).
An active fiscal policy is even less palatable for Friedman. The 
Keynesian fiscal prescription for a recession is for the government to 
run a deficit. Since this requires government borrowing, Friedman 
argued that it would force up interest rates by increasing the demand 
for loans. The increased interest rate would then cause a decrease 
in private-sector activity. Keynesian stabilization policy is actually 
counter-productive. Deficit spending is designed to stimulate the 
economy, but it causes the contraction of the private sector. The 
opposite is true when the government runs a surplus: interest rates fall 
and the private sector expands (Friedman & Heller, 1969, pp. 51–3). 
This creates a kind of stabilization policy nihilism for Friedman. 
Changes in aggregate demand through either monetary or fiscal policy 
have no long-term impact on output or employment. Any expansion 
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of the economy beyond Friedman’s natural rate will, over the long 
term, only result in higher inflation, not higher output or employment.
Friedman is careful to point out that the natural rate is not 
“immutable or unchangeable,” but is determined by economic 
structures in things like the labor market and the degree of competition 
or monopoly. For example, the natural rate of unemployment is 
increased by “legal minimum wage rates … and the strength of labor 
unions” (Friedman, 1968, p. 9). He blamed the stagflation of the 1970s 
in the US on an increase in the natural rate because of the entry of 
more marginally employed workers, like women and teenagers, and 
the increase in “assistance to unemployed persons” (Friedman, 1976, 
p. 273). Lowering the non-inflationary level of unemployment can 
only be done by improving these “real” elements of the economy like 
eliminating unions, unemployment insurance and minimum wages, 
not with a Keynesian stabilization policy.
Friedman’s Macro: What’s Wrong
There are a number of problems with Friedman’s version of the 
macroeconomy. These are not merely the careless mistakes of an 
economist without a particular predisposition to certain kinds of 
economic policies. Rather, they create precisely the kind of systematic 
bias in the economy that tilted so many of the economic rules in favor 
of the corporate world. Who gains and who loses from Friedman’s 
macroeconomic world can be seen by looking at the nature of 
unemployment and policy implications of the natural rate.
The preceding section demonstrated that, for Friedman, changes in 
employment are caused by workers’ decisions about how much they 
are willing to work for any given real wage. Unemployment increases 
during a recession because the lower perceived real wage makes people 
less willing to work. It is this mechanism that causes unemployment to 
increase during a recession. This generates the highly counter-intuitive 
implication that in recessions workers quit their jobs in high numbers. 
It also implies that the rate at which firms lay off workers should not 
change in economic downturns. Neither of these implications stands 
up to even casual empirical scrutiny. In fact, voluntary quits in the 
US actually decline during recessions while layoffs by firms increase—
fairly intuitive facts that run directly counter to Friedman’s theory of 
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the macroeconomy (Gordon, 1979 [1976], p. 274). If they were not 
taken so seriously in the economic world, these conclusions would 
be laughable and they certainly fail on any test of common sense or 
empirical support.
The insistence on voluntary unemployment also reflects Friedman’s 
misplaced belief that all factors of production have equal clout. In 
Friedman’s theory, workers have the luxury to reduce their hours of 
work or stay home altogether when they think that their real wages 
are declining. While this might be true for a fortunate few, this inter-
pretation of the labor market does not accord particularly well with 
most people’s experience. Most workers have little option but to sell 
their labor on the market. They own no other productive resources 
and have little cash set aside to voluntarily reduce their labor hours. 
Employees’ lack of power in the labor market is especially great during 
Box 4.1 Myopic paddling
It was not only Friedman’s counter-intuitive claim that unemployment 
was voluntary, even in an economic downturn, which failed to represent 
the real world particularly accurately. The Friedman-Phelps characteri-
zation of job search under adaptive expectations must also look a little 
unfamiliar to most workers. According to Northwestern University 
economist Robert Gordon:
The lack of reality in the standard new microeconomics model is 
vividly illustrated in Phelps’s well known “island parable”, in which 
individual firms are represented by separate islands lacking any 
inter-island communications link. Since the employee does not learn 
instantaneously of wage rates on other islands, but rather gains the 
information only after a slow trip by raft … if a firm offers lower wages 
because of a lack of demand some workers quit on the assumption that 
their situation is unique, boarding their rafts to sample wage offers on 
other islands. Only after several inter-island voyages do they realize 
that the recession-induced decline in demand is universal and that 
they will be no better off in a new job than in the original firm.
Workers do not really behave like this. For example, modern communi-
cations make it possible for workers to search for alternative employment 
“without any prior need to quit … Real world employees are not nearly 
as mindless as the parable suggests” (Gordon, 1979 [1976], pp. 273–4).
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economic downturns when unemployment is higher. It is this rising 
unemployment, and the resulting reduction in worker’s power that 
causes the reduction in wages. This suggests a very different cause and 
effect than that proposed by Friedman. According to Friedman, it is 
the perception of falling real wages that causes workers to withdraw 
their services from the labor market, causing unemployment. In reality, 
it is unemployment caused by involuntary layoffs that causes the 
decline in real wages.
While conceptualizing unemployment as voluntary puts a false 
positive veneer on people being out of work, the concept of the natural 
rate of unemployment surreptitiously tilted the labor market in favor 
of corporations in two ways. First, Friedman insisted that policy 
makers “cannot know what the natural rate is” (Friedman, 1968, p. 10), 
and should therefore, avoid using full employment stabilization policy 
for fear of pushing the unemployment rate below the natural rate and 
sparking inflation. This was important in the context of the post-1970s 
economy, when US firms were attempting to reduce their labor costs 
as one means of restoring profitability. When unemployment rates 
soared during the 1980s, in part because of very tight monetary policy, 
the concept of the natural rate was used to justify prolonged periods 
of high unemployment in the cause of inflationary discipline to the 
out of work citizenry. Essentially, the natural rate was taken to be 
whatever the unemployment rate was at the time (Palley, 2006). High 
unemployment rates, which lasted until the mid-1990s, were one of 
the factors that created stagnating wages for workers, as described in 
Chapter 3.
Second, the “real” economic factors that would cause the natural 
rate to be higher were precisely those that favored workers in the 
labor market. While Friedman identified a number of policies outside 
the labor market that would increase the natural rate, like increased 
corporate concentration, it was labor market policy, particularly 
policies that protected workers, which he targeted repeatedly as being 
problematic. According to Friedman, labor unions, unemployment 
benefits and minimum wages all push up workers’ earnings making 
more unemployment necessary to combat inflation. Economist Robert 
Pollin suggests that the “natural rate” is really a social phenomenon 
measuring the class strength of working people: “class conflict is the 
specter haunting the analysis of the natural rate” (Pollin, 1998). This 
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is nicely demonstrated in a paper by Robert Gordon, which estimated 
the natural rate (it came to be called the NAIRU—non-accelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment) decline in the US between the 1960s 
and the 1990s. He speculated that
… the late 1960s were a time of labor militancy, relatively strong 
unions, a relatively high minimum wage and a marked increase in 
labor’s share in national income. The 1990s have been a time of 
labor peace, relatively weak unions, a relatively low minimum wage 
and a slight decline in labor’s income share. (Gordon, 1997, p. 30)
In the language of the natural rate, limiting the strength of working 
people will create lower inflation and higher levels of employment.
The US economy since the 1980s does provide a handy natural 
experiment to test the distributional impact of Friedman’s policies to 
improve the natural rate. Since 1980, the US has enacted many of 
Friedman’s natural rate-decreasing policies. Income supports to the 
poor have been reduced, unionization rates have fallen and tax rates 
on the rich have dropped. As Chapter 3 documented, the result has 
been a dramatic increase in inequality between rich and poor in the 
US since 1980. Even among the relatively wealthy, the big after-tax 
income gains have gone to the very upper echelons of the income 
distribution. These trends are no coincidence given the fact that wages 
have not kept pace with productivity in the US.
Countries that have the kind of policies that Friedman argues 
should increase the natural rate, like Sweden, have fared no worse 
in terms of its macroeconomic performance than countries, like the 
US. Most workers in Sweden are unionized, the unemployment 
insurance benefits are far more generous and the tax system transfers 
far more income from rich to poor. Yet, as we showed in Chapter 3, 
these countries rank at the very top of the World Economic Forum 
(WEF) competitiveness ranking and fare as well as the US in terms 
of economic growth.
Friedman’s macroeconomic approach also directs attention away 
from theories (like those of Keynes) that suggest capitalist economies 
have a tendency to stagnation and towards the idea that problems are 
caused by interventions in the market like government and unions. 
If not for their ideological usefulness, dressed up as they are in the 
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language and technique of the mainstream economist, his ideas would 
not pass either predictive tests or the test of logic. Friedman’s mac-
roeconomic ideas provided considerable intellectual justification for 
abandoning labor market protection for workers and Keynesian full 
employment policies. These changes resulted in income stagnation for 
workers, greater inequality, and more instability after the 1970s, but 
also resulted in a restoration of profitability.
Friedman’s Microeconomics: Market Fundamentalism
The overarching theme behind all of Friedman’s work, but which is 
particularly explicit in his more public policy writing in microeconom-
ics, is that an economy based on the market will float along happily 
on the waves of progress, while one hampered by the lead weight 
of government will sink like a stone. This is based on two comple-
mentary propositions. First, that the market delivers results that are 
superior to any other institutional arrangement. We might call this the 
“government is unnecessary” proposition. Second, that even when the 
results of the market are not completely satisfactory, any intervention 
by the government to rectify the situation will result in an inferior, 
rather than superior outcome. We might call this the “government is 
harmful” proposition. The market is superior to the state with respect 
to the provision of goods and services because it is competitive, driven 
by the need to respond to the demand of consumers for low-cost, 
high-quality goods and services. The state has no such competitive 
incentive structure and so it will produce less efficiently.
Government is Unnecessary
While the market is not perfect, and will inevitably have a few bad 
apples lurking in the barrel, according to Friedman, “on the whole, 
market competition, when it is permitted to work, protects the 
consumer better than do the alternative government mechanisms that 
have been increasingly superimposed on the market” (Friedman & 
Friedman, 1990, p. 223). His answer to the question “who protects the 
consumer?” is the competition of the market. Offering poor service, 
substandard fare, or dangerous products is tantamount to business 
suicide in a market in which firms eagerly compete for customers. 
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Only by selling superior goods at reasonable prices will businesses 
attract the custom necessary to thrive in the cut-throat world of the 
free market: “It is in the self-interest of the businessman to serve the 
consumer” (Friedman & Friedman, 1990, p. 223).
For those that argue that the consumer needs to be protected by 
government in situations where the purchasing decision is fraught 
with complexity or potential safety issues, Friedman argues that this 
is better done through the private sector. While many purchases, like 
consumer electronics, are a bit complicated for the average person to 
wrap their head around, the private sector has developed mechanisms to 
protect the purchaser. Department stores, with reputations to protect, 
will carefully screen out poor merchandise. Further, the importance of 
branding for large firms makes it unlikely that they would compromise 
their expensively assembled and carefully cultivated brand with 
shoddy products. Finally, “Still another device is the private testing 
organization … For the consumer there are private organizations like 
… Consumer Reports” to which consumers can turn to determine 
product quality (Friedman & Friedman, 1990, p. 224).
His belief in the disciplinary mechanism of the market and 
sovereignty of the consumer is perhaps nowhere better, and more con-
troversially, displayed than when he argued against any professional 
licensing arrangement, including physicians. According to Friedman, 
anyone should be able to set out their shingle as a doctor and the iron 
laws of demand and supply should soon separate the skilled surgeon 
from the butchering hacker: “Insofar as he [the doctor] harms only his 
patient, that is simply a question of voluntary contract and exchange 
between patient and physician. On this score there is no ground for 
intervention” (Friedman, 1962, p. 147). Doctors of poor quality will 
soon find themselves without any patients and be forced out of the 
profession. Further, government intervention is unnecessary in health 
insurance since “the costs of ordinary medical care are well within the 
means of most American families. Private insurance arrangements 
are available to meet the contingency of an unusually large expense” 
(Friedman & Friedman, 1990, p. 115). Not only will competition 
ensure a safe and cost-effective supply of medical services, there 
is no case for anything other than a privatized health care system. 
Consumer protection merely requires competition. If this is true in the 
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complicated world of medicine, it must also hold in other areas like 
drugs, food and other areas of consumer safety.
Friedman uses the same logic of voluntary exchange and competition 
to argue that the labor market produces efficient and fair results. The 
answer to the question “Who protects the worker?” is not unions 
or government regulation, but other employers: “Their demand for 
his services makes it in the self-interest of his own employer to pay 
him the full value of his work” (Friedman & Friedman, 1990, p. 246). 
For Friedman, the labor market is not characterized by an unequal 
power relationship between employer and employee, but is a voluntary 
exchange between equals. This is nicely demonstrated by his insistence 
on the symmetrical possibility of exploitation in the labor market: 
“An employer is protected from exploitation by his employees by the 
existence of other workers whom he can hire” (Friedman & Friedman, 
1990, p. 246).
For Friedman, a market economy, characterized by economic 
freedom, will likely have the pleasant side-effect of greater income 
equality, but equality should not be a driving principle of economic 
policy. The essence of this argument is that inequality, and the 
incentives that go with it, are crucial in sending the right signals to 
economic actors. Jobs that are valued by society should pay well in order 
to attract more people to that field. As long as people have a reasonable 
opportunity to succeed, defined by having very few state-imposed 
limits on what they can do to make money, then equality of outcome 
is not particularly important.
The liberal will therefore distinguish sharply between equality of 
rights and equality of opportunity, on the one hand, and material 
equality or equality of outcome on the other. He may welcome the 
fact that a free society in fact tends toward greater material equality 
than any other yet tried. But he will regard this as a desirable 
by-product of a free society, not its major justification. (Friedman, 
1962, p. 195)
Government is Harmful
While Friedman concedes that there will be occasions where the 
free market does not function perfectly, he finds that government 
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intervention to correct for these rare problems is likely to do more harm 
than good. This is true in virtually any situation, from intervention 
in the price of products, to regulatory attempts to ensure consumer 
safety. Returning to the example of medicine, Friedman argues that 
government-imposed requirement for doctors to receive a certain 
level of training (like any kind of mandatory professional standards, 
from requiring that welders receive some sort of certification of their 
competence, to having lawyers pass the bar) is little more than a barrier 
to enter the industry, reducing competition and, therefore, forcing 
up the price to the consumer with artificially created restrictions of 
supply. Freidman claims that “licensure has reduced both the quantity 
and quality of medical practice” (Friedman, 1962, p. 158).
Friedman makes much the same claim for any intervention in the 
market. Regulatory agencies designed to protect the consumer are 
not only unnecessary, but also actually injurious. The FDA “has done 
more harm by retarding progress in the production and distribution 
of valuable drugs than it has done good by preventing the distribution 
of harmful of ineffective drugs” (Friedman & Friedman, 1990, p. 206). 
Similar concerns are expressed about the Consumer Products Safety 
Commission (CPSC) and the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA). The general point is that the increase in costs necessary to 
meet what will inevitably be an overly fussy and bureaucratic pre-
cautionary apparatus will create burdens that far outweigh any slight 
gains in improved safety.
Part of the reason for government’s lack of success in improving 
the outcomes of the market is that its regulatory apparatus would be 
“captured” by the very business interests that it was developed to oversee. 
In an argument that, not coincidentally, was adopted and refined by the 
public choice school which is discussed in Chapter 5, Friedman argued 
that, “the natural history of government intervention” (Friedman & 
Friedman, 1990, p. 201) followed a very predictable path: a problem 
with the free market gives rise to a popular movement pressuring the 
government for intervention, resulting in the passage of some law. The 
reformers turn to some new cause and the truly interested parties (the 
firms in the industry) go to work to ensure that the laws are used in 
their benefit: “In the end the effects are precisely the opposite of the 
objectives of the reformers … (Friedman & Friedman, 1990, p. 201).
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We will return to the problems with the idea of regulatory capture 
in Chapter 5, but for now we will merely comment that although in 
the US, especially after the 1980s, the business class certainly captured 
the regulatory apparatus of the state, there is nothing inevitable in 
this outcome. Nor is the Friedman solution to capture, having no 
regulation, particularly helpful.
Predictably, Friedman is also very dismissive of the results in 
industries that feature public ownership or substantial government 
intervention. In contrasting the organizations, like the Post Office, that 
Americans find most wretched, with those, like consumer electronics, 
that they find most satisfactory, Freidman concludes, “the shoddy 
products are all produced by government or government-regulated 
industries” (Friedman & Friedman, 1990, p. 192). Returning to the 
health care example, government-provided universal health insurance, 
as is practiced in countries like Canada, would not decrease medical 
costs, “at least until someone can find some example of an activity 
that is conducted more economically by government than by private 
enterprise” (Friedman & Friedman, 1990, p. 115).
The general conclusion is that, for Friedman, freedom of exchange, 
narrowly defined as the lack of coercion, is a fundamental right to 
be championed as an end to itself. Conveniently, this important 
freedom is also instrumental in providing the greatest level of broadly 
distributed material benefits. The prosperity generated by individual 
self-interest in a competitive market, however, can be jeopardized by 
unwarranted interference with the market:
The United States has continued to progress; its citizens have become 
better fed, better clothed, better housed, and better transported; 
class and social distinctions have narrowed; minority groups have 
become less disadvantaged; popular culture has advanced by leaps 
and bounds. All this has been the product of the initiative and drive 
of individuals co-operating through the free market. Government 
measures have hampered not helped this development. We have 
been able to afford and surmount these measures only because of 
the extraordinary fecundity of the market. The invisible hand has 
been more potent for progress than the visible hand for retrogres-
sion. (Friedman, 1962, pp. 199–200)
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Friedman’s Microeconomics: What’s Wrong
Friedman’s animosity to regulation is based on the claim that it is 
competition, not the government, which produces the best economic 
results. A complete accounting of the economic debate that rages 
around Friedman’s claims in all of these areas is beyond the scope of 
this work, but it would be fair to say that his assertions are far from 
established fact. In this section, we will provide a few specific examples, 
in the consumer market, and in innovation, which should cast 
considerable doubt on Friedman’s insistence that it is the private sector 
that is the wind that fills the economy’s sails while the government is 
nothing but dead weight.
Turning first to the consumer market, Friedman contends that 
government oversight is unnecessary and harmful. Yet in a study of 
several industries, the very private testing organization that he put 
forward as a more desirable substitute for government regulation, 
Consumer Report (CR), declared that decreased regulation had resulted 
in markets with large price increases, worse product choice and 
reduced safety. Its conclusion was that, on balance, consumers have lost 
ground since deregulation began in the telephone, banking, electricity, 
television and airline industries. Overall consumer prices often fell 
after deregulation, but they were falling for decades before, typically 
at a faster rate. There has been a decrease in consumer choice in the 
airline, banking and television industries, where fewer companies 
control a larger share of the market than prior to deregulation. 
Banking has been a disaster, with 1,600 bank failures in the United 
States, even before the financial crash of 2008 with its massive and 
growing cost to taxpayers. Deregulated airlines have given customers 
more connections, delays, cramped seats and uncomfortable planes. 
According to CR, the marketplace has become more adversarial toward 
consumers. The absence of strict rules has inspired aggressive tactics 
and enabled sellers to gain disproportionate power over buyers. CR 
recommended more regulation and vigorous anti-trust enforcement 
in order to protect consumers from increasingly rapacious business 
practices (Consumer Reports, 2002).
Perhaps the best example of Friedman’s insistence that the private 
sector is universally superior to government is in the area of health 
care. This is an industry in which consumers are poorly equipped to 
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determine for themselves what care they need, creating considerable 
asymmetry between the expert provider of health care services and 
the less informed patient. When a physician recommends surgery, 
prescribes a drug, or requires a test, few patients are sufficiently 
confident of their medical knowledge to go against their doctor’s orders. 
In a private, for-profit health system, this creates ample opportunity 
for what is called “supply-induced demand”—the idea that health care 
providers are in a position to have consumers use more services than 
they might genuinely need. Friedman downplays the problems that 
this will create for the consumer in the market for health, as he does 
with any other market with this type of difficulty, yet in health care, 
public or non-profit provision has been found to be superior to the 
private, for-profit sector.
While the debate about the merits of a public vs. a private system 
continues to rage, it is very inconvenient for Friedman’s position that 
the US, which relies most heavily on a private health care system, has 
the highest costs and the worst health indicators among the wealthy 
nations. US life expectancy is 79.6 years. According to the 2010 United 
Nations Human Development Index, this places it behind 28 other 
countries, following Greece and Liechtenstein and just above Costa 
Rica, Portugal and Cuba. In terms of mortality rates for children 
under five, it ranks a worrying 46th, just behind the UAE and above 
Chile (United Nations, 2011). In 2015, the US spent 17 percent of 
its GDP on health care. This is the highest of the 35 countries in the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
by a considerable margin. The country ranked second, Switzerland, 
spent 11.5 percent and the OECD average was a much more modest 9 
percent. The combined level of public and private health care spending 
per person is also much higher in the US than any other country. The 
US spent $9,451 per person, while the second highest nation, again 
Switzerland, spent only $6,935 and the OECD average was $3,740 
(OECD, 2016).
These broad measures, suggesting that the private health system in 
the US produces worse health results at a greater cost, are reinforced 
by more direct evidence from health insurance. The overhead cost 
of administrating a private, multi-payer system is generally much 
larger than a single-payer public system. In the US, this waste has 
been estimated at $400 billion (Freeman, 2009; see also Congressional 
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Budget Office, 2011). Further, in 2007, prior to the Obama admin-
istration’s reform of US health care under the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), about 15–16 percent of the US population (over 40 million 
people) did not have insurance, putting the lie to Friedman’s claim 
about its affordability (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2008).
Contrary to Friedman’s claims, for-profit health care delivery is 
more expensive without delivering better care. Medicare spending 
per capita (adjusted for health characteristics) in communities 
with for-profit hospitals ($5,172) was higher and increasing faster 
compared to communities with non-profit hospitals ($4,440) in 1995 
(Silverman, et al., 1999; see also Woolhandler & Himmelstein, 1997). 
A study by Alan Sager and Deborah Socolar of the Boston University 
School of Public Health estimated that in the US “one-half of health 
spending goes to clinical and administrative waste, excess prices, and 
theft” (Sager & Socolar, 2005, p. ii).
Despite the higher costs, quality of care is not superior in for-profit 
health facilities. Studies on patients as diverse as those suffering from 
heart attacks (Shen, 2002) to those who need dialysis facilities (Garg 
et al., 1999; Devereaux et al., 2002) show that mortality rates were 
higher in for-profit care. One of the dialysis studies estimated that 
as many as 2,500 deaths each year may be due to treatment at profit, 
as opposed to non-profit facilities (Devereaux et al., 2002). Patient 
surveys also fail to reveal a preference for care in for-profit systems. 
In the 1990s, people in the US reported much lower satisfaction with 
their health care systems than did Canadians, Western Europeans and 
the Japanese (Isaacson, 1993). A 2005 survey of six wealthy nations 
found that “the US often stands out for inefficient care and errors” 
(Schoen et al., 2005). A massive survey of 82,583 Medicare patients in 
182 health plans found that non-profit health plans scored higher than 
for-profit on measures of overall quality, access to care and customer 
service (Landon et al., 2001). In sum, in a review of some 150 studies 
comparing access, quality and cost effectiveness between the two 
ownership models in health care, 18 found that for-profit centers were 
better, 88 determined that non-profits were superior and 43 concluded 
that there was no real difference (Vaillancourt & Linder, 2003).
The point here is that health care is but one example of Friedman’s 
remarkable and erroneous insistence that competition will protect 
the consumer and that government intervention can only worsen the 
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situation. It is not true in the market for health care, nor is it true in 
many other markets that suffer from any number of market imperfec-
tions, of which the information asymmetry in health care is merely 
one of many. The accompanying box demonstrates similar flaws in 
Friedman’s logic in the areas of food safety. In these circumstances, 
government intervention can actually produce superior results.
For Friedman, the economy is not a place where some groups 
have power over others. Health care is not an arena in which often 
desperate and less than fully informed patients seek the advice of 
expert physicians. Rather, consumers of medical care can evaluate 
the advice offered by doctors and make informed treatment choices. 
Box 4.2 An excerpt from Paul Krugman’s “Fear of Eating,”  
New York Times, May 21, 2007
Yesterday I did something risky: I ate a salad.
These are anxious days at the lunch table. For all you know, there 
may be E. coli on your spinach, salmonella in your peanut butter and 
melamine in your pet’s food and, because it was in the feed, in your 
chicken sandwich.
The economic case for having the government enforce rules on food 
safety seems overwhelming. Consumers have no way of knowing whether 
the food they eat is contaminated, and in this case what you don’t know 
can hurt or even kill you. But there are some people who refuse to accept 
that case, because it’s ideologically inconvenient.
I blame the food safety crisis on Milton Friedman, who called for 
the abolition of both the food and the drug sides of the F.D.A. What 
would protect the public from dangerous or ineffective drugs? “It’s in the 
self-interest of pharmaceutical companies not to have these bad things,” 
he insisted in a 1999 interview. He would presumably have applied the 
same logic to food safety (as he did to airline safety): regardless of cir-
cumstances, you can always trust the private sector to police itself.
O.K., I’m not saying that Mr. Friedman directly caused tainted spinach 
and poisonous peanut butter. But he did help to make our food less safe, 
by legitimizing what the historian Rick Perlstein calls “E. coli conserva-
tives”: ideologues who won’t accept even the most compelling case for 
government regulation.
Earlier this month the administration named, you guessed it, a “food 
safety czar.” But the food safety crisis isn’t caused by the arrangement of 
the boxes on the organization chart. It’s caused by the dominance within 
our government of a literally sickening ideology.
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Similarly, for Friedman, firms and their workers are merely equally 
powerful owners of different factors of production and earn income 
that is “different in form but not in substance” (Friedman & Friedman, 
1990, p. 20). One owns capital, the other labor and they negotiate 
a labor contract between them on mutually beneficial terms. The 
labor market is not a place of power and inequality, where employers 
are at a considerable advantage over their employees. Ignoring the 
differences in power between different forms of income serves two 
important, interrelated purposes. First, it provides a justification for 
income disparity in a society. If certain groups in society earn a great 
deal more than others, it is not because of power relationships, and 
the institutional rules that support them, that favor one group over 
another but rather, it is because those at the more affluent end of the 
income scale deserve their reward for their skill and effort. According 
to Friedman, “accumulation of wealth was the most readily available 
measure of performance” (Friedman & Friedman, 1990, p. 133). 
Second, it justifies labor market policy that does nothing to redress 
the power imbalance in the labor market. There is no need for unions, 
minimum wages, or social insurance programs in Friedman’s account 
of the labor market. Friedman hides the actual power relationships 
in the labor market behind the impersonal and merit-based guise of 
the market mechanism. The policy implications of his labor market 
theories, which are reflected in his supposedly neutral ideas of the 
natural rate, very much favor those who do very well by being on the 
employing side of the labor market. Of course, there is evidence from 
the past about the effect of unregulated markets. Before the inter-
ventions of the regulatory state were introduced, the title of Upton 
Sinclair’s famous book The Jungle (first published in 1906) was an apt 
description of the effects of the free market in food on consumers and 
workers alike. The age of regulation was the response to the ravages of 
the free market on workers, citizens and consumers.
Friedman’s claim that our material progress is the product of 
private-sector innovation in spite of the drag of the government is also 
dangerously misleading. A major theme in much of Lester Thurow’s 
work has been the necessity of recognizing market failure with respect 
to long-term investment by business. In The Future of Capitalism 
(1996), he argued that private firms will not invest sufficiently in R&D 
for two reasons. First, the investment is likely to create greater social 
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benefits than narrow private returns for the company. Second, firms 
tend to have short-term time horizons. Since the return to basic, as 
opposed to applied, science is both longer term and more uncertain, it 
is extremely unlikely that private firms could afford to undertake this 
type of research. Because governments tend to be more indifferent as 
to who reaps the benefits from investments in R&D, nor is it focused 
on its own profit, it plays an essential role in long-term investment in 
capitalist economies.
Tangible evidence on the important role of the state in innovation 
can be found by a quick glance at some of the everyday products that 
owe their existence to government funding. Maxipads, Deet bug 
repellent, permanent-press cotton, shrink-proof wool, the soybean ink 
used in USA Today, disposable diapers, frozen foods and lactose-free 
milk were all invented by the Agricultural Research Service of the US 
government (Rawe, 2004, p. 68). US federal funding was also directly 
responsible for the cross-country railroad, the exploration of space, 
atomic energy, the Internet, the Global Positioning System (GPS), 
lasers, computers, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), Teflon and 
other advanced materials and composites, communications satellites, 
jet aircraft, microwave ovens, solar-electric cells, modems, semicon-
ductors, storm windows, genetic medicine and biotechnology (Office 
of Science and Technology Policy, 2000).
Both economic theory and historical evidence suggests that there are 
holes in the claim that it is the private sector alone that is responsible for 
our economic dynamism. Government has been a crucial contributor 
to the technological advances in our economy. Further, many of these 
state-funded innovations have gone on to contribute substantially 
to the profits of private-sector firms (Mazzucato, 2013). In this one 
area, Friedman’s economic perspective actually does severe damage to 
the interests of the business class. Without government, innovation, 
productivity and economic growth would suffer dramatically.
Friedman’s commitment to profits is laid bare in his discussion 
of corporate concentration. According to Robert Van Horn of the 
University of Rhode Island, traditional conservatives, like Henry 
Simons, were greatly suspicious of the corporate world, especially when 
firms became sufficiently large that they reduced competition. Simons 
saw “monopoly in all its forms, including ‘gigantic corporations’ and 
‘other agencies for price control,’ as ‘the great enemy of democracy’” 
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(Van Horn, 2011, p. 1527). However, Friedman was more amenable 
to corporate concentration than his traditional conservative ancestors, 
arguing that even industries with a few, large firms would function in 
much the same manner as if it were competitive (Van Horn, 2011, p. 
1544). Friedman makes a distinction between problematic monopoly 
power that is caused by government mandate—with the exception of 
patents, of which he approves (Friedman, 1962, p. 127)—and more 
acceptable monopoly power caused by the “natural” functioning of the 
market. This is an interesting, and, some would argue contradictory, 
position for a man whose theories rely so heavily on competition to 
protect the consumer and worker.
Conclusion: Friedman and Profits
Friedman has a legitimate claim to be the most influential economist 
of the post-war period. Friedman, and the people that implemented 
his ideas, quite literally changed the world. His academic contributions 
to macroeconomic theory that earned him the Nobel Prize and his 
public policy recommendations were increasing influential after 1980. 
While many, like his eminent critic Krugman, separate his academic 
macroeconomics from his public policy work in microeconomics, this 
distinction is misleading. Friedman’s business-friendly ideology, which 
has been so widely adopted by governments, is remarkably consistent 
whether you examine his more theoretical work or his policy pro-
nouncements. What Friedman describes as the free market is desirable 
and any intervention in that market, impeding the actions of firms, 
is harmful.
Friedman’s macroeconomic theory rejects the Keynesian anti-
recession policy of deficit spending and low interest rates to maintain 
full employment. Moreover, he argues that a low-inflation, high-
employment economy is fostered by things like low unionization rates 
and meager unemployment insurance benefits. Following Friedman’s 
desired macroeconomic structure exacerbates the power imbalance 
to the benefit of firms and detriment of workers. Full employment, 
strong unions and higher unemployment insurance benefits all 
create more power for workers in the labor market, going some small 
way to redressing the inherent power imbalance between firms and 
their employees.
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Friedman’s animosity toward government regulation may make 
the world a place so dangerous that fellow economist Krugman is 
frightened of eating a salad, but this has some real benefits for many 
firms. Most obviously, reduced regulatory oversight will decrease the 
compliance costs for firms. Less obviously, to the extent that firms’ 
taxes fund regulatory agencies, reducing government spending on 
monitoring and enforcement will increase the after-tax income of 
business. This is consistent with many of Friedman’s other policy rec-
ommendations, like abolishing corporate income tax (1962, p. 132).
Reducing government provision of goods and services has a similarly 
one sided distributional impact. By definition, government provision 
reduces the scope of opportunities for business profit. In the US, the 
private, for-profit health insurance industry earned a healthy $10–15 
billion profit each year in the late 2000s (Freeman, 2009). When the 
government provides health insurance, as it does in Canada, there 
is one less industry in the economy in which private-sector profits 
can be made. This uneven accounting is not isolated to the health 
insurance industry. It is true every time that the government provides 
any services, from energy to jails. Conversely, when government is 
removed, this opens up avenues for firms to profit. Friedman advocates 
for broad-based privatization including education, especially at the 
post-secondary level (1962, p. 99).
Friedman argues that these policies will lead to faster economic 
growth, greater prosperity, less unemployment, more affordable 
products and better consumer safety. However, none of these claims 
can be empirically demonstrated. Rather, what these policies very 
predictably do is shift the broad policy terrain to greatly favor business.
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The Deregulationists:  
Public Choice and Private Gain
Introduction
In Chapter 4, we focused on a single author whose ideas, we argue, 
contained much of the intellectual ammunition for the revolution in 
economic policy that transformed the US after 1980. In this chapter, 
rather than focusing on one particular author, we will analyze a school 
of thought, under whose umbrella many famous economists sheltered. 
In different ways, all of these authors refined and advanced Friedman’s 
ideas on the problems of government regulation of the free market. 
Between the 1970s and 1990s, proponents of what came to be known 
as “Public Choice” sought to apply the techniques and assumptions 
that had become commonplace in economics to the political system 
(which explains the alternative name of “rational choice in politics”). 
The authors surveyed in this chapter, the most famous in this tradition, 
argue that this method allows them to examine the political world 
in a positive, scientific manner, rather than the romantic, normative 
fashion that economists had previously used to study public policy.
Three University of Chicago economists—George Stigler, Sam 
Peltzman and Gary Becker—all made forays into developing an 
economic theory of political behavior using the assumptions of 
rational choice. Although all three were known for a variety of con-
tributions in other areas, for the purposes of this chapter, it is their 
work in forging an intellectual attack on government regulation that 
is relevant. Stigler received his PhD at Chicago, like Friedman who 
he claims was a major influence (Stigler, 1982). Also like Friedman, 
Stigler was a member of the Mont Pelerin Society whose goal was 
to save the free market from the clutches of government. Stigler 
moved from university to university before settling back in Chicago 
in 1958. He received the Nobel Prize in 1982 “for his seminal studies 
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of industrial structures, functioning of markets and causes and effects 
of public regulation,” but in this context it is his work on regulation 
that is most relevant. In his obituary in the New York Times, Stigler was 
described as a pro-business conservative, albeit one who maintained 
his intellectual independence (Passell, 1991).
Becker graduated from Chicago’s PhD program in 1955 and 
joined Columbia University before returning to Chicago in 1970. 
He claimed that his decision to leave Columbia was, at least in part, 
caused by what he perceived to be the intimidation of free inquiry at 
Columbia during the student movements of the late 1960s (Becker, 
1992). Again, Friedman had a profound impact. Becker described him 
as “by far the greatest living teacher I have ever had” (Becker, 2009, 
p. 141). Becker is renowned for applying the tools of microeconom-
ics, especially the assumption of individual, maximizing rationality, to 
non-market activities such as discrimination, education, crime and 
politics. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1992 “for having extended 
the domain of microeconomic analysis to a wide range of human 
behavior and interaction, including nonmarket behavior.” He also 
received the US Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian 
award in the US, from President Bush in 2007 (University of Chicago, 
2007). Like Stigler, Becker was an unabashed opponent of what he 
viewed as government’s unwarranted intervention in the economy. In 
his final column in a regular series for Business Week, he wrote, “my first 
few economics courses taught me the power of competition, markets, 
and incentives,” and the “debilitating effects of onerous regulations in 
investment, employment, and prices.” (Becker, 2004). Also like Stigler, 
Becker was a member of conservative, free market think tanks. He was 
part of the Mt. Pelerin Society, and he joined the Hoover Institution, 
where he was one of the eight Hoover Fellows on the Defense Policy 
Board that, according to the Chicago Tribune, played “an influential 
role in pushing the Bush administration toward an invasion of Iraq” 
(Stanford University, 2001; Hedges, 2002).
Rounding out the Chicago trio, Peltzman also earned his doctorate 
at Chicago, graduating in 1965. Like Stigler, after some early career 
voyaging, he landed back at Chicago, joining the School of Business 
in 1973. Peltzman is most famous for his research pointing to the 
flaws in the regulation of specific industries, like pharmaceuti-
cals and automobiles. However, the article that we will focus on 
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most prominently in this chapter is his advancement of Stigler’s 
theory of regulation in his article, “Toward a More General Theory 
of Regulation.”
The two economists most closely associated with public choice are 
James Buchanan (who won a Nobel Prize in 1986 for his work in this 
area) and Gordon Tullock (who controversially did not).
Buchanan viewed himself as a champion of the people, railing 
against the elite institutions that constrain their freedom. Buchanan 
claimed that his resentment of the elite came from personal 
experience during World War II, where he was scorned by those from 
exclusive Northeastern universities like Harvard and Yale: “I went 
to midshipman’s school in New York. It’s a long story, but there was 
a lot of obvious discrimination against all of us who went to small 
southern colleges, despite our records” (Warsh, 1993, p. 94). This sense 
of being an outsider in the elitist world continued throughout his 
academic career, though Buchanan overcame this aversion to attend 
graduate school at the University of Chicago. He described himself 
as a “libertarian socialist” on entering the school, but had a road to 
Damascus-style conversion to dedicated free marketeer while taking 
Frank Knight’s course in price theory (Buchanan, 1999a, p. 15). On 
graduating in 1948, Buchanan bounced around several universities but 
he is most closely associated with his time at Virginia and George 
Mason universities, where the school of public choice put down insti-
tutional roots. Perhaps part of the reason that he felt himself to be 
on the outside of economics is that he has been very critical of the 
discipline’s turn toward formalized modeling and abstract theorizing, 
a trend that has turned economists into, in Buchanan’s words, 
“ideological eunuchs.” He lamented current economics’ lack of interest 
in the real issues of economic policy while focusing on more irrelevant, 
abstract concerns: “They seem to get their kicks from the discovery 
of proofs of propositions relevant only for their own fantasy lands” 
(Warsh, 1993, p. 96).
Buchanan claimed that he avoided any requests to lend his name 
to policies or causes. He would “sign no petitions, join no political 
organizations, advise no party, serve no lobbying effort” (Buchanan, 
1992, pp. 105–6). Yet, according to one biography, Buchanan has been 
“involved, directly or indirectly, in nearly every significant skirmish of 
the American tax revolt, from Propositions 1 and 13 in California, in 
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1973 and 1978, to Proposition 2 1/2 in Massachusetts, to Proposition 
6 in Michigan, to the Balanced Budget Amendment” (Warsh, 1993, p. 
94).
Buchanan’s objection to government and his sense of being an 
outsider has been carried on by his graduate students. Paul Craig 
Roberts, one of Buchanan’s students, argued that academics in the 
public choice tradition were excluded from jobs in top schools and 
had to settle for second-choice careers in policy circles, many in the 
Reagan administration during the 1980s, but also in think tanks like 
the Heritage Foundation and Cato Institute. Roberts, himself, settled 
in the Reagan White House where he was instrumental in crafting the 
1981 tax cuts (Warsh, 1993, p. 95).
Tullock, Buchanan’s slightly less influential partner in public choice, 
is an obvious addition to a book about economics but a more contro-
versial inclusion in a book about economists. Tullock only took one 
course in economics. His academic credentials come from a law degree 
in 1947 from the University of Chicago, famous for its heritage of 
resident Chicago School economists like Henry Simons (Tullock’s 
only formal economics instructor) and Ronald Coase. The Faculty 
of Law also had a close relationship with economics department 
members like George Stigler and Gary Becker.
After serving as a practicing lawyer, working for the Foreign Service, 
and teaching at the University of North Carolina, Tullock joined 
Buchanan at the University of Virginia in 1962. His own sense of 
being an outsider in the economics profession was no doubt reinforced 
when Tullock was denied promotion to full professor (three times) 
at the University of Virginia. This feeling was probably cemented in 
1986, when his co-author and co-founder Buchanan was awarded the 
Nobel (surely going some way to dispelling Buchanan’s portrayal of 
himself as an outsider in the profession), but Tullock’s name was not 
included. In what could be interpreted as either gross hubris or an 
unanticipated slight, Tullock claimed that he was under the impression 
that he was going to be given the Nobel right up to the unfortunate 
October morning when the award went to only one of the Buchanan–
Tullock tandem (Warsh, 1993, p. 98).
Like Becker, Tullock applied conventional economic assumptions 
to non-economic topics such as civil wars (Tullock, 1974) and, even 
more surprisingly, animals (Tullock, 1971). However, his most famous 
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contributions were his research in the area of public choice, which 
will be documented below, and his stewardship of the institutions 
in which public choice was centered. The journal that became the 
flagship of public choice, appropriately named Public Choice, was 
started out by Tullock under the slightly less catchy title, Papers on 
Non-Market Decision Making. According to one biographer, Tullock 
kept a remarkably tight rein on the journal’s content, often acting as 
sole reviewer for submissions. In what must have been an incredibly 
heavy workload, he “read every manuscript submitted to his journal 
and made decisions unilaterally to reject, ask the author to revise 
and resubmit, or to accept it for publication” (Shughart & Tollison, 
2015, p. 5). Further, he would tailor the stringency of the acceptance 
criteria to encourage areas that he felt were particularly interesting 
as well as fledgling academics, fundamentally altering the landscape 
of public choice through his editorial control. It is interesting that 
Public Choice gained the wide acceptance it did given these less than 
commonly accepted editorial practices and Tullock’s own penchant for 
more descriptive work compared to the mathematical formality and 
statistical modeling of most economic journals.
Tullock also founded the Center for Public Choice, the academic 
home of Public Choice. After he resigned (as did Ronald Coase for 
similar reasons) in protest over Virginia’s academic slap in the face, he 
and Buchanan (who had also resigned in protest from Virginia) joined 
forces at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute (now Virginia Tech) to 
form the Center in 1969. In 1983, Tullock, Buchanan and the Center 
packed up and moved en masse to George Mason University.
Perhaps part of the reason for the success of the Center is that it 
has been able to count on funding from some very wealthy backers. 
In the years between 2010 and 2015, the Center received donations 
from many of the usual contributors discussed earlier in the book, 
including the Scaife Foundation, Koch Foundation, Whole Foods, 
President Reagan’s chair of the Federal Trade Commission and budget 
director, Jim Miller III, and the Earhart Foundation, which has also 
funded think tanks that attempted to discredit global warming and 
anti-affirmative action campaigns at universities (Center for Study of 
Public Choice, 2014). Not coincidentally, George Mason also hosts the 
Mercatus Center, an economic think tank started with money from the 
Koch Foundation, which is still represented on its Board of Directors. 
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The Center describes itself as the “world’s premier university source 
of market oriented ideas.” It traces its intellectual ancestry to scholars 
such as “Friedrich A. Hayek, Elinor Ostrom, Douglass North, James 
Buchanan and Vernon Smith” (Mercatus Center, 2016). Mercatus has 
been described as, “the most powerful think tank you’ve never hear of,” 
by the New Yorker (Mayer, 2010). According to a Wall Street Journal 
article, when George W. Bush took office in 2001, his administration 
asked for a list of regulations that needed to be eliminated or changed. 
Mercatus submitted an impressive list of 44, 14 of which ended up on 
Bush’s ultimate “hit list” of 23, an impressive record of persuasion for 
any lobby group (Davis, 2004).
These pioneers in applying the world of rational choice to the 
political realm blazed a new trail in economics. They have created 
a lasting institutional legacy by founding the now-established field 
of public choice. However, as the biographies above suggest, and the 
analysis below will demonstrate, their ideas were not ideologically 
neutral, nor was it likely they were intended to be. Their ideas provided 
much of the intellectual justification for the decline in the protective 
role played by government.
Rational Choice in Politics: The Theory
The starting point of public choice is that the assumptions and methods 
that have served economics, particularly microeconomics, so well when 
economists study markets should not be abandoned when they turn 
to study the political system. Public choice is the study of collective 
behavior in that it analyzes the formation of group action in the public 
sector and how policy outcomes will be determined. However, its 
analytics in this area are based on the economic assumptions of meth-
odological individualism in the sense that “separate individuals are 
separate individuals and, as such, are likely to have different aims and 
purposes for the results of collective action” (Buchanan & Tullock 1999 
[1962], pp. 6–7). Generally, actors are believed to behave rationally in 
the political system (Green & Shapiro, 1996). They will undertake an 
action only when the marginal benefits of doing so are anticipated to 
outweigh the marginal costs. Becker illustrates the general assumptions 
of public choice writers: “Political equilibrium has the property that all 
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groups maximize their incomes by spending their optimal amount on 
political pressure, given the productivity of their expenditures, and the 
behavior of other groups” (Becker, 1983, p. 372).
According to public choice authors, the use of microeconomic 
assumptions creates a theory of government that improves on previous 
normative assertions about what government should do. Public choice 
brands itself as a theory of “collective choice that is in some respects 
analogous to the orthodox economic theory of markets” that has “a 
limited claim as the only positive social science” (Buchanan & Tullock 
1999[1962], p. 17). James Buchanan has suggested that public choice 
theory be interpreted as “politics without romance” (Buchanan, 1999b). 
What public choice scholars are suggesting is that prior to their con-
tributions, while the market had been subject to stern positive tests 
that identified numerous cases of market failure, the world of politics 
had been treated as idealized realm, not subject to the same rigorous 
scrutiny. As a result, government intervention was often proposed as a 
remedy for the shortcomings of the market. By subjecting government 
to the same kind of examination to which the market had been put, 
public choice authors argue that it is possible that government failure 
is at least as common as market failure (Sandmo, 1990). Government 
intervention needs to pass two hurdles. The first is to discover a case 
in which markets fail. The second is to demonstrate that government 
intervention can actually improve on the market failure. As Becker 
spelled out explicitly in an article in the late 1950s, “it may be 
preferable not to regulate economic monopolies and to suffer their 
bad effects than regulate them and suffer the effects of political imper-
fections” (Becker, 1958, p. 109). Public choice’s contribution is the 
introduction of this second hurdle, which it sees as a correction of the 
earlier scientific record, requiring a certain pragmatism in comparing 
alternative politicized institutional structures.
An early, influential example attempted to explain how regulation 
of industry emerged in a democracy (Stigler, 1971, 1974; Peltzman, 
1976; Becker, 1983, 1985). In general, this theory begins with the 
assumption that the political world is populated by three types of 
rational actors: politicians, voters, and those that join interest groups. 
Politicians are motivated through self-interest. While the specific 
utility function of the politician has been the subject of some debate, 
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a common assumption has been that politicians act as though they 
maximize votes. The politician can either attract votes by enacting 
policies favored by the voters or using interest groups’ money 
to “purchase” votes through advertising and other information-
influencing methods.
Interest groups of producers and consumers seek to convince 
politicians to grant them favorable policies in exchange for the 
provision of votes and money, the two things politicians need to get 
elected. As rational actors, members of interest groups will engage in 
these activities only if the expected benefits outweigh the costs. The 
big problem that faces any interest group is that the benefits from 
political activity, such as protective regulation or pollution-free air, 
are non-excludable. This means that any individual will benefit from 
interest group success whether they contribute to the interest group or 
not. This is the famous “free rider” problem in which individuals will 
refuse to contribute to a non-excludable good because they cannot 
be prevented from benefiting from it. Of course, the problem with 
free riding is that if everyone does it, there is less chance of interest 
group success, which has a cost to the individual. In this cost-benefit 
calculation, producer groups have inherent advantages over consumer 
groups because they are both smaller and better organized through 
pre-existing institutions like industry associations. The increasing 
costs that consumers face from any increase in prices from government 
intervention that benefits firms (like a price floor or tariff ) will only 
be a small burden for each individual person and they will be spread 
over very large numbers. Producers, by contrast, are fewer in number 
and each individual business would stand to benefit substantially from 
regulatory favors. The differing costs and benefits facing these two 
groups explain the differing amount that they are willing and able to 
spend on influencing the political system for or against regulation. As 
Peltzman (1976) was able to stress, however, the producer group will 
not entirely capture the policy process as long as the consumer is able 
to influence the politician to some extent. 
The last group specified in this theory is the voters. The 
“instrumental” model of voting assumes that people will vote to 
maximize their rational self-interest (for example, Peltzman, 1976; 
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Becker, 1983; Sjoblom, 1985).1 Since one voter’s ability to influence 
an electoral outcome is infinitesimal, the gains from voting are small. 
When gathering information is costly, a rational voter will expend 
little time or energy in this process, allowing his or her perception 
of self-interest to be swayed by the easily accessible information 
provided by politicians and interest groups (Tullock, 1967). People’s 
voting patterns under the instrumental model have been succinctly, 
if somewhat bombastically, summarized as “they vote their interest, 
as best such interest is perceived to be through the fog of rational 
ignorance, stupidity, persuasion and lies” (Rowley, 2012, p. 43).
The individual actors in the political system are assumed to act 
in the same rational fashion as individuals in a market context. The 
only difference is that the benefits and costs of the political system 
are different from those that exist in the market and so people’s 
rational, maximizing behavior will reflect that difference. The most 
obvious and crucial distinction is that it is entirely rational for voters 
to remain ignorant in the political system but to be much more fully 
informed when making market decisions, because the benefits of 
the infinitesimal influence on an election are much smaller than the 
benefits of actually purchasing something in the market. Public choice 
interest group theory treats the political system as a market in which 
favorable policies go to those with the highest demand. Although it 
is assumed that an informed, one-issue vote on a transfer from the 
voters/taxpayers to firms would invariably fail, the political system 
rarely offers either one-issue or well-informed voting. Instead, issues 
are bundled into platforms at election time and voters are “rationally” 
poorly informed. In this context, interest group expenditures, and their 
ability to influence voter decisions through information provision, 
become a crucial factor in political outcomes. While it is true that 
producers have more influence than consumers in the political system, 
this is due to their “advantage as a small group with a large per capita 
stake over the large group with more diffused interests” (Peltzman, 
1  There is also an “expressive” theory of voting in which people derive 
utility from the act of voting for a certain democratic result without the 
expectation that their vote will actually make that result come to pass. 
The authors compare this motivation to that of cheering for a team at a 
sports event. See Brennan & Lomasky, 1994; Brennan & Hamlin, 1998; 
Copeland & Laband, 2002; Laband et al., 2009.
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1976, p. 212). For public choice writers, the ability to influence 
decisions, or power, in the political system is analogous to demand 
in the market. One of the basic claims that results from public choice 
theory is that good government policies, most of which would result 
in smaller government, will be in short supply in a democracy because 
of the rational ignorance of the voters.
The assumption in this theory is that government intervention 
makes consumers worse off than they would be in a free market. This 
assumption is made more explicit in the public choice ideas of capture 
and rent seeking, which were introduced in our discussion of Friedman. 
“Capture” refers to the virtually inevitable tendency of government 
regulation to be taken over by the industry it is designed to oversee. 
Stigler applies the by now familiar idea of rationally poorly informed 
voters losing out to very determined special interests to argue that 
“as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and 
operated primarily for its benefit” (Stigler, 1971). According to Stigler, 
industry will often seek rules that restrict entry of competing firms 
rather than direct subsidies, because the latter can get diluted by new 
firms seeking to grab their share of the cash. For Stigler, examples 
abound, from licensing requirements in industries, like dentistry and 
physicians, to restrictions on imported oil. Even regulation brought in 
with the best of intentions will be turned to the benefit of the industry 
it was designed to constrain. For example, the seemingly reasonable 
weight restrictions on “motor trucking,” in place to protect wear and 
tear on roads, varies by state according to the strength of the rail lobby, 
which opposes trucking, and the supportive farming lobby. Where 
truck competes most closely with train, for example, the powerful rail 
lobby successfully limited the weight that trucks were allowed to carry 
(Stigler, 1971, p. 10).
The incentive for regulatory capture is that government intervention 
can provide substantial benefits to firms. Rent is income earned above 
what would normally be necessary to attract resources to a particular 
employment or investment. While it is possible to apply this idea to a 
number of circumstances, such as the very high incomes of professional 
athletes when their next best alternative employment would likely 
pay them a fraction of their sporting income, a great deal of public 
choice writing has focused on the extra income stemming from 
favorable government legislation. Part of the reason for the focus on 
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the government is the idea that in market environments, rents tend to 
be eroded as either firms or workers flood into lucrative sectors, which 
forces prices down (Buchanan, 1980, p. 5). It is only where barriers 
to entry exist that this natural tendency will be blocked, creating an 
incentive for firms to seek out government legislation to prohibit 
entry. The costly activity of convincing government to provide this 
protection, akin to the “royal monopoly privilege” of the mercantilist 
days of old, is termed “rent seeking” (Buchanan, 1980, pp. 7–9). By 
diverting business activity away from productive investments and 
toward wasteful lobbying activity, rent seeking creates an additional 
cost of government intervention beyond the usually counted items of 
raising tax revenue and regulatory compliance (Krueger, 1974; Tullock, 
1967, 1980, p. 17). The conclusion of both capture and rent seeking 
is that even when the government gets involved for the most noble of 
reasons, the almost inevitable outcome is that it will produce a worse 
outcome than if the market was left to its own devices.
The tendency of rent seeking to expand the size of government is 
exacerbated by the incentive structure inside the bureaucracy. Again, 
using the hallmark public choice tactic of applying the assumptions 
of rational maximization to a political context, Tullock assumed 
that pursuing bureaucrats’ own interests would most likely involve 
maximizing their incomes, promotions and other personal rewards. 
Within the incentive structure of a government bureaucracy, these 
rewards can be obtained by commanding an ever larger government 
agency. The individual bureaucratic goal would naturally lead to an 
“over-expanded” government, creating a vicious cycle of inefficiency, 
further agency growth and more inefficiency (Tullock, 1965, p. 177; 
Thompson, 2008).
A society that realizes the political system will inevitably produce 
harmful government intervention has an incentive to design constitu-
tional rules that constrain state activity. Buchanan and Tullock argue in 
favor of restrictive rules that inhibit the ability of the state to interfere 
in “human and property rights” (Buchanan & Tullock, 1999 [1962], p. 
64). Unfortunately, as far as these public choice authors are concerned, 
many Western democracies, including the US, have abandoned these 
constitutional restrictions, resulting in an undesirable increase in the 
government’s ability to create severe gains or losses for individuals. 
It would, therefore, be wise policy to place renewed restraints on 
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the legislative power of governments by creating voting procedures 
that make it more difficult to pass new intrusive rules (Buchanan & 
Tullock, 1999 [1962], p. 210).
These constitutional recommendations are one example of Buchanan 
and Tullock’s general solution to the problems of government, which 
is simply to have less government. They cast a fond eye back to the 
early days of American political economy, when the government 
represented a much smaller portion of the economy: “In an era when 
the whole of governmental activity was sharply limited … the relative 
absence of organized special interests is readily explainable” (Buchanan 
& Tullock, 1999 [1962], p. 206). Writing in his regular column for 
Businessweek, Becker made similar recommendations, arguing that 
the only way to reduce undesirable business influence on government 
was to “eliminate many of the regulations affecting economic activity” 
(Becker, 1994, p. 18).
Although public choice authors claim to bring a positive, scientific 
approach to what, they argue, had previously been the overly romantic 
view of government, it is surely no coincidence that Buchanan and 
Tullock are strongly personally opposed to state intervention of almost 
any sort. When asked what the “optimal” size of government would 
be, Buchanan responded, “Several people have tried to estimate this 
and they come out with figures like government spending at 15% of 
GDP. In the modern world it has gone to 40% or above. So we are way 
beyond the optimal, and that is easier to say than what the optimum 
is” (Buchanan, 2001). Predictably, Buchanan opposed any policy that 
expanded the size of government, including the fiscal stimulus package 
used to ease the US out of the deep recession of 2008: “we have made 
no progress toward putting limits on political leaders, who act out 
their natural proclivities without any basic understanding of what 
makes capitalism work” (Conway, 2009). This is a specific example of 
Buchanan’s long-standing animosity towards Keynesian intervention 
(a topic to which we will turn later in the book), based on its tendency 
to increase the role of government. His menu of social ills to be laid on 
the doorstep of big government, and its inflation-causing tendencies, 
is surprisingly varied, including
… a generalized erosion in public and private manners, increasingly 
liberalized attitudes toward sexual activities, a declining vitality of 
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the Puritan work ethic, deterioration in product quality, explosion 
of the welfare rolls, widespread corruption in both the private and 
the governmental sector, and, finally, observed increases in the 
alienation of voters from the political process. (Buchanan, 1999c, 
p. 67)
For Tullock, the interesting exception to this small government role is 
the military: “if you look at governmental agencies, they are too big for 
everything. Except possibly the army. The army has very pronounced 
economies of scale, you can’t really get too big” (Tullock, 2003).
In addition to his work on interest groups, Becker has also extended 
the assumptions of economic rationality to crime. In keeping with 
Becker’s research agenda to apply commonly used economic tools 
and assumptions to novel areas, his work on crime rests on the theory 
that breaking or obeying the law is a rational calculation of costs and 
benefits: “a person commits an offense if the expected utility to him 
exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and other resources 
at other activities” (Becker, 1968). This economic approach allowed 
Becker to make a number of proposals designed to deter crime by 
increasing its costs and reducing its benefits. For example, increases 
in legal income or an increase in “‘law abidingness’ due to ‘education’” 
would reduce crime. Also in keeping with conventional economic 
approaches, Becker’s theory suggests that there is an optimal level 
of punishment for criminals that would deter criminal behavior 
and minimize social harm from crime. Further, the extent to which 
violators will invest in conviction-avoiding activities will depend on 
their income. Because criminal activity is based on costs and benefits, 
high-income earners will devote considerable resources to such things 
as good lawyers or legal appeals to reduce the probability of incarcer-
ation “because the cost in lost income is very high to them” (Becker, 
1968, p. 195). Of course, the converse is true of low-income earners, 
who will spend more energy avoiding fines than prison because 
their foregone time is worth less to them (Becker, 1968, p. 196). The 
implication is that, even for similar offenses, the rich should be fined 
and the poor imprisoned. Becker’s claim for his approach is that it 




While an economic theory of crime may seem like a bit of a 
diversion in a chapter on the merits (or lack thereof ) of regulation, 
Becker’s approach has been applied to white-collar crime, which often 
involves firms (or those that make decisions within them) violating 
their governing regulations. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
US Sentencing Commission released three draft reports on corporate 
crime. The final draft was considerably different than the first. In the 
first draft, the Commission recommended a dramatic increase in the 
fines that had previously been levied on violating firms. However, 
strong corporate opposition was successful in getting these penalties 
substantially reduced by the final draft (Etzioni, 1993, p. 150). In 
addition to reducing punishments, the Commission provided a list 
of extenuating circumstances that would further reduce the penalties, 
including a “lack of knowledge by management, prompt reporting, and 
recognition and acceptance of the criminal act” (Etzioni, 1993, p. 151). 
The economists on the Commission advocated strongly for lower 
corporate fines. According to sociologist Amitai Etzioni, the “pro-
business” ideology of these economists led them to both focus solely on 
the economic costs and benefits of crime, as Becker emphasized, and 
recommend very low penalties. The economists on the Commission 
followed Becker’s theoretical recommendation that the costs of a fine 
should be high enough to deter activity. However, a crucial part of the 
deterrence effect is not only the fine for violation, but the likelihood 
of being detected. One of the economists on the Commission, Jeffrey 
Parker, argued for fines based on a detection rate of about one out of 
ten or twenty. However, actual detection rates of about one in fifty are 
probably more realistic, which would require fines five times as large 
as would be implied by Parker’s detection estimate (Etzioni, 1993, 
p. 152). Indeed, the approach of the economists was so profoundly 
at odds with the rest of the Commission that they were relieved of 
their duties.
The rational choice approach to politics exemplified by public choice 
has garnered considerable acclaim for taking economic assumptions 
and techniques out of their usual realm and into politics. While some 
scholars of public choice claim that the alleged anti-government bias 
in public choice is inaccurate (Ginsburg, 2002, p. 1148), it is certainly 
true that its most famous founders developed a theory of government 
failure that reflected their personal beliefs about the shortcomings of 
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the state. Public choice scholars have been very successful in developing 
a theory that has gained considerable traction inside and outside the 
discipline. However, they may have been less successful in developing 
a reasonable theory of how government actually works.
Rational Choice in Politics: What are the Problems?
Critics of applying the economic methods of rational choice to the 
political world have pointed out several problems, which, taken 
together, demonstrate that public choice misrepresents how the 
political system actually works. Rational choice politics, at least 
as practiced, by Tullock, Buchanan, Becker, Peltzman and Stigler, 
takes a theory of government with profound normative implications 
and presents it as a positive, value-free science. The very starting 
assumption of individual maximization in the political system does 
not appear to paint a very accurate picture of politicians’ or voters’ 
actual motivations. The theory of rent seeking and capture misrep-
resents the winners and losers from regulation and, therefore, mistakes 
who is actually in favor of regulation and who is opposed. Becker’s 
analysis of white-collar crime justifies lax enforcement and toothless 
regulations. Finally, by locating the source of political influence in the 
differing costs and benefits facing interest groups, it mistakes where 
the actual source of political influence lies.
Anti-government Bias
While the rational choice approach to politics portrays itself as a 
positive, scientific approach to studying government, in practice 
it reflects a thinly veiled distaste of the state by the founders of the 
discipline. The anti-government bias is nicely demonstrated in the 
discussion about rent seeking. Theoretically, rent seeking could apply 
to any “unproductive” use of funds to create high profits. For scholars 
like Buchanan and Tullock, however, in practice rents are generated 
almost exclusively by the government. The public choice founders did 
not, for example, focus on the extensive list of business activities that 
could, by most definitions, be considered unproductive activity such 
as advertising, public relations, financial speculation, and the many 
non-governmental restrictions on entry. In their tribute to Tullock, 
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economists William Shughart II and Robert Tollison argue that when 
money is spent on lawyers and lobbyists to create governmentally 
restricted markets, such as cabbies spending money to ensure that the 
taxi-licensing system remains in place: 
… those resources could have been deployed in other, more 
socially productive activities, such as negotiating private contracts 
or designing effective advertising campaigns that arguably reduce 
transaction costs, increase economic efficiency and thereby expand 
the nation’s wealth. (Shughart & Tollison, 2015, p. 14)
The default assumption by these scholars is that even something as 
obviously unproductive as most advertising, which seeks to manipulate 
consumer preferences and foster dissatisfaction with people’s existing 
lifestyle, actually improves economic efficiency by providing people 
with better, objective information. Further, the assumption that the 
free market, without government intervention, is a natural and efficient 
state of affairs, so that deviations will decrease overall economic welfare 
is, in itself, a strong assertion.
The anti-government criticism of public choice is not new. As early 
as the 1970s, critics were arguing that some public choice theorists’ 
policy recommendations were biased, with “a consistent non-inter-
ventionist, anti-administration, and a conservative bent” (DeGregori, 
1974, p. 211). Twenty years later, another author could still remark 
that “the Virginia School of public choice was launched as a needed 
corrective to the theory of market failure, but has developed into a 
one-sided attack on government” (Udehn, 1996, p. 195; see also Scaff 
& Ingram, 1987; Honderich, 1996; Carpenter & Moss, 2014, p. 10). 
The policy conclusion that runs from this asymmetry in public choice 
is that rent seeking and capture are primarily caused by government 
and that the obvious solution is to shrink the size of the state. However, 
it discounts or ignores the many “unproductive” activities that occur 
in the everyday activities of private-sector firms. While public choice 
criticizes the conventional theory of promoting an idealized version 
of state remedies for the failures of the market, it puts forward an 
idealized version of the market that will always appear superior to the 
imperfections of the state (Novak, 2014, p. 46).
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Assumption of Rational Self-interest
There are also problems with the foundational assumption of public 
choice: that people behave in a rationally self-interested manner in the 
political system. For example, in Tullock or Becker’s work, the motive 
of self-interested politicians is to get elected. While there is obviously 
some degree of truth in this assumption, a theory that rests on this as 
the exclusive, or even driving, motive of political behavior ignores the 
very real prospect that politicians act along ideological lines, or even 
what they perceive to be the public good. One study investigated the 
extent to which self-interest could accurately predict voting behavior 
by the US Senate on coal strip-mining regulation. It found that voting 
was significantly influenced by altruistic or ideological factors such as 
genuine concern for the public good (Kalt & Zupan, 1984).
The self-interested voter, no matter how well informed, is also a 
problem for public choice theory. This assumption fares poorly in 
empirical studies that have attempted to determine whether people 
actually vote in this manner, leading one study to claim that “our main 
finding is that ideology is the most consistently important determinant 
of public opinion on a number of major economic policy issues, and 
objective measures of material self-interest are the least important” 
(Blinder & Krueger, 2004, p. 329). This study is not alone. According 
to Harvard’s Gar Orren, “the single most compelling and counterintu-
itive discovery of research on political attitudes and behavior over the 
last thirty years is how weak an influence self-interest actually exerts” 
(Orren, 1988, p. 24). Studies of voting behavior found that people are 
more likely to vote ideologically than for their individual economic 
self-interest and will vote for an incumbent if the economy as a whole 
is doing well rather than if they are individually doing well (Wright, 
1993; see also Mansbridge, 1990; Renwick Monroe, 1991; Green & 
Shapiro, 1996).
Basing a theory of politics on faulty assumptions has important 
consequences for policy. Buchanan claims that the goal of public 
choice is to “channel the self-serving behavior of participants towards 
the common good in a manner that comes as close as possible to 
that described for us by Adam Smith with respect to the economic 
order” (Buchanan, 1978, p. 17). However, if the starting assumption 
of individual maximization is incorrect, then the policy recommen-
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dations that focus on privatization and a minimal state will also be 
wrong (Petracca, 1991). According to Harvard’s Amartya Sen, the 
assumption of individual rationality renders public choice unable 
to address the most pressing issues, from poverty to environmental 
preservation, which must consider people’s social values and engage in 
a public discussion of what is best for the welfare of all society (Sen, 
1995; see also Barry, 1984; Mitchell & Munger, 1991).
The assumption of individual maximization also creates a nasty little 
inconsistency for public choice theory. The public choice “paradox 
of voting” is that if one rationally weighs the costs and benefits of 
actually turning up to vote from a purely self-interested standpoint, 
no one should actually cast a ballot. This is because the benefit of 
voting is the chance of influencing the election in the voter’s desired 
direction, which is absurdly small. If there are any costs (gas or time, 
for example) to voting, people should stay away from the polls. In 
fact, the voter has a greater chance of being killed on the way to the 
polling station than influencing the election (Pressman, 2004, p. 6). Yet 
people actually do turn up to vote and in quite large numbers. Public 
choice scholars have attempted to theorize away this inconsistency by 
resorting to an explanation for this turnout that rests on people having 
a “taste,” for voting (Brennan & Hamlin, 1998), or that they do so 
out of a sense of duty, but these are tautological defeats for the crucial 
rationality assumption (Ginsburg, 2002, p. 1147). Rational choice 
authors claimed that the individual maximizing assumption is realistic 
because it assumes that people behave in politics as they do in the rest 
of their lives. Yet, people and politicians do not appear to behave in this 
narrow, self-interested manner. In fact, many political actions consider 
something broader, such as the public good, or ideological beliefs.
Who Benefits from Regulation?
The theories of capture and rent seeking do contain some important 
truths regarding the influence that firms have on specific regulations. 
It is certainly true that the firms subject to government oversight 
have a large interest in channeling the rules in their favor. To take 
one particular example that fits well with capture theory, the tobacco 
industry is heavily regulated for what most people would construe 
as a reasonable public health motive. Tired of fighting rearguard 
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actions against interventionist legislation, Philip Morris embarked on 
its Regulatory Strategy Project, with the long-term goal of creating 
regulation with a set of core principles protecting the rights of tobacco 
companies, including preventing the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) from altering cigarette design, removing nicotine as an 
ingredient, interfering with marketing, or otherwise infringing on the 
“rights” of adult Americans to smoke. This wish list was successfully 
passed into law in 2009. In addition to these constraints on regulation, 
the bill “grandfathered” existing tobacco products and created 
impediments to the development of new substitutes, even if they were 
safer than current cigarettes. This last provision favored Philip Morris 
at the expense of new entrants to the industry and its competitors that 
had been developing precisely these kinds of cigarette substitutes. Such 
was the influence of Philip Morris in developing the regulation to suit 
its own needs that it became known as the “Marlboro Protection Act” 
(Potter, 2010, pp. 213–14) Capture theory is useful in specific cases 
where firms use regulation to improve their competitive position.
However, as economists George Akerlof and Robert Shiller argue 
in their book, Phishing for Phools, much of the evidence presented in 
support of regulatory capture is of the “man bites dog” variety, which 
highlights the exception that validates the theory and ignores the more 
frequent “dog bites man” story where regulation actually fulfills the 
function for which it was intended (Akerlof & Shiller, 2015, p. 144). 
Akerlof and Shiller favor the more nuanced idea that regulation does 
actually impose constraints on firms in the service of the public good 
(unlike capture theory), but that business interests do have influence 
over their formulation and operation. Further, even if regulations are 
subject to corporate influence, to argue that we should do away with 
regulation because it is flawed would be like implying “that because 
spouses, children and friends are often troublesome, we should never 
get married, never become parents, and have no friends” (Akerlof 
& Shiller, 2015, p. 145). Returning to the days before regulation, 
in which there was no requirement for drugs to demonstrate their 
safety or effectiveness, for example, would seem to be a step backward. 
Similarly, removing all regulatory oversight on cigarettes would not 
seem to be the ideal solution in Philip Morris example. In fact, the 
unregulated free market solution has already been tried and found 
detrimental to human health.
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This is not to say that firms do not have undue influence over the 
regulations that govern them, from food and drug industry influence 
at the FDA, to chemical industry influence at the EPA, to financial 
industry influence over the Security and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). Businesses have become so active in influencing the activities 
of regulatory agencies that one study argues that it is the “modus 
operandi of at least a large proportion of corporations in the United 
States” (Bohme et al., 2005, p. 338). For example, the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) works in very close col-
laboration with industry. An agreement between the agency and the 
industry trade association, the American Chemistry Council (ACC), 
states that one of its goals is to “provide expertise in the development 
of training and education program for OSHA’s Voluntary Protection 
Program evaluators and Responsible Care auditors” (Davis, 2007, p. 
386). A study examining nutrition-related health problems in the 
United States found that much of the blame could be traced to the 
fact that the “food industry seems to exert a big influence on the 
development of food policies” (Dubois, 2006, p. 138).
Yet, in these examples, capture theory is less useful because while 
the firms have influence over public policy, they use their rent-seeking 
funds to seek precisely the small government that public choice authors 
prefer, but argue firms do not desire. For example, business successfully 
lobbied the Department of Labor under President Bush for changes 
in the way toxins were measured in the workplace, making it more 
difficult for the OSHA to find them harmful to workers (Leonnig, 
2008, p. A01). Similarly, the President’s Cancer Panel’s conclusion 
about the regulation of chemicals in the US was that “as a result of 
regulatory weaknesses and a powerful lobby, the chemicals industry 
operates virtually unfettered by regulation or accountability for harm 
its products may cause” (Reuben, 2010, p. 23). A court challenge from 
industry forced OSHA to scrap a 1979 ruling that set the standard for 
benzene, a known carcinogen, at one part per million (ppm), rolling 
the requirements back to 10 ppm. This was despite 1989 and 2005 
studies that found that Chinese workers exposed to benzene were sta-
tistically more likely to develop bone marrow cancer, lung cancer and 
leukemia, even for those with exposure levels between “6 to 10 ppm” 
(Davis, 2007, pp. 384–6). One survey discovered that 42 per cent of 
EPA scientists knew of instances where “commercial interests have 
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inappropriately induced the reversal or withdrawal of EPA scientific 
conclusions or decisions through political intervention” (Union of 
Concerned Scientists, 2008, p. 23). In response to industry pressure, 
the National Toxicology Program (NTP) delayed listing fiberglass 
insulation for nearly six years, and removed saccharin from its Report 
on Carcinogens (Huff, 2007, p. 109). The list of products over which 
regulatory oversight was delayed or prevented altogether includes 
(but is by no means limited to) benzene, vinyl chloride, lead, asbestos, 
Vioxx and arsenic (Bohme et al., 2005; Michaels, 2008; Pearce, 2008).
In all of these cases, the decline in regulation sought and received 
by firms has left the general public worse off. These costs and benefits 
of regulation are the opposite of those theorized by public choice 
theory, which argues that firms will gain and consumers will lose. 
Stigler argued in his tellingly titled article, “Why have the socialists 
been winning,” that the burdensome growth of government was 
due to “the use of public power to increase the incomes of particular 
groups in society” (Stigler, 1986). According to Becker, decreasing 
government intervention may occur because government programs 
must be paid for through taxes, which inevitably create a drag on the 
economy. While interest groups have a large incentive to influence 
political outcomes in order to increase their favorable policies from the 
state, this will be limited by the voting public if the costs become too 
large (Becker, 1983). While this has some intuitive appeal, it reverses 
the actual groups that are for and against regulation. The history of 
interest group activity after 1980 is not that the general public has 
lobbied vociferously for reduced government oversight against the 
wishes of protected firms, but that firms have engaged in a concerted 
effort to reduce regulations, mostly against the wishes of the rest of 
the population. Rather than consumers benefitting from decreased 
regulatory activity opposed by firms, as public choice suggests, people 
are harmed by the decreased regulation desired by firms. Since the 
1980s, the regulatory agencies that have been set up to shield people 
have become increasingly dominated by the corporations that they 
are supposed to be overseeing. However, in contrast to public choice 
assertions, firms have not used this influence to bolster regulatory 
protection but to weaken or dismantle regulation. Corporate success 
in this endeavor has meant that our food, environment and workplaces 




Becker’s approach to white-collar crime has important implications 
for regulations, which like other laws, are only as strong as the 
monitoring and enforcement that accompanies them. As we have 
seen, while Becker is in favor of imprisoning poor offenders, he prefers 
fines for higher-income miscreants. In order to keep firms, and the 
wealthy individuals who make business decisions, on the regulatory 
straight and narrow, Becker advocates a fine equal to the gain from the 
crime adjusted for the likelihood of detection, which he argues would 
eliminate the incentive to commit crime. In addressing corporate 
crime, this logic has a certain appeal. When the costs of violation 
are greater than the benefits, profit-maximizing firms are unlikely to 
break the law. However, in practice, the Becker approach is unlikely to 
act as an effective deterrent because it is likely to result in punishments 
that are too low, creating a permissive environment for white-collar 
crime. Given the very low detection rates for corporate crime, the fine 
would have to be extraordinarily large to act as a meaningful deterrent. 
Etzioni admitted that his own estimate of detection rates, one out 
of fifty for white-collar crimes, was inevitably wildly speculative; 
detection rates are inherently “very difficult to establish,” since they 
require knowledge of the number of times violations occur but are 
not caught (Etzioni, 1993, p. 152). The one-in-fifty detection ratio 
may be optimistic for many regulations. On average, state-run OSHA 
enforcement could only inspect each workplace once every 55 years 
(McQuiston et al., 1998; Weil, 1996). In Chapter 3 we demonstrated 
how the neoliberal policy of cutting funding to regulatory agencies, like 
the EPA, compromised their ability to detect violations. The obvious 
solution to this problem would be a dramatic increase in monitoring 
activity by the state to detect non-compliance. In fact, criminology 
research suggests increased monitoring would be more effective than 
severe penalties. The reason for this is that people do not, generally, 
want to be caught violating rules and so frequent inspections, even 
without large penalties, can often be an effective deterrent (Dukes et 
al., 2014, p. 318). However, for Becker and many other public choice 
theorists, increased monitoring falls afoul of the desire to maintain a 
small state, especially as it pertains to regulating firms.
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With low detection rates, to act as a meaningful deterrent fines 
would have to be so high that they would be almost impossible to 
levy on a firm without inducing bankruptcy, or at least considerable 
financial stress. Fines this injurious to firms are unlikely to be levied. 
Perhaps this explains the seemingly low fines levied by OSHA in the 
1990s. The average federal fine for a “serious” violation in 1995 was 
$763, and the maximum fine was only around $7,000 (Weil, 1996; 
McQuiston et al., 1998). In the book Too Big to Fail, law professor 
Brandon Garrett chronicles the pattern of negotiation and compromise 
that prosecutors settle for when faced with the well-financed legal 
departments of corporations. According to Garrett, despite the 
headline-grabbing initial penalties, many are greatly reduced, and 
high-level employees get off without any penalty at all (Garrett, 
2014). While Garrett focuses on finance as the source of corporate 
power in the legal system, economist David Gordon points to the 
structural necessity of creating a profitable economic environment 
as a determining factor in monitoring and fine levels (Gordon, 1971; 
see also Nickerson, 1983). Given the negative impact that steep fines 
would have on firms, they are unlikely to be levied on a systematic 
basis. In fact, the likely result of Becker’s approach to crime is precisely 
the low-detection, low-fine environment that benefits business, and 
has been put in place increasingly since the 1980s.
Becker’s insistence of fines as the most appropriate penalty for 
corporate crime explicitly rejects one alternative deterrent and fails 
to even consider another. Becker explicitly rejects prison time for 
high-income earners, based on the logic that they will undertake more 
actions to avoid jail than a fine, making conviction more difficult. 
The implication that this would make almost all jail terms in essence 
debtors’ prisons, limited to low-income offenders for whom fines are 
not an appropriate penalty, might be objectionable in and of itself to 
some. However, the converse of Becker’s own logic is that jail time 
appears to be a severe prospect for high-income earners and might 
act an impressive deterrent, not, it should be pointed out, because of 
the elimination of freedom it entails but because of the lack of ability 
to earn their impressive salaries. And Becker fails to consider the 
option of nationalizing businesses that commit offenses. This would 
obviously provide a fairly substantial deterrent and would not suffer 
from the problem of putting the firm out of business that plagues large 
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fines. However, given Becker’s distrust of government and support of 
private enterprise, it is likely safe to assume that he would not support 
this alternative.
The Source of Business Influence in Politics
Finally, rational or public choice misrepresents the source of influence 
wielded by firms in the political system. Recall that the explanation rests 
on the differing costs and benefits facing actors in the political system. 
A small number of firms stand to benefit substantially from regulation, 
while a large group of consumers are individually harmed a small 
amount. Firms then have a large incentive to invest in lobbying, while 
individuals will have much less desire to mount a counter-campaign. 
Conceivably, any group with a similar size and vested interest would 
also wield the same sort of influence in the political system. The idea 
from which public choice authors are carefully distancing themselves 
is that business, as a class (or interest group in public choice language), 
has an inherent political advantage in the capitalist system based on 
its ownership and control of the productive capacity in society. Instead, 
political outcomes are determined by the costs and benefits facing 
rational actors (Hudson, 2002; see also Atkinson, 1983).
In fact, some public choice authors have been clear about setting up 
their theory as a superior alternative to radical explanations of politics. 
Robert Tollison claimed, “the confusion with Marxist theory is more 
apparent than real” (Tollison, 1982, p. 591), because outcomes are not 
determined by the power of classes or interests but by the costs and 
benefits facing the individuals that belong to those interests. Buchanan 
and Tullock, “reject any theory or conception of the collectivity which 
embodies the exploitation of a ruled by a ruling class” (Buchanan 
& Tullock, 1999 [1962], p. 17). Becker echoed this sentiment when 
he claimed that the differing costs and benefits facing individuals 
in a group, far more than the “production relations emphasized by 
Marx, explain the prominence in political life of economic pressure 
groups” (Becker, 1983, p. 388). In public choice, access to favorable 
policies does not depend on whether a group is either capital or labor. 
In fact, both capital and labor, or specific subsections of these two 
broad interests (industry groups and unions, for example), can develop 
significant political clout. In the rational choice theory of politics, the 
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corporate world is able to win favorable treatment solely because of 
its large “demand” for favorable policies, compared with the opposing 
“demand” of the taxpayers or consumers.
The sort of radical theory that rational choice capture theory tries 
to supplant was developed in the 1960s. It had in common with public 
choice a desire to subject regulation to a more rigorous accounting, 
but it located the source of corporate influence not in the relatively 
favorable costs and benefits for firms and their industry groups but, 
in the tradition of Marx and Veblen, in the more pervasive power of 
business as class (Kolko, 1963; Weinsten, 1968; Sklar, 1988). These 
works explored the regulatory push of the progressive period in US 
history, which spawned agencies like the FDA and the anti-trust 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The common theme of these 
studies was that, from the outset of the drive for regulation in the early 
1900s, “class conscious” members of the business elite were able to 
co-opt the process so that the legislative regime legitimized modern 
capitalism, which did involve a certain degree of ceding to public 
pressure demanding some constraints on the most odious activities of 
firms, but in a manner that was controlled and acceptable to business 
(Berk, 1991; Novak, 2014). They did so with the financial power at 
their disposal, their ability to provide plum jobs for regulators and the 
requirement of framing regulations in a manner that would maintain 
a profitable environment for firms.
These radical theories also offer a more plausible explanation for 
government regulatory trends over the last 35 years. What public 
choice lacks, or deliberately avoids, is a theory that acknowledges the 
uniquely powerful position of firms in the capitalist economy due to 
their financial clout and the necessity of creating a profitable policy 
environment conducive to private-sector investment (Udehn, 1996, 
p. 204). A more robust theory of government intervention would be 
able to explain, for example, why firms would request and receive the 
changes to policy instigated by the American Legislative Exchange 
Program (ALEC) discussed in Chapter 2, the cuts to social regulation 
listed in Chapter 3, and the deregulation of consumer protections and 
food safety covered in Chapter 4. As we saw in Chapter 3, all of these 
deregulatory changes were part of a broad effort to restore the profits 
of firms that had fallen through the 1970s.
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It is difficult to see how public choice theory’s focus on differing 
costs and benefits in the political system could explain the trans-
formation in corporate support for government intervention in 
the post-war period. According to economist David Kotz, business 
in the US, and the interest groups that represented it, such as the 
Committee for Economic Development (CED) were broadly 
supportive of a post-World War II compact resting on the pillars of 
collective bargaining, Keynesian stabilization of the business cycle and 
government social welfare programs (Kotz, 2015, p. 54). However, 
by the late 1970s, rising labor costs, the expansion of the state into 
social regulation such as the environment, and growing interna-
tional competition combined to create an economic environment 
that convinced firms that a dramatic restructuring needed to occur. 
Their response was outlined and coordinated by organizations such 
as the Business Roundtable. The Roundtable’s position papers and 
lobbying efforts insisted that “excessive government regulation” was 
to blame for the low productivity growth in the 1970s (Kotz, 2015, 
p. 70). A public choice explanation of this transformation would have 
to rely on a change in the costs and benefits of business rent-seeking 
behavior, which is difficult to imagine. A more plausible interpretation 
is that in a period of economic decline caused by falling profits, firms 
have a greater incentive to shed costs including those that stem from 
regulation. Further, governments are more likely to take these requests 
seriously in a context of declining profits and investment than they are 
when profits and investment are high.
Conclusion: Deregulation and Profits
The rational choice approach to politics, a cornerstone of public 
choice, has enjoyed a meteoric rise as an economic field. From a few 
dedicated scholars toiling away in the academic margins in the 1960s, 
public choice has become a respected field in the discipline. Applying 
commonplace economic tools to politics followed a general trend of 
using economic methods to analyze what were previously considered 
non-economic subjects like crime, discrimination and family 
dynamics. Its most famous practitioners, like Tullock and Buchanan, 
argue that the application of economic assumptions and techniques to 
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the political system allow for a more rigorous, scientific examination 
of outcomes of the state. They contrast this approach with what they 
describe as the less analytic theories of government that took for 
granted that intervention would be welfare improving.
However, the portrayal of rational choice as a more positive, less 
normative approach to analyzing government masks a fairly transparent 
political agenda by the scholars investigated in this chapter. Buchanan, 
Stigler, Becker and Tullock all view government intervention in the 
economy as a deleterious force, constraining the free market. Unsur-
prisingly, their positive approaches yield results that fairly uniformly 
find evidence of government failure. The policy implications that 
follow from the research by these authors are clear. Since rent seeking 
and capture are only possible because of government intervention, 
reducing government is the solution.
Interestingly, the supporters and opponents of regulation are the 
opposite of those predicted by these authors. While the ideas of 
capture and rent seeking do accurately reflect a very small subsection 
of regulatory activity, and can nicely explain policies like the smoking 
example used earlier and when industries seek protection from inter-
national trade, they are more problematic when addressing most 
regulations. For most other regulations, it is the regulated firms that 
are staunchly opposed and devote their considerable political influence, 
not to reinforcing or redirecting the regulations, as these authors have 
suggested, but to eliminating or minimizing state interference. On the 
other hand, the general public is broadly supportive of these policies. 
Perhaps this is because the public understands the costs and benefits 
of regulation better than these public choice authors. The public is 
often better protected with regulation than without, while the activity 
of firms is often constrained. The deregulatory history of the US since 
1980 has not been the triumph of the citizen over the wishes of the 
firm, but the exact opposite. Further, these founders of rational choice 
in politics deliberately set their theory up as a superior alternative to 
a class-based explanation of political influence. Yet a more radical 
theory that understands that power in the political system does not 
come from differing costs and benefits facing interest groups, but from 
the structural power of business in a capitalist economy, can much 
better explain the deregulatory trends since 1980.
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It is, perhaps, no coincidence that the rise of the economic approach 
to politics has occurred precisely when firms engaged in a massive 
political and economic effort to reduce the regulatory “burden” of the 
state in a successful effort to reduce their costs and restore profits after 
the 1970s. As a theory of government failure, public choice aligned 
nicely with Ronald Reagan’s famous claim that “government is not the 
solution to our problem; government is the problem” (Reagan, 1981). 
The institutions of public choice, from university departments to 
research institutes, have benefited from corporate funding. The public 
choice policy prescriptions of these authors align very nicely with the 
desire of firms to shed governmental regulation and transfer economic 
decisions from the state to the market (Wright, 1993).
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The Great Vacation:  
Rational Expectations  
and Real Business Cycles
Introduction
Wage slavery can be a grind. The top-down, command-and-control 
style of most employment fails to give many workers a sense of 
fulfillment during the time that they spend in their cubicle or at the 
assembly line. Yet, for most people, unemployment is something to be 
avoided. A choice between earning an income with a job, no matter 
how unpleasant, or doing without a weekly pay packet altogether, is 
really no choice at all. The economists in this chapter, however, view 
a job as something that many people can take or leave. In fact, it is 
people’s willingness to give up their employment when wages drop that 
is the hallmark of a school of macroeconomics that rose to prominence 
in the 1970s and 1980s.
As we saw in Chapter 4, Friedman’s macroeconomic research 
attempted to call into question the Keynesian explanation for the 
cause of, and cure for, economic fluctuations and the devastating 
unemployment that inevitably accompanies them. As was the case 
with the public choice authors in Chapter 5 who picked up and refined 
Friedman’s microeconomic contempt for regulation, subsequent mac-
roeconomic theorists have advanced Friedman’s incomplete attack on 
Keynesian policy. Like Chapter 5, this chapter will look at the work 
of what might be termed the founding, or at the very least, most 
famous, proponents of what became an influential economic school of 
thought: Robert Lucas, Thomas Sargent, Neil Wallace, Finn Kydland 
and Edward Prescott.
If Milton Friedman could make a claim to being the most influential 
economist since Keynes, Lucas has been dubbed the only slightly less 
prestigious, most influential macroeconomist of the last quarter of 
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the twentieth century (Fischer, 1996; Hall, 1996). Like so many of 
the authors discussed in these pages, Lucas received his PhD from 
the University of Chicago, graduating in 1964. When asked which 
economists had the most influence on his work, Lucas responded that 
Friedman was a “great teacher,” whose ideas forced students to rethink 
their whole social philosophy (Lucas, 1996; Snowdon & Vane, 2005, 
p. 274). After graduating from Chicago, he joined Carnegie Mellon 
University, but such is the gravitational pull that the University of 
Chicago economics department exerts on its former students that 
Lucas returned to the department in 1975. He was awarded the Nobel 
Prize “for having developed and applied the hypothesis of rational 
expectations, and thereby having transformed macroeconomic analysis 
and deepened our understanding of economic policy” (The Royal 
Swedish Academy of Sciences, 1995). As we shall see, the manner in 
which rational expectations transformed economics was to, “throw the 
Keynesian paradigm off its pedestal” (De Vroey, 2001, p. 127).
Lucas has been fairly unpredictable in his public pronouncements 
on economic policy. His parents were advocates of the New Deal, 
which apparently influenced his decision to vote for Barack Obama 
against John McCain in 2008, based primarily on “the racist history” 
of the US ( Jenkins, 2011). He also described himself as “never going 
to be anywhere near the far-right end of the spectrum for Chicago” 
(Klamer, 1984). On the other hand, his other policy pronouncements 
do seem to put Lucas more squarely in the free market camp. Lucas 
was not very keen on Obama as a president, claiming that he was 
“caught by surprise by how far left the guy is” ( Jenkins, 2011). In 
addition, despite stating that McCain “didn’t have a clue about the 
economy” ( Jenkins, 2011), Lucas signed a 2008 petition supporting 
McCain’s economic policy and another in 2012 backing Mitt Romney. 
He has also signed single-issue petitions opposing “anti-sweatshop” 
legislation and in favour of moving social security toward individually 
owned accounts (Klein & Daza, 2013). In a 2012 interview, he stated 
his opposition to socialized medicine and high marginal tax rates on 
the rich (Klein & Daza, 2013). In terms of long-term growth policy, 
he argued that the lesson from countries like Taiwan, Korea and 
Japan are that “conservative, pro-market, pro-business” policies lead 
to economic success. Africa’s sub-par performance, on the other hand, 
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was due to “too much socialist influence” (Snowdon & Vane, 1998, 
p. 135).
Lucas was a friend of Neil Wallace while the two were completing 
their PhD programs at Chicago. Like Lucas, Wallace graduated 
in 1964. He is mostly associated with his time at the University of 
Minnesota, where he spent thirty years between 1964 and 1994. He 
moved to Pennsylvania State University in 1997, after a brief stint 
at the University of Miami. Wallace is best known for his work with 
Thomas Sargent. The two are considered founders of the new classical 
school that revolutionized macroeconomics. Although Wallace has 
an impressive array of awards to his name, including Distinguished 
Fellow at the American Economic Association and a Fellow at the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, it is probably fair to say that 
he does not enjoy quite the same celebrity as Sargent.
Thomas Sargent received his PhD in 1968 from Harvard University. 
After a stint in the US Army and a very brief period at the University 
of Pennsylvania, Sargent settled in with Wallace at the University of 
Minnesota from 1975 to 1987. Since then he has bounced around from 
the University of Chicago to Stanford University to his current post as 
the William Berkley Professor of Economics at New York University. 
Along with Chris Sims, in 2011 Sargent was awarded the Nobel Prize 
for “their empirical research on cause and effect in the macroeconomy.” 
That less than enlightening synopsis of Sargent’s research, which 
really could probably describe most modern macroeconomics, hides 
Sargent and Wallace’s influence, which, as we shall see, revolution-
ized macroeconomics through the adoption of rational expectations 
and equilibrium models that appealed to economists because of 
their theoretical consistency with microeconomic assumptions about 
the economy.
Sargent is, in some ways, cagier than Lucas about where he stands 
on economic issues. He is insulted by people who call him a “non-
Keynesian” or “right wing” (Sommer, 2011a), arguing that he, and his 
work, are not political, but technical (Klamer, 1984, p. 62). He declares 
himself a long-time Democrat and maintains that government needs 
to play a role in economic affairs (Sommer, 2011b). He claims both 
Friedman and the prominent Keynesian economist James Tobin as 
major influences (Klamer, 1984, p. 62). On the other hand, outside 
observers have placed him firmly in the “free market” camp and there 
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seems to be considerable evidence for this (Cowen, 2011). Sargent is 
a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, a think tank known for its 
conservative orientation that promotes personal and economic liberty 
and limited government (Hoover Institution, 2016). Sargent has argued 
that the higher unemployment rates in Europe compared to the US 
can be explained by the generous European system of unemployment 
benefits and has expressed concern that recent increases in the social 
safety net in the US will lead to higher persistent unemployment 
(Sargent, 2010).1 While Sargent views his work as non-political, we 
will see that it certainly has political implications.
Lucas was also a good friend of Ed Prescott, who received his PhD 
in 1967 from Carnegie Mellon. After graduation, Prescott taught at 
the University of Pennsylvania until 1971 before returning to Carnegie 
Mellon, where he stayed until 1980. He then joined the “freshwater” 
home of rational expectations, the University of Minnesota, for over 
twenty years before moving to Arizona State University in 2003. In 
2004, Prescott won the Nobel Prize in Economics for his work with 
Finn Kydland on “dynamic macroeconomics: the time consistency of 
economic policy and the driving forces behind business cycles.”
Prescott is more forthcoming about where he stands politically than 
Sargent. He claims that although he went through high school as a 
Fabian socialist, the ideological blinkers worn by his fellow students at 
Swarthmore College cured him of his socialist leanings. He generally 
favors economic policy that promotes “individual responsibility and 
decentralized arrangements” as opposed to “paternalistic statism” 
(Klein et al., 2013b). Prescott has presented at the Cato Institute, one 
of the think tanks highlighted in Chapter 2, which is “dedicated to 
the principles of individual liberty, limited government, free markets 
and peace” (Cato Institute, 2016), on how private accounts in Social 
Security could boost GDP and increase the incentive to work. In 
2009, he signed an open letter to Barack Obama that was sponsored 
1  Sargent does not argue that generous unemployment benefits will always 
create unemployment. If the labor market functions so that spells of 
unemployment do not reduce lifetime income substantially, generous 
benefits can lower unemployment. However, he argues that since the 
1970s, losing a job has meant an increased drop in human capital during 
the non-work period, so the negative impact of longer unemployment 
spells caused by generous unemployment insurance has increased.
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by Cato opposing the post-crisis economic stimulus package in the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Cato Institute, 2009) and 
supported Mitt Romney for president in 2012 (Klein et al., 2013b). 
He claims that the slow growth in the US economy since 2007 was 
due to an “explosion in federal regulation, intervention and subsidies,” 
including, but not limited to Obamacare, high corporate tax rates and 
“numerous antibusiness National Labor Relations Board decisions” 
(Prescott & Ohanian, 2014). He also argued that Americans work 
more than Europeans because of the incentive of lower tax rates in 
the US (Prescott, 2004). In perhaps his most controversial public pro-
nouncement, he claimed that “it is an established scientific fact that 
monetary policy has had virtually no effect on output and employment 
in the U.S. since the formation of the Fed” (Appelbaum, 2014). As we 
shall see, this statement is far from an “established fact,” but it is an 
inevitable conclusion from Kydland and Prescott’s theory.
Finn Kydland is a rare non-American in this book. He grew up in 
a small town in Norway and was the only person in his elementary 
school to complete high school. He lists Lucas as one of his major 
academic influences and completed his PhD at Carnegie Mellon 
in 1973 under Prescott. After briefly returning to Norway, Kydland 
returned to Carnegie Mellon in 1978 where he stayed until 2004 when 
he moved to the University of California Santa Barbara.
Kydland does not like offering policy opinions. He even refuses 
to be drawn out when interviewers have sought out his political 
views. However, he has been classified by others as leaning toward 
free market policies (Klein et al., 2013c). Like Sargent, Kydland was 
a National Scholar at the conservative Hoover Institution. He is also 
a member of the Copenhagen Consensus Center (CCC), “a think 
tank that researches the smartest solutions for the world’s biggest 
problems, advising policy makers and philanthropists how to spend 
their money most effectively” (CCC, 2016). Its founder and president 
is the controversial environmentalist Bjorn Lomborg, author of the 
Skeptical Environmentalist, which argued that the world should not 
be attempting to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In 2009, Kydland 
contributed to a report for the CCC proposing that world leaders 
should focus on geo-engineering as a solution to climate change in 




Rational Expectations and the Real Business Cycle:  
The Theory
One of the most apparently damaging blows to the Keynesian 
prescription of counter-cyclical policy might not appear, at first glance, 
to be the knockout punch that it became. Much of the traditional 
justification for Keynesian policy was provided by macroeconomic 
models in which people’s response to policy changes was predictable. 
For example, if governments increased spending in the economy, 
firms would respond with a predictable increase in investment to 
meet that demand. This permitted a macroeconomic model to predict 
what would happen to the economy in response to a specific policy 
change. The now-famous Lucas Critique of Keynesian policy started 
from the premise of rational expectations. As we saw in Chapter 4, 
Friedman applied the Adaptive Expectations Hypothesis (AEH)—
that people base their expectations on past truths. The flaw with this 
assumption is that it does not allow people the very real tendency to 
use current information in their decisions. The Rational Expectations 
Hypothesis (REH) corrected this perceived shortcoming by modeling 
behavior that allowed actors to use up-to-date information as well 
as past events. Workers can read the newspaper, listen to the radio, 
these days go online, rather than only using the past as a guide. In 
economic language, agents make the best use of information available 
to them. If rational expectations are correct, then people will take the 
policy change into consideration when making their decisions. Since 
it is virtually impossible for the economic modeler to predict how 
people will respond to the policy change, it is impossible to accurately 
determine how the economy will react.
To take one example from Lucas, one possible counter-cyclical 
policy during a recession might be an investment tax credit. The goal of 
this policy is induce investment by firms to stimulate the economy. In 
order to do this, the government needs to know how much investment 
is expected to increase with a change in taxes. However, even if there 
is ample econometric work specifying a relationship between tax rates 
and investment based on past changes, it is not valid to assume that 
firms will respond in an identical manner to future tax changes. This is 
especially true if, as should be the case for an expansionary policy, the 
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tax cut is temporary, in which case the modeler would have to know 
how firm decisions would respond to a change in policy of uncertain 
duration, a difficult task indeed (Lucas, 1976; for more on Lucas’s 
rational expectations, see Lucas, 1972, 1973; Lucas & Sargent, 1981). 
The conclusion is that it is beyond the ability of economic models to 
accurately predict the consequences of “arbitrary” policy decisions.
In addition to creating uncertainty surrounding counter-cyclical 
policy intervention, rational expectations became an important 
component of a theory of business cycles that came to prominence 
in the 1970s and 1980s. These models had several key components 
that combined to offer up a theory of economic fluctuations that 
provided an alternative to the Keynesian demand-based explanation. 
In addition to rational expectations, these macro models applied the 
assumptions that firms maximize profits and individuals maximize 
utility, which was pleasingly consistent to many economists, because it 
aligned macroeconomic theorizing more closely with the assumptions 
that were deemed to be standard in micro. The authors highlighted 
in this chapter viewed the economy as perfectly competitive, where 
no firm or worker had sufficient market power to influence the price. 
The economy was also characterized by flexible wages and prices that 
adjust instantly in response to changes in supply and demand. For 
example, if the demand for labor falls and firms are willing to hire 
less people at existing wages, the surplus of workers will cause wages 
to fall. The decline in wages then increases the number of workers 
that firms will be willing to hire and decreases the number of workers 
willing to supply labor in that market. As a result of falling wages, 
the surplus of labor is eliminated and markets will rapidly tend to an 
equilibrium in which supply equals demand. The assertion of flexibility 
and equilibrium, a hallmark of classical economists, helped name this 
school of thought the “new classicals”2 (Lucas, 1972; Sargent, 1979; 
Snowdon & Vane, 2005, p. 219).
Astute readers will be slightly perplexed about how an equilibrium 
theory, in which demand equals supply in all markets, can explain 
business cycles. After all, if wages adjust instantly so that the 
2  Although there are some differences between RBC and the new classical 
school surrounding whether monetary policy is ever effective, they have 
enough in common that RBC was branded “new classical mark II” by one 
expert on the history of economics (Snowdon & Vane, 2005, p. 294).
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number of jobs in the labor market equals the number of job seekers, 
involuntary unemployment, the hallmark of a downturn, is non-
existent. Real Business Cycle (RBC) authors explain this through 
changes in productivity, wages and the amount that people want to 
work. In RBC theory, business cycles originate with random shocks, 
or large fluctuations, in the rate of technological change (Kydland & 
Prescott, 1982). These shocks could be caused by a number of events 
like (un)favorable weather in agriculture, large changes in energy 
prices, major social upheavals, or damaging government policies, 
but the most likely are changes in productivity, due to say, a change 
in technology. While these events are genuinely diverse, they are all 
external “shocks” to the stable economy that originate outside the 
normal functioning of the economic system. That is, RBC theory does 
not trace the source of the productivity change to any predictable or 
inherent tendencies in the economic system toward downturns, as we 
attempted to do in Chapter 2’s discussion of the 2008 crisis. RBC 
authors suggest that the rate of technological advance in society has 
considerable variation, meaning that there are booms, with rapid 
adoption of innovations, and slowdowns, where technology advance is 
stagnant. Prescott demonstrated that there is considerable pro-cyclical 
variation in the “Solow residual,” a measure that attempts to calculate 
the effects of technological change by taking the difference between 
the percentage change in outputs and the percentage change in inputs. 
For example, if there has been no increase in the amount of capital and 
labor inputs used in production but output increases, the assumption 
behind the Solow residual is that the output increase must be due to 
technological improvements (Prescott, 1986). Kydland and Prescott 
estimated that changes in the Solow residual could account for about 
70 percent of the variation in output in the US post-war period 
(Kydland & Prescott, 1991). When positive technology shocks occur, 
then labor productivity will increase. In competitive labor markets, the 
increase in productivity will cause an increase in real wages.
In an effort to move beyond a technological explanation of 
productivity shocks, Prescott (and co-author Ellen McGratten) turned 
to government policy as a source of instability. They explained the very 
slow recovery after the 2008 crisis as a shock in productivity rather 
than the standard explanation of ailing credit institutions, indebted 
households and jobless workers. Given the absence of an obvious 
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technology shock during this period, Prescott and McGratten argued 
that the post-2008 malaise was caused by the escalating costs incurred 
by businesses to comply with regulations and the tax costs of paying 
for the workers at regulatory agencies. They interpret these rising costs 
as a decline in productivity (McGratten & Prescott, 2012).
The second hallmark of RBC theory is that workers respond to 
changes in real wages through “intertemporal” changes in labor 
supply, which means that people will work more when wages are high 
so that they can work less when wages are low (Lucas & Rapping, 
1969; Kydland & Prescott, 1982; Mankiw, 1989; Snowdon & Vane, 
2005, p. 340). Economic fluctuations are caused by employees 
changing the number of hours they work in response to the changes 
in real wages that stem from temporary productivity shocks. When 
an adverse technology shock occurs and wages fall, workers will 
reduce the amount they want to work, creating a recession. Workers 
make up for this income decline by working longer hours when 
positive technology shocks increase wages. In explaining the Great 
Depression, Prescott claims that, “market hours fall, reducing output 
… and more time is allocated to leisure” (Prescott, 1999, p. 26). In this 
theory, unemployment is voluntary. In labor market equilibrium, the 
number of workers seeking a job equals the number of jobs available 
so anyone wishing to work can do so. The decline in labor hours is a 
voluntary, optimal response by workers in the face of a reduced real 
wage (Lucas, 1978).
It is also important to highlight the interpretation of recessions in 
RBC. In many economic theories, downturns are inevitably character-
ized by harmful, involuntary unemployment. Of course, this cannot 
happen when markets adjust instantly in RBC theory. Rational 
expectations also destroys Friedman’s AEH explanation for recessions 
and depressions, which are caused when falling prices leads firms to 
offer lower nominal wages that are rejected by workers whose adaptive 
expectations belief is that this offer is a decline in real wages. The gap 
between what firms are willing to pay and what workers are willing 
to accept creates unemployment and recessions. This explanation, 
based as it is on mistaken beliefs about wages and prices, is impossible 
under rational expectations. Workers would immediately know that 
although their nominal wages had fallen, the decrease in prices would 
leave their real wage unchanged, destroying the AEH explanation of 
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unemployment. With the twin assumptions of rational expectations 
and price and wage flexibility, neither the Keynesian nor the AEH 
explanation can be correct. Rather, downturns are caused when workers 
withdraw their labor due to decreases in productivity and real wages.
The RBC logic of recessions caused by intertemporal changes 
to working hours in a context of equilibrium also has important 
implications for how recessions and depressions are interpreted. The 
standard post-war interpretation was that the reductions in income 
and increase in unwanted unemployment that accompany a downturn 
are societally harmful and should be avoided if at all possible. It is 
this logic that created the case for Keynesian counter-cyclical policy. 
However, the RBC explanation of fluctuation implies that recessions 
are, in fact, optimal responses to technology shocks. While the 
economy would have been better off without a negative shock, if and 
when a shock occurs, and Prescott’s evidence suggests that it will, 
the optimal response by firms will be to reduce real wages. Given the 
decline in real wages, workers will want to work less. Given that each 
of these decisions is a desirable adjustment to falling productivity, 
the fluctuation is actually an appropriate response to the fall in 
technology. Prescott puts this quite explicitly: “the policy implication 
of this research is that costly efforts at stabilisation are likely to be 
counter-productive. Economic fluctuations are optimal responses 
to uncertainty in the rate of technological progress” (Prescott, 1986, 
p. 21). It is not quite true that RBC theorists argue that recessions 
are positive, since it would be a superior result if negative technology 
shocks could be avoided. However, RBC theory does suggest that 
if a negative shock occurs, the recession is a desirable consequence. 
Therefore, government policy that strives for something called “full 
employment” is misguided, because the economy is always in such a 
state (Snowdon & Vane, 2005, p. 331). For RBC authors, like Prescott, 
the term “business cycle” is undesirably misleading because it creates 
the impression that the economy goes through cycles of better and 
worse times, when, in fact, a better statement would be that there is 
no such thing as a business cycle in the sense that fluctuations are a 
normal, acceptable feature of economic growth (Prescott, 1986).
Government policy to correct for a recession is not only unnecessary, 
it is also ineffective. Or, if we are going to be a bit more careful 
with our language, if rational expectations are taken seriously, then 
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anticipated changes to monetary policy will affect prices, but will have 
no impact on either output or employment (Sargent & Wallace, 1975, 
1976).3 Let’s say a central bank were to reduce interest rates, encourage 
borrowing and, therefore, increase consumption and investment. This 
increase in demand in the economy would drive up prices. Since actors 
in the economy have rational expectations, workers will increase their 
wage demands to reflect the higher prices. Because the real wage then 
remains unchanged, the profit of firms would not change and neither 
would their output and employment (Sargent, 1999).
On the other hand, anti-inflationary policy is not only effective 
but also painless. In most Keynesian (and Friedman’s AEH) theory, 
inflation could only be controlled at the expense of employment and 
output. Increasing interest rates would increase unemployment and 
slow down the economy, which would, in turn, put downward pressure 
on prices as demand fell. In the Sargent and Wallace economy, on the 
other hand, if the increase in the interest rate is credibly announced 
by the central bank, it will create the same chain of events outlined 
in the previous paragraph but in the opposite direction. When the 
interest rate increase is announced, people will rationally revise their 
price and wage expectations downward, resulting in a decreased price 
level without the sacrifice of declining output and employment. In the 
early 1980s context of rapidly rising prices, this theory had a certain 
utopian appeal, since it implied that inflation could be tamed without 
the nasty adjustment costs predicted by either the Keynesians’ or 
Friedman’s adaptive expectations (Gordon, 1978, p. 338; Snowdon & 
Vane, 2005, p. 248).
The RBC model turned the Keynesian theory of economic 
fluctuations on its head. Rather than being caused by insufficient 
demand, recessions and depressions are caused by supply-side 
productivity shocks. Rather than an undesirable stagnation to be 
corrected by counter-cyclical government policy, recessions represent 
optimal responses to shocks for which the government cannot, and 
should not, correct. For these RBC authors, barring any undesirable 
government policy, technology shock, or environmental disaster, 
3  Kydland and Prescott’s RBC theory would go a step further and argue that 
even unanticipated changes in monetary policy will have no effect, going 
as far as calling it a “monetary myth” (Kydland & Prescott, 1990).
the great vacation
117
whatever the state of the capitalist economy, it is the best of all 
possible worlds.
Rational Expectations and RBC: Problems and Criticisms
RBC theory and rational expectations have come under attack on 
a variety of fronts, from the ability of humans to actually behave as 
rational expectations hypothesizes, to the assumption of equilibrium 
and voluntary unemployment, to the implications for policy. Turning 
first to the idea of rational expectations, questions have been raised 
about people’s ability to process and adopt “correct” information in 
forming their expectations. Indeed, even among those professional 
few who dedicate their working lives to analyzing the economy, 
uncertainty reigns and disagreements rage over the impact of changes 
to the macroeconomy. To argue that people can correctly anticipate 
the price increase that will stem from reduced interest rates appears 
to grant people predictive powers beyond even those of the central 
banks responsible for monetary policy (see, for example, Evans & 
Honkapohja, 1999).
Questions have also been raised about the dependence on 
technology as a driver of economic ups and downs. First, technologi-
cal change is most likely not sufficiently large or sudden to cause the 
kind of swings in productivity required by RBC theory (Muellbauer, 
1997). Second, Solow residual evidence for technology shocks may 
not prove what RBC scholars claim. Recall that the Solow residual 
measures the difference between the change in output and the change 
in the quantity of inputs. If output is increasing with the same number 
of inputs, then the RBC school claims that this is evidence of a 
technology shock, loosely defined since it doesn’t actually have to be 
technology. However, the Solow residual could be capturing a whole 
host of changes that have nothing to do with the RBC supply-side 
productivity explanation. One possibility is that firms “hoard” labor in 
recessions. If there are some fixed costs to hiring and letting workers 
go, firms will keep workers during downturns despite a decline in 
their sales. These “underutilized” workers will be less productive in the 
sense that the same inputs now produce less output (Mankiw, 1989, 
p. 1984). This would show up as a negative productivity shock in the 
Solow residual, but what it would be really measuring was a reduction 
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in demand. If the Solow residual represents something other than the 
productivity shocks that RBC authors claim, then the productivity 
explanation that is so crucial to RBC theory remains unproven.
RBC insistence that only supply-side productivity changes can 
cause economic fluctuations is a particularly extreme version of the 
more general tendency in much of mainstream economics to focus on 
shocks, external to the economic system, as the source of instability. 
This analysis ignores the possibility that the economic system is not 
stable. The position taken by what might be called “radical” economists 
is that the economic system generates internal contradictions that will 
cause repeated crises. As one example of how this might happen, in 
Chapter 2 we outlined the policy transformation in the US in response 
to the low profits of the 1970s. In Chapter 3, we discussed how the 
deregulation and income stagnation caused by that transformation laid 
the foundation for the economic crisis of 2008. The 2008 decline was 
not due to a shock external to an otherwise smooth system. Rather, 
the crisis came from an economic structure set up to restore profits 
starting in the 1980s. One interpretation of the 2008 crisis was that 
it was a specific example of a general type of crisis in which capital is 
“too strong,” in the sense that the compensation that firms pay their 
employees is not sufficient to guarantee demand for their products. 
This is not the only theory of the cause of the 2008 crisis. Radical 
economists agree, in general, about the system’s tendencies, conflicts 
and contradictions, but differ over the proximate cause. For example, 
economic historian Robert Brenner of UCLA claimed that overpro-
duction (too many factories in too many countries producing the same 
products) has resulted in falling prices and profits (Brenner, 2006). A 
contrasting explanation was put forward by The New School’s Anwar 
Shaikh, who argued that firms’ tendency to increase their fixed capital 
costs in order to keep ahead of the competition and undermine the 
demands of labor for higher wages will also lead to long-term declines 
in the rate of profit (Shaikh, 2010). Despite the differences between 
scholars in this tradition, they all look inside the system to explain 
crises, rather than resorting to external shocks.
Beyond questions about the rational expectations hypothesis and 
relying on shocks to explain instability, the assertion of price flexibility 
and market equilibrium has also raised a few eyebrows. Recall that 
wage and price flexibility means that markets instantly clear. If prices 
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and wages do not adjust as quickly as these equilibrium theories 
suggest, then prolonged periods of disequilibrium can occur where 
supply does not equal demand in markets. In fact, this disequilibrium 
is a fundamental component of many mainstream Keynesian theories 
to explain economic fluctuations. While arguments have been put 
forward supporting sticky prices, the more common objection to 
flexibility revolves around wages. Casual observation and empirical 
evidence suggests that wages do not fall rapidly, even in the face of large 
surpluses of labor (Mankiw, 1989). There have been many justifications 
for this. For example, many contracts, like those negotiated by unions 
in collective bargaining, lock workers and employers into multi-year 
wage deals. An even more permanent explanation is the “efficiency 
wage” hypothesis that states that it is profit maximizing for firms to 
pay higher than equilibrium wages in order to attract better-quality 
employees and induce more effort out of their workforce. In either 
event, wages will not fall even in the face of involuntary unemployment. 
Regardless of the specific justification for a prolonged situation in 
which those seeking work exceeds the number of jobs available, the 
RBC denial of the very possibility that this can happen appears to be 
contradicted by a casual glance at the labor market, especially during 
recessions or depressions.
A related concern is the interpretation of unemployment. RBC 
theory suggests that the reduction in hours that perpetuates a recession 
is caused by voluntary decisions by workers. Expansions are caused by 
workers choosing more hours following positive productivity shocks. 
For this to be true, workers must be quite responsive to changes in 
the real wage. Yet statistical studies find that workers do not greatly 
alter the amount they work when wages change (Altonji, 1986). This 
certainly makes intuitive sense. Few workers have the flexibility in 
either their work schedules or their budgets to cut back on the number 
of hours they work. A second problematic implication of the RBC 
version of voluntary unemployment is that the number of workers 
quitting their jobs should increase during a recession. Yet this is the 
opposite of what occurs. During recessions, the number of voluntary 
quits decreases while the number of job listings decreases. Recessions 
and depressions are times when the unemployed, desperate to find 
a job at virtually any wage, line up to apply for those few jobs that 
become available. This is precisely what is implied by an explanation 
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of downturns that rests on involuntary unemployment, but it flies in 
the face of RBC theory. 
Perhaps even more perniciously, RBC theory implies away 
the very real and very damaging effects of unemployment on the 
unemployed. In RBC theory, unemployment is not something forced 
on an unwilling worker, but something chosen and welfare improving. 
However, unemployment has been linked to increased mortality, 
worse mental health, and unhealthy behavioral changes like alcohol 
consumption and marriage breakdown. Both men and women who are 
unemployed report being in bad health more often than those who are 
employed. In terms of stressful life events, unemployment is ranked 
as equivalent to the death of a family member (McKee-Ryan et al., 
2005; Bartley et al., 2006; Mustard et al., 2006). These facts do not lie 
comfortably alongside an assertion that choosing “more leisure” is a 
voluntary, welfare-improving choice by workers.
RBC theory’s lack of understanding of the functioning of the 
labor market is underlined in their assumption about the connection 
between productivity and wages. For the authors in this chapter, the 
labor market is competitive and wages are flexible. As a result of 
competition between firms for workers, when productivity increases, 
the value of workers’ production will rise, and wages will go up. 
Yet, as we have seen in Chapter 3, while prior to 1980 wages did 
increase with productivity, since 1980 wages have lagged well behind 
productivity growth. RBC theory would have difficulty explaining 
this trend because of its erroneous assumptions about a perfectly 
competitive labor market. We have argued that the labor market is 
not a place of perfect competition, where equally powerful employers 
and employees bargain a wage contract. Rather, the labor market is 
characterized by the power of the firm over the worker, which waxes 
and wanes with the changing structure of the labor market, from the 
level of unemployment to regulations that help workers like favorable 
unionization rules. The changing relative power of workers and firms 
in the labor market can explain the changing relationship between 
wages and productivity before and after 1980, a theory that assumes 
perfectly competitive labor markets cannot.
Finally, the RBC policy ineffectiveness conclusion appears to be 
falsified by economic evidence. It is ironic that RBC theory rose to 
prominence in the 1980s, the precise moment that the unemployment 
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sacrifice, something that RBC claims does not exist, was so conclusively 
proven. RBC theory implies that with rational expectations and 
price and wage flexibility, there should be no decline in output or 
employment when contractionary monetary policy causes interest 
rates to rise. In the US during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
Federal Reserve under Paul Volcker followed a restrictive monetary 
policy that forced nominal interest rates up above 15 percent. A severe 
recession followed. Unemployment rose from 6 to 10 percent between 
1979 and 1983. Inflation was also reduced, falling from 11 to 3 percent 
during the same period. The debate between non-RBC economists 
was not so much whether the high interest rates contributed to the 
recession as whether the benefits in terms of reduced inflation were 
worth the costs of higher unemployment.
The difference between Friedman’s adaptive expectations 
monetarism from Chapter 3 and RBC theory can be highlighted 
in this context. Friedman argued that the inflationary tolerance of 
the Fed prior to 1979 meant that people did not believe that it was 
going to seriously combat inflation. As a result of people’s continued 
expectation of inflation, the Fed had to raise interest rates sufficiently 
high to convince people that its anti-inflationary policy was credible, 
which created a greater recession than would have been necessary 
had the Fed’s contractionary policy been believed (Friedman, 1984). 
However, the benefit of establishing the credibility of the Fed’s low 
inflation target is that people would now expect inflation to be lower 
in the future. As William Poole more explicitly stated, “a recession may 
be necessary to provide the evidence that the central bank is serious” 
(Poole, 1988, p. 98). Even those in favor of the high interest-rate effort 
to control inflation recognized that there would be recessionary costs. 
RBC theorists insisted that this was not the case. For RBC theorists, 
the high interest-rate policy and subsequent recession must have been 
coincidental events, not causal ones.
Kydland and Prescott’s RBC theory, however, creates the misleading 
impression that high interest rates are not associated with higher 
unemployment or reduced output. Nor will lower interest rates 
increase output and reduce employment. As Mankiw noted:
… to the extent that it trivializes the social cost of observed 
fluctuations, real business cycle theory is potentially dangerous. The 
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danger is that those who advise policy-makers might attempt to use 
it to evaluate the effects of alternative macroeconomic policies or to 
conclude that macroeconomic policies are unnecessary. (Mankiw, 
1989, p. 79)
Even Mankiw’s telling critique does not explicitly acknowledge the 
distributional consequences of RBC policy. Stabilization policy aimed 
at promoting full employment, a policy that RBC theory views as 
ineffective and unnecessary, improves the bargaining position of 
workers in the labor market. Conversely, RBC theory dismisses 
anti-inflationary policy’s very real negative impact on workers who 
find themselves unemployed or in a diminished bargaining position if 
they manage to hold onto their job.
In total, RBC theory is sufficiently at odds with actual economic 
events that it led one researcher to conclude that “anyone who believes 
that theories must be warranted by evidence has little reason to date 
to place much confidence in real business cycle models” (Hartley et 
al., 1997, p. 51). In a more dramatic vein, the rational expectations 
revolution was summarily dismissed by Robert Solow:
Suppose someone sits down where you are sitting right now and 
announces to me that he is Napoleon Bonaparte. The last thing I 
want to do with him is to get involved in a technical discussion of 
cavalry tactics at the Battle of Austerlitz. If I do that, I’m getting 
tacitly drawn into the game that he is Napoleon Bonaparte. Now, 
Bob Lucas and Tom Sargent like nothing better than to get drawn 
into technical discussions, because then you have tacitly gone along 
with their fundamental assumptions; your attention is attracted 
away from the basic weakness of the whole story. Since I find 
that fundamental framework ludicrous, I respond by treating it 
as ludicrous—that is, by laughing at it—so as not to fall into the 
trap of taking it seriously and passing on to matters of technique. 
(Klamer, 1984, p. 146)
In some ways RBC’s economic theory amounts to little more than 
assuming away the problematic impacts of economic downturns. 
Further, even an economist like Mankiw, who as we saw in Chapter 1, 
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is fairly amenable to pro-business policy, was concerned that RBC 
policy recommendations are dangerously misguided.
Conclusion: RBC and Profits
The problems associated with RBC theory are, in fact, sufficiently 
grave that it could lead one to question why it was so influential. The 
answer might be that RBC was more useful than it was accurate. 
By useful, we mean that, given the economic conditions of the time, 
RBC theory justified the policies that played an important role in 
restoring profits.
First, it suggests that unemployment is not caused by monetary 
policy. Since recessions can only be caused by supply-side shocks and 
employees’ choices about hours of work that follow, high interest-rate 
policy cannot cause unemployment in RBC theory. As a result, the 
high interest-rate policy is justified by RBC theory. In doing so, it not 
only disguises the attack on labor as an attack on inflation, as does 
Friedman, but also goes a step further in arguing that fighting inflation 
actually harms no one. In the context of the 1980s, this provided an 
intellectual justification for the turn away from using monetary policy 
to maintain higher levels of employment and focusing instead on 
fighting inflation—a policy change that, as we have seen, has been 
beneficial to the profitability of US firms, but has had problematic 
consequences for US workers.
Second, RBC downplays the negative impacts of unemployment 
on workers by suggesting that unemployment is a welfare-improving 
voluntary response to supply-side shocks and declining real wages. 
RBC theory suggests that policy should focus on alleviating 
productivity-decreasing shocks but not using either counter-cyclical 
policy (deficit spending and lower interest rates) or social insurance 
to alleviate the impacts of that unemployment. According to the 
RBC model it would appear, for example, that increasing payments to 
the unemployed would make it more likely for workers to substitute 
leisure for labor when real wages fall, exacerbating the duration of 
downturns. This is the opposite of the Keynesian implication that 
maintaining consumer demand in a recession can help maintain sales 
for business and shorten a recession. Of course, the debate around the 
merits of providing income to the unemployed is not only about the 
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impact on unemployment, but also on the relative power of workers 
and employers in the labor market. The less government assistance is 
provided to those out of work, the more desperate workers become to 
either keep or find a job. The RBC insistence that unemployment is 
caused by workers freely choosing leisure very nicely dovetails with 
business desires to get labor costs down after the 1970s.
Third, as RBC theory moved from a more narrow technological 
explanation of productivity swings, to one that included government 
policy, the policies that RBC authors deemed harmful were revealing. 
Government policies that are harmful to productivity according to 
RBC include protective regulation, like environmental or worker 
safety, and corporate taxation. In this respect, RBC reinforced the 
claim that business was being dragged down by the cost of government, 
which we saw in both Friedman’s work in Chapter 4 and public choice 
theory in Chapter 5. The obvious policy solution is to reduce these 
costs to create a more hospitable climate for productivity-enhancing 
investment by the private sector. However, this ignores any socially 
beneficial uses corporate taxes might be put to, and any benefits that 
flow from regulatory protection of workers and the environment.
It is, perhaps, no surprise that rational expectations and RBC came 
to prominence during the 1980s. The idea of rational expectations was 
first credited to a 1961 paper by Muth, but it took a decade for it to be 
applied by Lucas (Muth, 1961). Even Lucas’s 1972 paper only really 
rose to prominence a decade later. Some analysts have explained this 
by arguing that prior to the 1970s, the Keynesian analysis was the 
“only game in town” (Snowdon & Vane, 2005, p. 230). But this begs 
the question of why an alternative was needed after this and why this 
particular alternative gained so much traction. According to corporate 
America, profits had fallen in the 1970s because American labor 
worked too little and was paid too much. A Business Roundtable report 
in the 1970s claimed that profits were being squeezed by accelerating 
unit labor costs as wages rose and productivity stagnated (Kotz, 
2015, p. 77). The policy implications that flow from RBC theory, like 
abandoning the Keynesian commitment to full employment, limiting 
income support for the unemployed, and reducing corporate taxation, 
were precisely the policy changes for which business, and its organi-
zations like the Business Roundtable, were lobbying to restore their 
profits after the 1970s.
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Bursting Bubbles: Finance, Crisis  
and the Efficient Market Hypothesis
It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary 
depends on his not understanding it. (Upton Sinclair, 1934, p. 109)
Introduction
The world of finance can seem a bit above the pay grade of most 
people. The realm of stock values and diversifying risk seems more 
commonly populated by Warren Buffet-style billionaires than people 
of more modest means. As we saw in Chapter 3, it is certainly true 
that the ownership of assets in the US is the privilege of a very select, 
fortunate few, but this does not mean that the world of finance has 
no bearing on the lives of those with much more limited investment 
portfolios. This was brought crashing home for most people by the 
2007 financial crisis in the US that bankrupted several giants in the 
investment industry, cost many families their homes and put millions 
out of work when the subsequent economic collapse forced the 
unemployment rate up from 4 to 10 percent. Purportedly, the role 
of the financial sector is to channel money from those with savings 
to socially desirable investments. This includes a wide variety of 
functions, from banks taking deposits and issuing loans to the 
stock market distributing the ownership of firms. In an ideal world, 
the financial system would work to channel investments into those 
activities that society considered to be most desirable, and much of 
the debate in financial economics is the extent to which this is likely 
to be achieved without government oversight, and whether there are 
features of financial markets that make them prone to instability.
The authors featured in this chapter generally come down on the 
“no oversight” side of the debate. Eugene Fama started his under-
graduate university career in the Romance languages, a considerable 
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disciplinary distance from finance economics where he made his 
name. However, he quickly grew bored of Voltaire and turned his 
attention to finance and business economics, becoming yet another off 
the Chicago graduate school assembly line in 1964. He immediately 
took a job at Chicago where he remained for the rest of his career. 
He credits fellow Nobel-winning finance economist Merton Miller 
as his mentor (Fama, 2013). His work ethic has become the stuff of 
legend. In a 2007 interview with the Minneapolis Fed, he claimed 
that working every day, including holidays, is really nothing out of 
the ordinary (Clement, 2007). Fama’s 2013 Nobel Prize, shared with 
fellow Chicagoan Lars Peter Hansen and Yale’s Robert Shiller, was 
awarded for “their empirical analysis of asset prices.” Awarding the 
Nobel simultaneously to Shiller and Fama raised a few eyebrows 
since, as we shall see, their theories appeared to contradict each other. 
While they both conducted, in the highly generic terms of the Nobel 
award, “empirical analysis of asset prices,” Fama’s work suggested that 
the market is efficient and that investors are rational, while Shiller’s 
argued that investor irrationality can lead to asset bubbles.
Fama claims that his “extreme libertarian” views make him 
something of a political outsider. He admires both Friedrich Hayek’s 
Road to Serfdom and Milton Friedman for arguing that “to the extent 
you let government take over economic activity you’re basically giving 
up freedom” (Sommer, 2013). Despite his claims to being outside the 
normal political spectrum, Fama is an active participant in debates over 
economic policy. He is on the American Enterprise Institute’s (AEI) 
Council of Economic Advisors and won its 2014 Irving Kristol Award 
for “exceptional intellectual and practical contributions to improve 
government policy, social welfare, or political understanding.” Some 
indication of the type of contribution that wins the Kristol Award can 
be gleaned from past winners: Dick Cheney, Clarence Thomas, Ronald 
Reagan, Paul Ryan and Henry Kissinger (AEI, 2014). He has justified 
skyrocketing CEO compensation, arguing that, although their wages 
are undeniably very high, they could only be too high if the process is 
somehow “corrupted,” a claim for which Fama says there is no evidence: 
“So my premise would be that you’re just looking at market wages. 
They may be big numbers; that’s not saying they’re too high” (Clement, 
2007). In general, he also argues that government intervention and 
regulation are harmful to the economy. Although Fama argues that 
bursting bubbles
127
“some regulation” is necessary in the financial system, he thinks that 
the fairly limited Dodd-Frank bill, which was designed to prevent a 
recurrence of the 2007 financial crisis, went “too far.” The collapse 
of the housing market in 2007 was due to government policy, “not a 
failure of the market. The government decided that it wanted to expand 
home ownership. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were instructed to buy 
lower grade mortgages” (Cassidy, 2010a). For Fama, the worst lesson 
from the ensuing financial collapse was that government was willing 
to bail out companies that were “too big to fail,” which created risky 
investment strategies by firms that knew they would not be allowed to 
go under (Fisher, 2012). However, in a seeming contradiction of both 
his libertarian leanings and Hayek’s threat about encroaching socialism, 
Fama recommended nationalizing the banks that failed after the 2007 
crisis rather than bailing them out (Sommer, 2013).
In some ways, Robert C. Merton’s future career in financial 
economics was apparent from childhood. His father was a social 
scientist of considerable renown at Columbia. In fact, he coined the 
phrase “self-fulfilling prophesy” in which people’s belief that something 
will happen makes it happen, for example, when people’s belief that a 
share price will go up makes people buy that share causing its value 
to increase. Merton’s childhood years were dedicated to baseball and 
cars, but even in these he showed a penchant for obsession to detail, 
memorizing batting averages and engine horsepower. He claims that 
he grew up fascinated with stocks and money. He even created his 
own fictitious bank, RCM Savings of Dollars and Cents Company 
(Merton, 1997). With an academic father and an interest in money, 
his career path should not be hugely surprising. Although Merton 
started off his university life in math and engineering, he opted to 
jump to economics and completed his PhD at MIT in 1970, where 
he subsequently took a faculty position alongside Fischer Black and 
Myron Scholes. In 1988, he moved to Harvard where he is currently 
a Professor Emeritus.
Despite dying his hair red after winning the Nobel, Merton has been 
described as a reserved academic (Lowenstein, 2011, p. 35). Unlike 
Fama, he doesn’t belong to any think tanks and has made fewer public 
pronouncements on his economic ideology. However, he has weighed 
in with some carefully measured words on the role of government 
in the financial sector. Like Fama, although he acknowledges that 
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there is some role for government, successful public policy involves 
“recognizing when government inaction is the best choice” (Merton & 
Bodie, 1995, p. 266). Following the financial crisis, Merton advocated 
a national financial oversight board, which would investigate financial 
failures in the same manner that the transportation safety board deals 
with air plane crashes: “a forensic team, highly trained, comes in and 
examines what happened” (Klein et al., 2013a, p. 459).
Scholes is portrayed as the more gregarious of the Merton-Scholes 
duo. He grew up in Ontario, Canada, the son of a dentist. Entrepre-
neurial from an early age, he started a string of businesses with his 
brother including selling satin sheets. His career path mirrored many 
of the others summarized in these pages. He completed his MBA 
and PhD at Chicago under Fama, who he described as his mentor. 
After graduation in 1968, he took a job teaching financial economics 
at MIT’s Sloan School along with Merton and Black, with whom he 
did his most famous work. As was so often the case with its graduates, 
Scholes returned to Chicago in 1973. He moved again after a decade, 
taking a job at Stanford in 1983, where he currently enjoys the lengthy 
title, Frank E. Buck Professor of Finance, Emeritus.
Scholes is a little more forthcoming about his policy stances 
than Merton. Scholes was a Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover 
Institution. Like others profiled here, he signed a petition supporting 
Mitt Romney’s “bold economic plan for America” during the 2012 
presidential campaign (Hoover Institution, 2012). In a 2008 debate 
with Joseph Stiglitz, Scholes argued in favor of a light regulatory touch 
in the wake of the financial crisis. Market failures, he claimed, “do not 
lead to the conclusion that re-regulation will succeed in stemming 
future failures. Or that society will be better off with fewer freedoms.” 
After all, he continued, those who favor regulation inevitably overlook 
“the vast increase in the wealth of the global economy that has resulted 
from the freedom to innovate” (Scholes, 2008). As we will see, Scholes’s 
academic work facilitated the dramatic expansion of financial markets, 
opening him up to considerable criticism after the 2008 crash. Yet, 
he remains unrepentant about the growing financialization of the 
economy, claiming that despite the crash, “I haven’t changed my ideas” 
(Solomon, 2009).
Merton and Scholes won the Nobel in 1997 for “a new method to 
determine the value of derivatives.” The original work was laid out by 
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Scholes and Black (who died in 1995, or he would have undoubtedly 
shared the award), who developed a pioneering formula for valuing 
stock options, coined the Black-Scholes Formula. Merton expanded 
and generalized the formula. According to both Merton and the 
Nobel Committee, the work of these three facilitated more efficient 
risk management in society and “laid the foundation for the rapid 
growth of markets for derivatives in the last ten years” (The Royal 
Swedish Academy of Sciences, 1997). In more general terms, the 
decision to award the Nobel to economists who argued that prices in 
financial markets were accurate reflections of the real value of an asset 
was “a clear statement: markets work” (Henderson, 1997).
The world of financial economics is a little different than other 
fields in the discipline. In every field, academic work and the 
policy implications that stem from that work, have different costs 
and benefits for different groups in society. We have attempted to 
demonstrate in previous chapters that economic ideas that support 
the profitability of business became increasingly prominent after the 
1970s. We have attempted to trace this influence, in part, to the ability 
of business to fund and promote the ideas of sympathetic scholars. 
In all of these cases, there is an alignment of interests. The ideas of 
particular academics dovetail nicely with the interests of business and 
are therefore promoted and disseminated. Where financial economics 
differs from other disciplines is that it has not, generally, been the 
case that academic economists routinely benefit directly from their 
intellectual work—at least not to the degree that exists for those 
actually working in finance. The relationship between financial 
economics and the corporate world is more intimate. Most financial 
economists—Fama, Merton and Scholes included—have very direct 
relationships with investment firms. As a result, their interest in the 
regulatory environment surrounding these firms is not that of an 
impartial academic observer, but rather someone with a vested interest. 
For example, an economist who receives income from a company that 
trades in derivatives would be financially harmed by a government 
decision to regulate derivatives trading. If, as is often the case, that 
economist were in a position to offer policy advice or to publish 
literature on the topic of derivatives regulation, that would commonly 
be thought of as a conflict of interest, and yet this is frequently what 
happens in the world of financial economics (Mirowski, 2013, p. 220). 
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The hidden financial connections of economists and their advocacy for 
the deregulation of the financial system were dramatically illustrated 
in the film, The Inside Job. In a more academic vein, economists Jessica 
Carrick-Hagenbarth and Gerald Epstein investigated the business 
affiliations of 19 financial economists who were involved in two 
groups proposing reforms to the financial system following the 2008 
crisis, the Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation, and 
the Financial Reform Task Force associated with the Pew Charitable 
Trusts Financial Reform Project. They found that between 2005 and 
2009, 15 of the 19 economists in their sample had affiliations with 
private financial institutions. Further, 13 of the 15 did not disclose their 
affiliations in their academic or policy work. The consensus policy view 
of these economists was that any reform needs to be market based and 
involve relatively less government regulation (Carrick-Hagenbarth & 
Epstein, 2012, p. 59). While it is impossible to determine whether the 
material interests of these economists influenced their academic policy 
stances, the two align conveniently.
All three of the economists highlighted here have one foot in the 
academic world and one foot in business. Fama was on the board of 
Dimensional Fund Advisors (DFA), an investment firm founded by 
Fama protégé David Booth, who described Fama’s Chicago course 
as a life-changing experience. As a mark of his appreciation, Booth 
donated $300 million to the University of Chicago and credited Fama 
for his success (Allen, 2013). Merton and Scholes are even more 
involved in the private sector. Scholes was the chairman of Platinum 
Grove Asset Management, on the board of the DFA, and is on the 
American Century Mutual Fund Board of Directors. He was also 
a managing director at Salomon Brothers (Scholes, 2016). Merton 
was a resident scientist at Dimensional Holdings, Inc., where he is 
the creator of Managed DC, “a global integrated retirement-funding 
solution system” (Merton, 2016).
Most famously, Merton and Scholes were partners in Long-Term 
Capital Management (LTC). Although Merton operated more in 
the background, the outgoing Scholes was a crucial element of the 
company’s sales pitch. His academic credentials impressed potential 
clients and investors, who he bewildered with the math behind 
LTC’s investment strategy, which he compared to “vacuuming up 
nickels others couldn’t see” (Lowenstein, 2011, p. 34). Scholes was 
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also valuable to LTC because of his intimate knowledge of tax rules 
and his ability to put his claim, that “no one actually pays taxes,” into 
practice (Lowenstein, 2011, p. 35). When Merton and Scholes won 
their Nobel in 1997, things were on the up for LTC. Merton could 
legitimately boast that LTC had raised $1 billion from investors, 
had 180 employees, and had opened an office in Tokyo. One dollar 
invested in LTC in early 1994 would have been worth $4 in early 1998 
(Lowenstein, 2011, p. i). According to Merton in 1997, LTC “charac-
terizes the theme of the productive interaction of finance theory and 
finance practice” (Merton, 1997). Yet, by the end of the summer of 
1998, LTC had lost everything in a remarkable five-week period after 
Russia declared a debt moratorium and refused to defend the value 
of the ruble. The refusal of any government or international actor 
to step in and prop up the Russian financial system, as the US had 
done for Mexico earlier in the decade, made investors leery of first, 
emerging markets, and then, of any risky investment. In one day, LTC 
lost 15 percent of its capital, over $500 million. Although LTC made 
its money gambling on firms that it felt were over- or under-valued, 
it was completely unprepared for a general downturn in the financial 
market (Lowenstein, 2011, p. 143).
Ironic may be a much-abused term, but surely the bankruptcy 
of an investment firm in which two of the partners won the Nobel 
Prize for their work in valuing assets fits the definition. In the context 
of this chapter, perhaps the more important lesson from LTC is 
that highlighted by Carrick-Hagenbarth and Epstein. These three 
scholars, especially Merton and Scholes, are not disinterested impartial 
observers of the world of finance. Rather they are practitioners with 
a material interest in the conditions of that market. Unlike many 
of the economists in this book, whose ideas accord with those that 
benefit business, the economists in this chapter are members of the 
business community.
Asset Pricing: The Theory
Merton and Scholes are most famous for their work inventing and 
refining the Black-Scholes formula for valuing options. An option,1 
1  To be precise, this is an example of a European option. An American option 
can be exercised on any date between the option sale and an end date.
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as the name suggests, provides the purchaser with the right (not the 
obligation, which is why it is called an option) to buy (call option), 
or sell (put option), an asset at a certain price at a certain future date. 
When X buys an option from person Y, they pay Y for the right to 
purchase an asset at a later date. If the actual value of the asset at that 
later date is greater than the agreed on price, then X will take the 
option. If the difference between the agreed on price of the asset and 
the actual price is greater than the price paid by X for the option, X has 
gained on the transaction. The worst X can do from the transaction is 
the loss from the price paid to Y for the option (Shah, 1997).
The problem that Fischer, Black and Merton were able to solve was 
how to price the option. Prior to the Black-Scholes formula (coined by 
Merton – the name is extended to the Black–Merton–Scholes model 
by some), pricing an option was equal parts guesswork and gambling 
because of the uncertainty surrounding the risk premium. As a result 
of this uncertainty, at the time Fischer and Black were coming up 
with their formula, there was no institutionalized, organized market 
for options. Black, Merton and Scholes argued that the risk premium 
is already included in the price of the asset. Their equation related 
the price of the option to three things that can be readily measured: 
the amount of time until the option date, the price of the asset upon 
which the option is secured, and the interest that could be earned by 
an investment with zero risk, such as government bonds. The fourth 
element, which is not as obviously observable, is the volatility of the 
asset, but this is assumed to be constant for the lifetime of the option. 
The price of the option then depends on these variables. For example, 
if the price of the asset increases, then the price of the option, should 
also increase since there is a greater likelihood that the asset price 
will be greater than the agreed-on sale price when the agreement 
comes due.
One of the important discoveries of Black, Merton and Scholes 
is that hedging—making an offsetting investment—can be used to 
eliminate risk, using a mix of the option and the underlying asset. 
They then asserted that this riskless mix of investments should earn 
the same return as a riskless interest rate-bearing investment like a 
bond. The logic behind this is that if the return were any different 
between two equally risk-free assets, people would flee the lower return 
asset and flock to the one that earned a higher return equalizing the 
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returns between the two (Schaefer, 1998). The Black Scholes formula 
is a partial differential equation that determines the rate of change 
of the option price in terms of the rates at which the other variables, 
like the price of the asset, are changing (Black & Scholes, 1972, 1973; 
Merton, 1973; for a popular account of the equation see Jarrow, 1999; 
Stewart, 2012a).
A fancy partial derivative may not sound like a particularly 
ground-breaking discovery. However, it opened up not only the 
market for options but a wide variety of other financial instruments, 
including derivatives. The techniques invented by Black, Merton and 
Scholes revolutionized not just academic economics or even economic 
policy, but provided a valuable tool for the practitioners of finance used 
by “literally thousands of individuals” (Schaefer, 1998, p. 425). When 
Scholes and Black wrote their article in the early 1970s, it was possible 
to speak of options as being a small market. By 2007, $1 quadrillion 
per year worth of derivatives were traded internationally, ten times 
the real value of all products manufactured in the world over the last 
century (Stewart, 2012b).
Fama was known more as an empiricist than a theorist. He is best 
known for his support for the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). 
The claim that markets are “efficient” demands some definition of 
what is meant by efficiency. What Fama means by “efficient” might 
be thought of as “accurate” in the sense that he argues that efficiency 
means a fairly narrow definition of: “a market in which prices always 
‘fully reflect’ available information” (Fama, 1970, p. 383). He claims 
that because of competition between rational investors, the value of 
assets, like stocks, incorporates all relevant information. This claim 
was formulated very early in Fama’s career, appearing in his doctoral 
dissertation (Fama, 1965; Clement, 2007). Part of the problem in 
testing this idea is defining what “information” means. In his 1970 
paper, Fama defines three types: information on historical prices (weak 
form), all publicly available information, such as annual corporate 
earnings announcements (semi-strong form), and investors having 
“monopolistic” information, by which he means that some have a 
special advantage over others in obtaining or processing data (strong 
form). He finds that “evidence in support of the efficient markets model 
is extensive and (somewhat uniquely in economics) contradictory 
evidence is sparse” (Fama, 1970, p. 416). Fama’s definition is different 
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than allocative efficiency, which would mean that the prices of assets 
would channel money into the most socially desirable investments, 
a fact that some of Fama’s critics seem to miss (Mirowski, 2013, p. 
266). Having said this, Fama does claim in his 1970 article, “Efficient 
Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,” that “the 
ideal is a market in which prices provide accurate signals for resource 
allocation,” which would seem to imply something much broader 
and more normatively desirable than Fama’s information definition, 
involving the capital market’s ability to channel investment into those 
areas that society would find most valuable (Fama, 1970, p. 383).
Fama continued this work in various forms throughout his career. 
Fama’s work with Dartmouth economist Ken French found that 
asset prices are “highly related to business conditions,” and that “the 
variation in expected returns is rational” (Clement, 2007). He has also 
surveyed the existing work on “event studies,” which are essentially 
tests of how asset prices respond to new information (events), such 
as mergers or unexpected earnings announcements. Fama argues 
that there is no systemic bias to how investors react to these kinds 
of events. Apparent under-reaction to events occurs as often as over-
reaction and continuation of abnormal returns after the release of the 
information is as frequent as reversals of above-normal returns (Fama, 
1998; Malkiel, 2003). The implication is not that prices are efficient 
in the sense that they are always correct. Because asset prices are based 
on future earnings, it would require perfect foresight for them to be 
completely accurate and no one has a magic crystal ball. Rather, it 
means that new information is quickly incorporated into asset prices 
and that investors do not make any predictable, systematic errors in 
using that information.
While it might not seem particularly ground-breaking to discover 
that stock prices are “related to business conditions,” Fama’s EMH 
has two important implications. The first is less controversial from 
a policy standpoint, but does suggest an investing strategy. If new 
information is quickly adopted by rational investors into the price 
of the asset, then future prices are essentially random because they 
will only reflect unpredictable upcoming events. Because there are no 
predictable future patterns to asset prices, it is impossible to “beat the 
street,” even for the professional investor. According to Fama, “only 
the top 3%” of portfolios that are actively managed by professionals 
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earn returns high enough to cover their additional costs (Harrison, 
2012). The implication of this for investing strategies is that paying for 
managed funds in which analysts use supposedly innovative strategies 
to pick winners is a waste of money. Fama’s research implies that a 
much more cost-effective strategy is to invest in an index of stocks, 
which contributed to the spread of low-cost passive investing through 
index funds (Campbell, 2014; Malkiel, 2003).
The second implication of the EMH is more controversial from a 
policy standpoint. If markets are efficient and prices accurately reflect 
available information, this would seem to dismiss the possibility of 
investor behavior that leads to systematically incorrect pricing of 
assets. This is important because it suggests that there should be no 
such thing as an asset bubble caused by investor over-confidence or 
exuberance. In a New York Times interview, Fama declared, “I don’t 
even know what a bubble means … These words have become 
popular. I don’t think they have any meaning” (Appelbaum, 2013). 
Fama’s claim that asset bubbles cannot exist seems to run up against 
some prominent recent examples. On Black Monday in 1987, the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 22.6 percent in a single day, which 
seems to suggest either over-exuberance leading up to that date, or 
panic on the day itself. In the early 2000s, the decline in value of 
Internet-related business caused a rapid decline in the stock market. 
More recently, in 2007, the mortgage market in the US collapsed, 
taking the market for mortgage-based derivatives with it. Fama argues 
that these declines were not due to the collapse of inflated prices 
caused by overly optimistic investors, but, rather, were a rational 
adjustment to asset prices based on changing economic circumstances 
(Lowenstein, 2011, p. 74). For example, one theory about the collapse 
of the mortgage derivative market is that the derivatives made up of 
bundled mortgages were so complex that investors didn’t know what 
they were buying and were easily misled by the artificially high credit 
rating on these assets assigned by rating agencies like Moody’s, which 
suggests a certain degree of “inefficiency.” Fama argued that this is a 
misreading of the information, saying that “I’m very skeptical of these 
stories” (Clement, 2007). According to Fama, it was not financial 
collapse that sparked off economic crisis but the other way around: “I 
think you can’t reject the hypothesis that it was an economic disaster 
that caused the financial disaster” (Harrison, 2012). The logic behind 
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this is that the financial collapse was a rational response by investors 
to a rapidly deteriorating economy that would produce lower profits 
in the near future.
The idea that asset markets are always rational and efficient is not 
merely an academic assertion. It has important policy implications. If 
asset bubbles and their subsequent collapse are not a realistic possibility, 
then governmental oversight of the financial system is not necessary. 
The financial industry was steadily deregulated after the 1980s. Much 
of intellectual justification for this move was provided by the belief 
that asset prices were accurate and that the financial instruments that 
were being developed, like options and derivatives, made the economy 
less risky, making damaging asset bubbles nigh on impossible.
Taken together, the three Nobel winners in this section laid the 
ground work for the dramatic expansion and deregulation of the 
financial sector. Merton and Scholes’s work opened up new kinds of 
financial instruments such as options and derivatives. Fama’s EMH 
suggested that the market for these new assets was as accurate a 
reflection as possible of their underlying value, negating the need for 
government oversight.
Asset Pricing: Criticisms
By now, readers should recognize a recurring theme in this book. 
Many of the theories being analyzed assume that humans want, and 
have the ability, to act as rational maximizers. As Real Business Cycle 
(RBC) theorists assumed that people would take new information on 
the macro economy, like a change in interest rates, into their decisions 
about the future, so too the financial economists in this chapter 
assume that investors can make rational use of public information in 
valuing assets. Merton viewed investors as little more than calculators, 
going so far as to always put the term “speculative” in quotes so as to 
dismiss it as a possible motive (Lowenstein, 2011, p. 74). Much of 
the criticism of their work, including that of Nobel co-winner Shiller, 
is based on the extent to which people behave in this manner. If the 
Nobel Committee were attempting to make the economics profession 
look slightly foolish, they couldn’t have named a better combination of 
academics in 2013. Shiller’s theory of finance is almost impossible to 
reconcile with Fama’s. It was as though the best explorer of the year were 
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given jointly to someone who proved the earth is round and someone 
else who claimed to have fallen off its edge. This controversy was not 
lost on Shiller, who described the EMH as “the most remarkable error 
in the history of economic theory” (Lowenstein, 2011, p. 74). In a 
slightly more measured tone, he also stated that the EMH
… makes little sense, except in fairly trivial ways. If the theory 
said nothing more than that it is unlikely that the average amateur 
investor can get rich quickly by trading in the markets based on 
publicly available information, the theory would be spot on … But 
the theory is commonly thought, at least by enthusiasts, to imply 
much more. Notably, it has been argued that regular movements 
in the markets reflect a wisdom that transcends the best under-
standing of even the top professionals, and that it is hopeless for an 
ordinary mortal, even with a lifetime of work and preparation, to 
question pricing. (Shiller, 2013)
For Shiller, investors are not the rational automatons of EMH. Rather, 
they are subject to psychological influences that result in them being 
overly optimistic or unduly pessimistic, depending on which way the 
prevailing winds are blowing. This can create a “bandwagon” effect, 
where confident investors flock to assets in the belief that values are on 
the up, or vice versa, creating more volatility in asset prices than would 
be the case than if investors were, strictly speaking, rational (Shiller, 
2015). Shiller supports this with empirical evidence showing price 
volatility in the stock market is 5–13 times too high to be attributed 
to only new information about future real dividends (Shiller, 1981). 
According to Shiller, “I emphasize the enormous role played in markets 
by human error, as documented in a now-established literature called 
behavioral finance” (Shiller, 2013; see also Bernard & Thomas, 1990; 
DeBondt & Thaler, 1985; Kahneman & Rupe, 1998).
The idea that investors are prone to flights of fancy is not merely 
a matter of whether a few investors end up on the losing end of a 
gamble. If stock values are not correct, then the production and 
investment decisions based on those prices will also be incorrect. For 
example, in the early 2000s, this fancy new thing called the Internet 
was really taking off. Any company that could stick a “dot.com” after 
its name saw its value skyrocket. At the time, the optimistically high 
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valuations of such unlikely successes as “pets.com” were justified by 
the dot.com world as a new way of doing business that was poorly 
understood by the old analytics. As the price of these stocks increased, 
the Internet and technology sectors benefitted from a rush of new 
investment. Although hindsight is always perfect, it is now apparent 
that investment money was being channeled into areas that were 
unlikely to succeed. The EMH implies that because asset prices are as 
well-valued as possible, investment will be channeled into profitable 
avenues. Or, at least, avenues that people’s best rational judgment deems 
to be profitable. If Shiller is correct, investment money is often likely 
to be wasted on fads and trends. The debate between the supporters 
of the rationalist EMH and the behavioralist Shiller camp remains 
completely unresolved, despite an Everest-like mountain of research 
on the subject using increasingly advanced statistical techniques. Part 
of the reason for the ongoing uncertainty is that testing the EMH 
involves actually knowing what the “correct” prices of asset would 
be and what is causing their fluctuations, so any test of the EMH is 
simultaneously a test of other hypotheses, such as how to price an asset 
(Lo & MacKinlay, 2002). As a result of the difficulty of testing the 
EMH, additional research seems not to have brought any resolution of 
the debate. Rather, it has merely hardened the positions of both sides 
(although the debate around the EMH hardly stands alone in the 
economic landscape in this regard) (Mirowski, 2013, p. 265). Perhaps 
part of the reason for the dogmatism of each group is that they both 
understand the enormous implications of the contrasting theories. 
The gravity of the irrationality critique was not lost on Merton, who 
acknowledged, in his rebuttal of Shiller’s empirical studies, that if 
Shiller is correct “then serious doubt is cast on the validity of this 
cornerstone of modern financial economic theory” (Marsh & Merton, 
1986, p. 484).
If investors are, at times, irrational, it does not only lead to misplaced 
investment. In stark contrast to Fama’s assertion that the financial 
system cannot create asset bubbles and the Merton-Scholes claim 
that options can reduce risk, heterodox economist Hyman Minsky of 
Washington University in St. Louis argued that the inherently unstable 
financial system can destabilize the broader economy. Like Shiller, 
Minsky believed that people have a bandwagon mentality. When the 
economy is booming, the growing confidence of both borrowers and 
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lenders leads to increasingly speculative loans on the expectation of 
growing asset prices. At the beginning of a cycle, lenders will only 
provide credit in instances when both the interest and principle can be 
repaid. Minsky termed this “hedge finance.” As the boom continues 
and investors gain confidence in the second phase, “speculative 
finance” emerges, when loans are extended to those whose revenues 
will only cover interest. Finally, during the over-confident height of 
the boom, the “Ponzi finance” phase is reached, when revenues do not 
even cover the interest, and repayment is dependent on capital gains 
of increasing asset values. This bubble will then collapse when asset 
values decline, creating a short-term boom-and-bust cycle. In addition 
to these short-term fluctuations, there is a longer-term, overarching 
cycle in which the institutions that regulate and protect society from 
the inherently risky financial sector are eroded by the demands of the 
financial industry for a more laissez-faire approach (more on this in 
the next chapter). As a result of a policy environment that permits 
progressively more risk over this overarching cycle, the financial sector 
can be thrown into full-blown crisis (Minsky, 1977, 1982; Minsky & 
Vaughan, 1990; Minsky, 1993).
The very idea that bubbles and speculation are not a recurring 
theme in the world of finance is belied by its history of manias, panics 
and crises. As early as 1636, the price of tulips in the Netherlands 
skyrocketed and then crashed amid stories of investors selling their 
houses in order to buy into the booming bulb business. While it is true 
that bubbles and their nasty, inevitable burst have a long history, they 
have increased in the deregulated and increasingly financialized world 
after 1980. In their history of financial crises, economic historians 
Charles Kindleberger and Robert Aliber note that the years since 
the late 1970s have been unprecedented in terms of the “frequency 
and severity” of financial shocks (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005; see 
also Bilginsoy, 2015). Part of the reason for this must surely be the 
rapidly expanding range of financial instruments for the purposes of 
speculation. Prior to 1970, if an investor wanted to gamble on the future 
US mortgage values, there was no real market or financial instrument 
with which to do it. With the Black-Merton-Scholes formula and the 
expansion of asset trading that followed, speculation and the volatility 
that accompanied it increased dramatically (Lowenstein, 2011, p. 241). 
An International Monetary Fund (IMF) report counted a total of 147 
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banking crises worldwide between 1970 and 2011. The decade of the 
1970s was comparatively peaceful, with no crises in the first part of 
the decade and only four in the second half. After 1980, the story is 
very different. Not a year went by between 1980 and 1998 without at 
least one banking crisis somewhere in the world, with 1995 marking 
a particularly turbulent year featuring 13 crises, mostly centered on 
the nations of Latin America. The early years of 2000s were calm 
relative to the turbulent 1990s but, of course, this came crashing to an 
end with the 2007 wave of crises that engulfed over twenty countries 
(Laeven & Valencia , 2012, p. 10; for an early World Bank report along 
the same lines, see Caprio , 2003). As a reminder of just how damaging 
the 2007 crash was to financial markets, the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average fell by 40 percent, from 14,000 to 8,000, between November 
2007 and November 2008. Authors, like Fama, who question the 
existence of bubbles and argue that rational investors price assets as 
accurately as possible, are faced with the uphill task of explaining away 
the very existence of crises stemming from asset bubbles, let alone the 
coincidence that crises of unprecedented “frequency and severity” have 
accompanied an increasingly large, deregulated financial system.
A closer examination of the financial crisis reveals that the increased 
use of exotic financial instruments and deregulation were contributing 
factors. Although the Black-Merton-Scholes formula was purported 
to permit the calculation of the value of an asset, it actually provided 
a sense of false confidence in many of the outrageously complicated 
instruments that were being developed, such as mortgage-backed 
securities. In fact, no firm, let alone an individual investor, had the 
time or ability to accurately calculate the risk associated with them. 
As a result, buyers relied on ratings agencies, like Moody’s, to provide 
a credit score to indicate the riskiness of the asset. There were two 
problems with this. First, it appears as though the credit agencies did 
not fully understand many of these complex assets. Second, there was 
little incentive for them to dig very deeply to find problems with the 
assets and, if they did, giving an investment a low credit rating was 
against the interests of rating agencies. The problem was that the profits 
of rating agencies were dependent on maintaining the business of the 
investment banks who sold these derivatives. If one credit agency gave 
an asset a low rating, the investment bank selling the asset would simply 
take its business to another agency to get a higher rating. Reassured 
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by a naively secure impression of the risk of these assets, over-confi-
dent investors were snapping up mortgage-backed derivatives at prices 
that did not reflect their underlying value. House prices in the US fell 
by 7.2 percent in the year after the third quarter of 2007, the largest 
decline in the 39 years the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac) has been keeping statistics. When housing prices began 
to collapse in 2007, the value of these securities plummeted, sparking 
the global financial crisis (Crotty, 2009). In his assessment of the 
extent to which the Black-Merton-Scholes formula was to blame for 
the crash, mathematician Ian Stewart gives a slightly equivocal “Yes 
and no. Black-Scholes may have contributed to the crash, but only 
because it was abused. In any case, the equation was just one ingredient 
in a rich stew of financial irresponsibility, political ineptitude, perverse 
incentives and lax regulation” (Stewart, 2012b).
This brings us to the deregulatory causes of the crash. As economist 
James Crotty has pointed out, the policy implications of Minsky’s 
theory are dramatically different than those of Fama. While Minsky’s 
theory insists on the importance of maintaining protective regulation 
to minimize the risky activity of the financial system, Fama’s ideas 
imply that they are unnecessary. If Minsky’s ideas were taken more 
seriously, it is extremely unlikely that the deregulation of the financial 
sector would have been so wide-ranging, the assets so complex, and 
the investments so risky as was the case in the run-up to the 2007 
collapse. According to Shiller, Fama’s EMH was harmful because it 
provided the intellectual justification for “authorities in the United 
States and elsewhere to be complacent about asset mispricing, about 
growing leverage in financial markets and about the instability of 
the global system” (Shiller, 2013). With the increasing complexity of 
exotic financial instruments like options and derivatives, the financial 
world was becoming more, not less, risky and unstable. Yet the EMH 
was a falsely comforting theory that dismissed the possibility of asset 
bubbles and, therefore, the need to regulate against their possibility. 
The fact that asset bubbles have a long history and have increasingly 
plagued the world economy were explained away by Fama’s EMH 
as rational market adjustments to new information, rather than a 
financial world subject to swings of exuberance and panic.
Increasing financialization of the economy not only raises the 
specter of instability and crisis, it may also create longer-term problems 
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for economic growth. While most economists agree that finance plays 
a crucial role in the economy by channeling savings into socially useful 
investment, the extent to which specific financial institutions actually 
play this role, and the appropriate size of the financial sector, is subject 
to much more debate, with some questioning the desirability of the 
recent expansion and direction of finance. There is no question that 
the profitability of finance has increased since 1980. Financial sector 
profits as a percent of GDP increased from around 1 percent in the 
early 1980s to 3 percent in 2004 (Crotty, 2008, p. 169). Between 1966 
and 1984, financial sector profits hovered around 15–20 percent of 
total corporate profits in the US, but on the eve of the financial crisis 
in 2006 they accounted for over 40 percent of the total (Khatiwada, 
2010, p. 2). Since 1980, employment in the US finance sector has 
increased from around five million to more than seven-and-a-half 
million (Cassidy, 2010b). In 1980, the financial sector contributed 
4.9 percent of GDP. By 2006, that number had increased to 8.3 
percent (Greenwood & Scharfstein, 2013, p. 3). Even firms tradition-
ally outside of the financial sector were switching into the world of 
finance. In 1980, financial assets made up about 15 percent of total 
assets in the non-financial sector. By the early 2000s, that percentage 
had almost doubled, to 29 percent (Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2015).
Some of the major financial institutions also do less of what would 
be considered traditional investment in favor of more exotic financial 
activities of the kind that exploded with the creation of the Black-
Merton-Scholes formula. This trend continued even after the 2007 
financial collapse, in which investment giants Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs would have failed without government bailouts. 
Just to provide a quick snapshot for a few large financial firms, the 
traditional investment business of raising money for companies 
contributed less than 15 percent of revenue for Morgan Stanley in 
the first nine months of 2010. Between July and September of 2010, 
63 percent of Goldman Sachs’s revenue came from simply trading 
assets such as derivatives, while corporate finance added a much more 
modest 13 percent. In Citi’s investment-banking section about 80 
percent of revenues came from buying and selling securities, compared 
to 14 percent from raising capital for companies (Cassidy, 2010b). The 
financial sectors that expanded most rapidly since 1980 were asset 
management and “credit intermediation,” especially the rise of new 
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forms of mortgage lending (Greenwood & Scharfstein, 2013), not the 
more traditional capital-raising activities of finance.
The concern is that high profits in the finance industry, particularly 
that which is speculative rather than real investment, channel money 
and people away from “real” parts of the economy that actually produce 
goods and services and into finance, which does not actually produce 
anything. This was succinctly expressed by Christina Romer, the chair 
of President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers, in 2009, when 
she claimed that the US economy was suffering under the weight of a 
bloated financial sector that attracted investment that could have gone 
into “real” sectors of the economy, and talent that could otherwise have 
become doctors and engineers. A smaller financial sector, she argued, 
would actually allow the US to “make things” (quoted in Henwood, 
2010, p. 2; see also Baragar & Chernomas, 2012). The chair of Britain’s 
Financial Services Authority, Lord Adair Turner, was blunter, arguing 
that while finance has an important role in society, much of what is 
done in the financial centers of New York and London is “socially 
useless activity.” Rather than helping with production, many financial 
instruments “extract rents from the real economy” (cited in Cassidy, 
2010b). There appears to be some empirical support for these claims. 
An IMF study examining the effects of “financial development” on 
economies (using an index of the size of the financial sector, access 
and cost as a measure) found that a growing financial sector can 
actually have a negative impact on economic growth if the nation is 
already at a high level of financial development, as is the case in the 
US. The authors argue that this is because high levels of financial 
development can impair “allocation of financial resources toward 
productive activities” and create misallocation of “human capital 
across sectors” (Sahay et al., 2015, pp. 15–16; for more support for the 
negative connection between financialization and economic growth, 
see Stockhammer, 2004; Krippner, 2005; Palley, 2007; Freeman, 2010; 
Khatiwada, 2010; Arcand et al., 2012, and Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 
2015).
Conclusion: Finance and Profits
Crotty describes the EMH as a “fairy-tale theory,” based on “crudely 
unrealistic” assumptions, yet, although it was controversial, it became 
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widely accepted in both academic and policy circles. At least part of 
the answer to its popularity must turn on its benefits to the financial 
community (how this happened in policy circles will be covered in the 
next chapter) (Crotty, 2013; see also Roubini & Mihm, 2010).
The problems caused by selling complicated mortgage-backed 
derivatives in an increasingly deregulated environment may have 
contributed to the indebtedness of US households, but it increased 
the profitability of US firms. We have previously discussed the role 
of subprime mortgages in increasing the debt of US families and 
increasing the profitability of lenders. Of course, the problem with 
subprime loans is that the lender is extending loans to borrowers 
increasingly unlikely to be able to repay. This leads to the question of 
why banks would find these risky loans so attractive. Part of the answer 
is undoubtedly that they, along with most other observers, were overly 
optimistic about the US housing market. In addition, the innovation of 
mortgage-backed securities allowed them to access funds well beyond 
their own deposits. However, a crucial part of this story is the role of 
the incentive structure of mortgage-backed derivatives, which grew 
from $19 billion in 1995 to $508 billion in 2005 (Getter et al., 2007, 
p. 3), as opposed to the more traditional relationship between bank and 
household. Mortgage-backed derivatives severed the traditional risk of 
default that in the past had made banks cautious lenders. Traditionally, 
banks made money on loans by having the principal repaid along with 
a bit of interest. This made banks fairly conservative lenders, since they 
would not get repaid in full if the borrower defaulted. When banks (or 
any other lending institution, but we’ll use banks as a shorthand) sell 
a bundled package of mortgages as a financial instrument, they earn 
income on the sale of the mortgage bundle, not on the repayment of 
the mortgage. The risk of repayment is transferred from the bank to 
the buyer of the mortgage-backed security, reducing the incentive for 
banks to loan only to households who are likely to repay. In fact, the 
incentive for the bank is to sign as many families up for mortgages 
as possible, since that creates more derivatives for it to sell. While it 
might seem that if banks were a little looser with their purse strings, 
this would have the beneficial effect of providing families with lower 
incomes access to the American dream of home ownership, the reality 
was that by preying on people’s hopes, banks increased the number of 
families making larger debt payments. Family incomes were not only 
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stretched as a result of stagnating incomes due to changes in the labor 
market discussed earlier, but also because that limited income now 
had to stretch to cover the additional costs of interest and principle 
on loans. It would be a gross overstatement to lay the blame for the 
collapsed housing market at the feet of the Black-Merton-Scholes 
formula. Every stage in the mortgage and finance industry created 
an incentive for borrowers to overextend. Real estate agents on a 
commission have an incentive to sell a more expensive house. Lenders 
have an incentive to maximize their interest income by approving high 
mortgage limits and higher interest rates. Yet it is also certainly true 
that providing the foundation for the market in derivatives created a 
new and risky form of lending in which the incentive for banks was 
to have a large quantity of loans but the quality of those loans was of 
secondary importance at best. The result of all the links in this chain 
is that lending institutions extended larger loans to more families, 
increasing the interest payments from families and increasing the 
profits of firms in the financial sector.
The Black-Merton-Scholes formula also contributed to profits in 
the financial industry, because their formula for option pricing opened 
up a largely undiscovered market in new financial instruments. As the 
expansion of both the finance industry as a share of the whole economy 
and the rise of specific financial instruments, like mortgage-backed 
securities demonstrates, firms rushed in to take advantage of these 
new opportunities. As financial firms created, bought and sold these 
increasingly complicated but highly lucrative instruments, their profits 
were protected from the unwanted constraints of regulatory oversight 
by Fama’s EMH, which suggested that asset prices were generally 
priced accurately, removing the possibility of bubbles and their 
problematic popping. As we shall see in the next chapter, a number 
of concerns were raised about the deregulated financial market and 
regulations were proposed to rein it in. For example, limits on how 
much financial firms could borrow were proposed, as were restrictions 
on banks’ ability to function as investment houses. Each of these pieces 
of legislation would have constrained firms and lowered their profits. 
The intellectual justification for rejecting these regulatory moves was 
that the financial market was efficient.
The finance sector has enjoyed unprecedented profits over the 
last three decades or so. Yet these profits contributed to increasing 
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indebtedness of homeowners, economic instability and perhaps even 
reduced economic growth. Fama, Merton and Scholes were not 
directly responsible for the economic collapse or growing debt of 
the average American. Yet, as economist and former Greek Finance 
Minister Yanis Varoufakis remarked:
I don’t blame my fellow economists for pulling the trigger that 
created so much devastation in 2008 and before that and after that, 
but I blame them for providing the economic, the mathematical 
models, the sermons which steadied the hand of the financiers and 
allowed them to believe that what they were doing was perfectly 
okay, consistent with science, provable mathematically that it was 
riskless, and therefore allowed them the mental and emotional 




Economists Go to Washington:  
Ideas in Action
Introduction
In the 1939 movie Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, James Stewart plays 
a naïve but wholesome leader of the “Boy Rangers,” who is somewhat 
randomly plucked from the comfort of his small-town Midwestern 
life and thrust into the world of high politics when he is chosen to 
replace a recently deceased senator. The new senator falls afoul of 
the Machiavellian dirty dealing inside the Washington Beltway and 
is on the brink of being falsely charged for another’s corruption, 
when he saves himself with a filibuster so honest and impassioned 
that he sways the actual guilty party into confessing. It’s a movie that 
highlights the dishonesty and corruption of the political world while 
reaffirming the potential of US democracy when morally upstanding 
individuals take charge. This romantic version of politics, which places 
the faults in the system squarely on the shoulders of bad individuals, is 
considerably different than the interpretation offered in this book. In 
Chapters 2 and 3, we emphasized an interpretation of policy based on 
the powerful actors who can influence political results in their favor. 
These actors were not corrupt politicians or greedy bureaucrats but 
the business community, who were doing nothing more than acting 
in the political system in the same manner that they act in the rest 
of their operations—to maximize their profits. Most of the rest of 
the book has aimed to demonstrate that economists provided what 
might be called the ideological justification for the transformation of 
economic policy that has so favored the business community. In most 
of these examples, the economists played an arms’-length role. With 
the exception of the financial economists in the previous chapter, they 
did not have a direct material interest in the policies that they were 
the profit doctrine
148
advocating and they did not have their hands directly on the levers 
of power. They were not corrupted in the Mr. Smith manner. Rather, 
the theories that they developed had distributional consequences 
that favored business, which promoted these ideas to the public and 
within the halls of political power. In this chapter, we will examine two 
economists who were known not for their intellectual achievements 
in the economics profession, but who did have their hands on the 
levers of power. These individuals enacted the kind of pro-business 
policies that the other economists in this book advocated. There will 
be no Nobel Prize winners here. Rather a look at two economists in 
particularly high-ranking bureaucratic positions will illustrate the 
specific types of policies that led to the transformation of the US 
economy after 1980. Unfortunately, the story of Alan Greenspan and 
Lawrence Summers doesn’t have the same kind of feel-good ending as 
the tale of Mr. Smith.
For about twenty years, Alan Greenspan had a realistic claim to be 
the most famous, powerful economist alive. His position of influence 
did not come from clever economic theory, but from his long-standing 
position as chair of the Fed, the US central bank. It was a classic rise 
from humble beginnings to riches and power for a boy who was raised 
in his grandparents’ tiny apartment in New York, where his mother 
moved after splitting with Greenspan’s father. The most commonly 
bandied-about “revelation” about the young Greenspan by his various 
biographers was that he attended the Julliard School of Music, which 
he left to tour in a dance band. This is a pleasantly colorful bit of 
history for a man whose dour speaking style could only generously be 
described as deadly dull.
Greenspan traded music for economics. However, he was less 
academically driven than others whom we have discussed here, 
finishing his PhD in between his pursuits outside the ivory tower. 
While earning his bachelor’s and master’s degrees from New York 
University, Greenspan worked on Wall Street for one of the largest 
private banks in the United States, Brown Brothers Harriman, until 
opening his own consulting firm, Townsend-Greenspan & Co, where 
he worked from 1955 to 1987 (Biography, n.d.). An old music friend, 
Leonard Garment, started Greenspan’s life in the public sector when 
he convinced Greenspan to help out on the 1968 presidential campaign 
of Richard Nixon, who was Garment’s law partner (Martin, 2000). 
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He briefly interrupted his private-sector career to serve on President 
Gerald Ford’s Council of Economic Advisers from 1974 to 1977. His 
1977 PhD from New York University was not based on a traditional 
dissertation but rather on a collection of other writings, including the 
annual report of the president, which Greenspan prepared for Ford 
in his role on the Council of Economic Advisers. In fact, Greenspan 
never completed his planned dissertation. When Ronald Reagan was 
voted in, Greenspan served on his Economic Policy Advisory Board 
from 1981 to 1983. Of course, his biggest government role was chair 
of the Fed, where he became the most important setter of monetary 
policy and financial market regulator in the world (Crotty, 2009, p. 9).
Like the economists highlighted in Chapter 7 on finance, Greenspan 
was intimately connected to the private sector. He not only ran his 
own consulting firm but also served as a director for some of the 
biggest corporate names in America, including ALCOA, JP Morgan, 
General Foods and Mobil. According to former financial regulator 
Bill Black, Greenspan worked as a “de-facto” lobbyist for Charles 
Keating, whose Lincoln Savings and Loan fraud was a critical part of 
the Savings and Loan (S&L) collapse in the late 1980s. Greenspan 
enlisted the “Keating Five” senators who pressured regulators to forgo 
enforcement action against Keating’s S&L. Greenspan, himself, also 
sent a memo encouraging regulators to be more lenient, arguing 
that Lincoln “posed no foreseeable risk of loss” (Black, 2013; see 
also Fingleton, 2013). For his casual and very misleading look at 
the Lincoln books, Greenspan reportedly received $30,000–40,000 
(Madrick, 2011, p. 224).
Greenspan describes himself as a “lifelong libertarian Republican” 
(Ip & Steel, 2007); he has been described by others as an Ayn 
Rand acolyte. Rand is famous for her books, Atlas Shrugged and The 
Fountainhead, in which she espouses the ethics of self-interest through 
the fiction of heroic capitalists struggling against the drag of intrusive 
governments. Greenspan co-edited a book, Capitalism: the Unknown 
Ideal, with Rand and contributed an essay, “The Assault on Integrity,” 
to the volume, in which he argued that “the ‘greed’ of the businessman 
or, more appropriately, his profit-seeking … is the unexcelled 
protector of the consumer.” He claimed that this was true for banks 
as well as other firms since they needed to be able to maintain the 
trust of the customers to survive. Overall, he described free market, 
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unregulated capitalism as a “superlatively moral system” (Greenspan, 
1967). Greenspan’s own interpretation of his relationship with Rand 
is that it was a youthful fling that waned as he matured, but his policy 
pronouncements throughout his career remained consistent with 
the broad thrust of Rand’s philosophy (Greenspan, 2008; Monbiot, 
2012; Weiss, 2012). One example of Greenspan’s ideology comes 
from Bob Woodward’s fawning biography, called Maestro (2000). 
In 1994, Democratic President Bill Clinton appointed Alan Blinder 
as vice chair of the Fed under Greenspan. The outgoing vice chair, 
David Mullins, whom Greenspan had asked to check into Blinder’s 
bona fides, reported back, “it’s not like he’s a Communist or anything. 
It’s just in his early publications he’s noticeably soft on inflation.” 
Greenspan responded, “I would have preferred he were a Communist.” 
After less than two years as vice chair, Blinder resigned, frustrated by 
the cold relationship between the two, in which Blinder’s desire to 
allow a little more inflationary wiggle room in an effort to bring down 
unemployment was repeatedly foiled by Greenspan (Woodward, 
2000; see also Tuccille, 2002). Later in his tenure as the Fed chair, 
Greenspan endorsed Bush’s tax cuts, a foray into the political realm 
that had previously been taboo for supposedly impartial Fed chairs. 
His support of the cuts, despite the fact that the benefits went almost 
entirely to the richest income group and that they would increase the 
deficit, was based on his fear that a government surplus might be used 
to purchase private-sector stocks and bonds, a public intervention in 
the private sphere that he found unpalatable (Madrick, 2011, p. 243).
Lawrence Summers is more of an academic intellectual and had 
less policy clout than Greenspan, although admittedly that sets the 
academic bar low and the clout bar high. Unlike Greenspan, Summers 
was born to the academic world. His parents, Robert and Anita 
Summers, were both academic economists, first at Yale and then at 
the University of Pennsylvania. His uncles, Paul Samuelson and Ken 
Arrow, are two of most famous post-war economists. Summers is 
generally held to be remarkably intelligent. At age 10, he appeared on 
a local sports-radio quiz show and answered everything so quickly that 
the show ran out of questions (Bradley, 2005).
After earning his doctorate at Harvard in 1982, Summers flitted 
between the academic life and the public sector. After a very brief stint 
teaching at MIT, Summers went to work with the Reagan presidency’s 
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Council of Economic Advisers, but that lasted only until 1983 when 
he returned to Harvard and stayed there until 1991. In 1988, he signed 
on as an economic adviser with the presidential campaign of Massa-
chusetts Governor Michael Dukakis, where he met future bosses Bill 
Clinton and Robert Rubin (Bradley, 2005). It was after his departure 
from Harvard that Summer’s star really rose as a public figure. In 
1991, he went to work as the chief economist at the World Bank. In 
1993, he joined the US Treasury, where he rose from undersecretary to 
deputy to secretary of the Treasury under Clinton. It is this portion of 
Summer’s career that will be the primary focus of this chapter. After 
leaving government, Summers returned to academia, but not to the 
drudgery of lectures and seminars with the professoriate. Instead, 
he became Harvard’s president until he was forced out in 2006. In 
2008, he rejoined the federal government as Obama’s assistant to the 
president for economic policy and director of the National Economic 
Council until 2010, where he was tasked with organizing the federal 
response to the economic crisis. In 2011, he returned to Harvard as the 
Charles W. Eliot University Professor.
One of the common criticisms of Summers is that he projects an 
abrasive combination of superiority and crassness. Two high-profile 
instances are often cited to illustrate Summers’ tendency to court 
controversy. First, as chief economist at the World Bank he released 
a memo (written by Lant Pritchett, but signed by Summers) arguing 
that because wages were lower in the developing world than in richer 
countries, lives shortened by pollution were less costly. The inevitable 
conclusion, the memo claimed, was that “just between you and me, 
shouldn’t the World Bank be encouraging more migration of the dirty 
industries to the LDCs?” After all, lives shortened by pollution in 
poor nations did not represent a great loss compared to the economic 
benefits of more industry (Bradley, 2005). Needless to say, when 
this memo was leaked, it was not greeted with enthusiastic support. 
Summers’ defense was that it was sarcastic, designed to be contro-
versial in order to start a conversation on the limits of using narrow 
cost-benefit analysis. However, there is nothing in the memo that 
suggests this context (for a critique of the logic behind this memo, see 
Hausman & McPherson, 1996, pp. 9–16).
His diplomatic skills again failed him as president of Harvard. 
At a 2005 lecture at a conference on “Diversifying the Science and 
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Engineering Workforce: Women, Underrepresented Minorities, and 
their S. & E. Careers,” in which Summers was asked to be provocative, 
he certainly complied (Goldenberg, 2005). He started out by pointing 
out that women are not the only group to be underrepresented in 
desirable professions. For example, “white men are very substantially 
underrepresented in the National Basketball Association.” He then 
went on to dismiss discrimination as a likely culprit for the lack of 
women in science and math, using an economic framework developed 
by Chapter 5’s Gary Becker:
If it was really the case that everybody was discriminating, there 
would be very substantial opportunities for a limited number 
of people who were not prepared to discriminate to assemble 
remarkable departments of high quality people at relatively limited 
cost simply by the act of their not discriminating. (Quoted in 
Jaschik, 2005)
In addition to women’s unwillingness to work long hours, Summers put 
forward the possibility that women’s underrepresentation in science 
and math careers might be down to “issues of intrinsic aptitude,” 
citing as evidence the fact that fewer women than men score at the 
very top end of high school math scores (quoted in Jaschik, 2005). 
His comments created a firestorm of negative publicity that played 
a significant role in his subsequent resignation after a no-confidence 
vote by the Harvard faculty.
Fellow economist Blinder once claimed that “everybody knows, 
Larry is very smart, and he likes to show it” (quoted in Hirsch, 2013). 
At Treasury, one aide described his management style in the following 
manner: “If you’re in a meeting, whatever you say, he will make you 
feel like you’re an idiot” (Bradley, 2005). This confidence in his own 
intellectual ability literally cost Harvard hundreds of millions. As 
President, Summers invested billions of dollars of Harvard’s cash 
in risky derivatives and stocks of the kind discussed in the previous 
chapter. When these markets collapsed in 2007 and 2008, Harvard 
lost $1.8 billion (Healy, 2009).
Unlike Greenspan, Summers did not join the public service from 
the private sector. However, according to Charles Ferguson, director of 
The Inside Job, Summer’s career does reflect an increasingly common 
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“convergence of academic economics, Wall Street, and political power” 
(Ferguson, 2010). Between 2001, when he left the Treasury, and 2008 
when he returned to the federal government with Obama, Summers 
made a tidy personal fortune of $20 million from consulting and 
speaking engagements with financial firms. He earned $5 million 
a year for working one day a week at finance company D.E. Shaw 
and made some tidy speaking fees from big finance companies such 
as Goldman Sachs ($135,000), JP Morgan ($67,000) and Lehman 
Brothers ($67,500) (Mirowski, 2013, p. 206). His 2009 federal financial 
disclosure form listed his net worth as somewhere between $17–39 
million (Ferguson, 2010). Long-time Summers critic, economist 
Joseph Stiglitz, argued that Summers was “seen to be, and probably is, 
captured” by the finance industry (Hirsh, 2013).
Unlike Greenspan, Summers is not an acolyte of Rand-style freedom 
for firms. In his writing and public pronouncements, he would much 
more accurately be described as a liberal new Keynesian. In a 2001 
speech, he claimed that he went into economics to research “the most 
important problems in the world: poverty, unemployment, helping 
poor people. But I knew that I didn’t want to just shout and rant about 
them” (Bradley, 2005). His subjects of interest reflect noble goals, and 
his desire to move beyond “ranting” mirrors many economists’ justi-
fications of the rigor of the discipline. Summers is a great admirer of 
Friedman, declaring that “we are all now Friedmanites” and that he 
had “great respect for his ideas” (quoted in Mirowski, 2013, p. 207). Yet, 
Summers made his name, and won a John Bates Clark Award for the 
best US economist under 40, for applying economics to the real world, 
frequently in a manner that justified government intervention. One 
example of this kind of research is his attack on Real Business Cycles’s 
anti-government macroeconomic policy described in Chapter 5. He 
has also produced research advocating raising government revenue 
by taxing financial transactions, based on the argument that financial 
markets may no longer be playing their one-time role of “efficiently 
guiding the allocation of capital” (Summers & Summers, 1989, p. 
262). Further, discouraging financial activity may actually be desirable 
since so little finance “has to do with the financing of real investment 
in any very direct way” (Summers & Summers, 1989, p. 173). A final 
example came in 1997 when the US was engaged in a debate over 
the merits of cutting the tax on inheritances. Summers again took 
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the pro-taxation side, arguing that “when it comes to the estate tax, 
there is no case other than selfishness” (quoted in Bradley, 2005). 
These comments by Summers are particularly interesting, because, 
as we shall see, they are difficult to reconcile with his actions while 
at the Treasury. While Greenspan is remarkably consistent across his 
writing, his public opinions and his policy actions, Summers appears 
to don one hat as a writer or academic and another while in office. 
Greenspan and Summers were not only the two most ungainly tennis 
partners at the St. Alban’s Tennis Club (Bradley, 2005), but also were 
surprisingly in sync when it came to overseeing the rapidly growing 
financial industry.
Economics in Action: Monetary Policy  
and Deregulation in Finance
In their prominent roles in the Treasury and the Fed, Summers 
and Greenspan operationalized many of the ideas that had been 
championed by economists in the previous chapters. As chair of the 
Fed, Greenspan was the driving force behind the monetary policy 
responsible for the increased debt of US households. He also combined 
with Summers to support the financial deregulation that helped create 
the speculative frenzy that contributed to the financial collapse in the 
US.
Monetary Policy
Greenspan’s monetary policy choices can be divided into two distinct 
periods. The first period, which lasted until the late 1990s, continued 
his predecessor Paul Volcker’s policy of aggressively attempting to 
subdue what they thought were dangerously high rates of inflation. 
In 1989, Greenspan testified that he viewed an acceptable level of 
inflation as one in which “the expected rate of change of the general 
level of prices ceases to be a factor in individual and business decision-
making” (Greenspan, 1990, p. 6). In fact, he immediately increased 
interest rates on taking office in 1987 to signal his inflation-fighting 
credentials and combat what he thought were entrenched inflationary 
expectations. The concern about inflationary expectations, for someone 
like Greenspan, is that they are a bit of a self-fulfilling prophecy. If 
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people believe that inflation will exist in the future, they build this 
into their economic actions such as contract negotiations. If people 
want a 2 percent increase in their spending power and inflation is 
going to be 7 percent, they need to ask for a 9 percent raise. This 
becomes self-fulfilling because now the 9 percent wage increase is 
built into the costs that firms pass on to customers. So, inflationary 
expectations create inflation. His goal in office was to drive inflation 
down and keep it there so that people’s expectations about inflation 
would fall. For the first part of Greenspan’s tenure, interest rates were 
occasionally reduced, as was the case between 1991 and 1994, but in 
general he was willing to sacrifice employment and growth to reduce 
inflation. For example, from the beginning of 1988 to the end of the 
year, interest rates increased from 6.5 to 8 percent. As the economy 
slowed, Greenspan informed the Fed’s Open Market Committee that 
“those who think that we are in a recession … are reasonably certain 
to be wrong” (quoted in Madrick, 2011, p. 234), and he refused to 
cut rates until 1991 and 1992, despite growing unemployment and 
slow economic growth. George H.W. Bush blamed his election defeat 
on the sluggish economy brought on by Greenspan’s monetary policy 
(Madrick, 2011, p. 234). After lowering interest rates during the worst 
of the recession of the early 1990s, Greenspan increased rates by a 
remarkable three-quarters of a point, a very large rise, worried about 
the inflationary consequences of unemployment falling below 5.5 
percent. By 1995, he had increased interest rates from 3 to 6 percent in 
just over a year (Madrick, 2011, p. 236).
An approving review of monetary policy in the 1990s by Mankiw 
noted that interest rates were more “responsive” to inflation than in 
previous periods and that the Fed may have been involved in “covert 
inflation targeting” of about 3 percent (Mankiw, 2001). Greenspan’s 
successor as Fed chair, Ben Bernanke, described the Greenspan policy 
as “de facto very similar to inflation targeting” (Bernanke & Mishkin, 
1997, p. 113). Monetary policy expert Marvin Goodfriend agreed, 
claiming that while Greenspan was in charge, the Fed acted to keep 
“core inflation” at around 2 percent (Goodfriend, 2007, p. 54). These 
three approving reviews of Greenspan’s inflation targeting reflect our 
claims from Chapter 2, that one of the dramatic changes in economic 
conventional wisdom in the post-1980 period was the abandonment 
of Keynesian stabilization. Much of the momentum for this change 
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was provided by Friedman, and even more forcefully, the Real Business 
Cycle (RBC) scholars. In monetary policy, this reflected a change from 
focusing on the twin goals of low inflation and high employment 
to fighting inflation alone. Goodfriend, for example, argues that 
inflationary targeting was a remarkable success despite the fact that 
it came “at some cost in unemployment” (Goodfriend, 2007, p. 54).
William Grieder of The Nation disagreed with the notion that 
Greenspan had followed a wise monetary policy. Grieder argued that 
Greenspan “deliberately restrained economic growth for many years, 
effectively suppressing employment and wages. The economy, he 
[Greenspan] argued, cannot grow faster than 2–2.5 percent without 
igniting price inflation, so the Fed was duty bound to prevent it” 
(Grieder, 2005). As we highlighted in Chapter 3, high interest policy 
is commonly justified on the grounds of combating the horrors, as 
elusive as those may be, of inflation, but the unstated concern about 
high employment is that it causes wage increases that might cut into 
profits. According to Greider, prior to 1997, Greenspan used monetary 
policy to keep the unemployment rate above 6 percent because 
he feared creating more jobs would lead to inflationary pressures 
(Greider, 2001).
The second period was Greenspan’s low interest-rate, high 
employment monetary-policy regime that lasted a little less than a 
decade, from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s. According to Greider, 
the ability of the US economy to withstand low rates of unemployment 
without creating excessive inflation surprised even Greenspan. It was 
only in early 1997, under the threat of a potential worldwide financial 
meltdown (and collapse of LTC), that Greenspan relaxed monetary 
policy sufficiently to let US unemployment fall below the feared 6 
percent rate and accidentally discovered that his ceiling was artificially 
high. Even when unemployment fell to 4 percent, while wages 
increased slightly, it did not lead to what Greenspan considered to 
be “wage inflation” (Greider, 2001). The reason that Greenspan could 
lower interest rates to levels unprecedented in recent history, and so 
against his natural proclivity, was, as we have said in Chapter 3, that US 
workers were traumatized by a number of forces from previous high 
unemployment to international trade to labor market policy changes, 
which meant that they would not seek, or could not get, wage increases 
despite high levels of employment. Once Greenspan realized that he 
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could relax interest rates, much more than he previously believed, he 
used low interest rates in his attempt to keep the US economy bobbing 
along (although the inflation fighting Greenspan did briefly re-emerge 
when he increased rates from 4.75 to 6.5 percent between 1997 and 
May 2000: Madrick, 2011, p. 242). Inflation and unemployment were 
low and growth was high. In 1998, Greenspan told Clinton, “This is 
the best economy I have ever seen in fifty years of studying it every 
day” (Madrick, 2011, p. 241). Of course, low interest rates had the 
advantageous effect of maintaining consumer demand despite stagnant 
labor incomes. Unemployment dropped to very low rates during this 
period, and wages even increased a little. However, the downside of 
low rates and modest incomes was the steadily increasing household 
debt of the US population as detailed in Chapter 3. At the start of the 
1980s, personal saving as a percent of personal disposable income was 
11.5 percent. By 2005, it was 2.6 percent (US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, 2016).
In the context of debt-driven consumption, it is important to 
recognize the importance of the prolonged period of low interest 
rates starting in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The low interest 
rates played a dual role in maintaining consumer spending. Most 
obviously, it kept debt payments manageable for increasingly indebted 
households. Secondly, by keeping borrowing costs low, it helped inflate 
the value of the US housing market that was a cornerstone of the 
growing wealth against which households were borrowing. During 
this period, Greenspan dismissed concerns that the housing market 
might collapse, arguing that housing prices had never suffered a broad 
nationwide decline (Andrews, 2008).
Despite Greenspan’s confidence about the solidity of the housing 
market, it did collapse in 2007, after Greenspan raised rates by more 
than 4 percentage points between 2004 and 2006. Households with 
precariously high debt loads, many with dangerous subprime and 
variable-rate mortgages, could not manage the increasing payments 
brought on by increased interest rates. According to the Mortgage 
Bankers Association, the share of loans that “were seriously delinquent 
or beginning the foreclosure process” were more than two times their 
previous record highs by the mid-2008 (US Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, 2010, pp. 4–6). Predictably, defaults were 
especially pronounced in the subprime market, but spread to mortgages 
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with adjustable rates. As defaults increased, housing prices collapsed 
in the US, declining by 8 percent in the year between November of 
2007 and 2008 (Avery et al., 2010). This was precisely the decline 
that Greenspan claimed was unlikely to occur. As housing prices fell 
and families defaulted on their mortgages, the bottom fell out of the 
mortgage derivative market, causing the failure of financial giants like 
Lehman Brothers and insurance firm AIG.
Greenspan continued his predecessor Volcker’s tight monetary 
policy in his early years as Fed chair. However, limiting inflation meant 
creating unemployment, which holds down the income of workers. 
Only when he realized that low unemployment would not result in 
escalating wage pressure did Greenspan lower rates. Those lower 
rates played a crucial role in maintaining demand in an economic 
environment of low wages that Greenspan himself had helped create. 
The problem with this method of maintaining demand is that it is 
very precarious. A high-debt economy is inherently unstable, but it is 
especially vulnerable if interest rates rise, as they did in 2006 and 2007.
Financial Deregulation
The other piece of the policy puzzle that contributed to the 2008 crisis 
was the deregulation of the financial sector. This policy was consistent 
with the ideas of Friedman, the public choice school and the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH), which argue against state oversight 
of private-sector activity. Both Greenspan and Summers played 
important roles in first deregulating and then resisting restoration of 
regulations in financial markets. Before delving into the history of the 
deregulatory 1990s, it might be instructive to provide a quick look at 
the post-Depression regulatory regime that was dismantled.
The Great Depression was, in part, caused by a massive wave of 
bank failures across the country, creating a consensus that regulation 
was needed to create an industry less prone to risky behavior. Part of 
the reason for the banks’ failure was that they were doing two things: 
the traditional banking role of taking deposits and making loans, as 
well as acting as an investment house. This created two sources of risk. 
First, it created a potential conflict of interest because banks could 
make loans to, underwrite securities for, and hold stock in the same 
company (Wigmore, 1985). Second, in the bull market of the late 
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1920s, banks were as eager as anyone else to cash in by purchasing 
stocks. Unfortunately, when the market crashed in 1929, banks were 
left holding rapidly declining stocks, contributing to their financial 
woes. The Glass-Steagall Act (or Banking Act) of 1933 separated the 
deposit collecting and loaning activities of commercial banks from 
other investment activities by prohibiting banks from dealing with 
financial securities (Kroszner & Rajan, 1994). This legislation was 
designed to create a firewall to prevent the conflict of interest and 
reduce the risk that existed when commercial banks could both loan 
money and deal in securities.
The banking industry was never happy with the legislated separation 
of commercial banking and investment. In the 25 years between 
1975 and 1999, the banking industry unsuccessfully attempted to 
get Glass-Steagall overturned twelve times. Despite these political 
failures, Glass-Steagall had been whittled down, starting in the late 
1980s. The language of the Act allowed for a certain degree of inter-
pretation of how strict the separation of commercial and investment 
banking needed to be. The Fed started to allow banks to own 
securities companies as long as they were a very small percent (initially 
5 percent) of revenue. This limit was raised to 25 percent by 1997 
(Barth et al., 2000).
Glass-Steagall was finally repealed and replaced after more than 
sixty years with the Gramm-Leach-Bilely Act (GLBA) in 1999. 
The general thrust of the GLBA was to allow banks to engage in a 
wider range of activities, including the previously forbidden roles of 
selling securities and insurance. It also eliminated many federal and 
state restrictions on affiliations between banks and investment and 
insurance firms (National Commission on the Causes of the Financial 
and Economic Crisis in the United States, 2011). The new regulations 
were enacted in spite of a prescient warning in the rationale for 
preserving Glass-Steagall, written by the Congressional Research 
Service in 1987: “Securities activities can be risky, leading to enormous 
losses. Such losses could threaten the integrity of deposits. In turn, the 
Government insures deposits and could be required to pay large sums 
if depository institutions were to collapse as the result of securities 
losses” ( Jackson, 1984, p. 3).
The elimination of Glass-Steagall did not come from a groundswell 
of popular anger against unjust and archaic legislation. The pressure 
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for regulatory change came directly from the banking and finance 
industry. Citigroup was especially keen on advancing this agenda. In 
1998, it had merged with Travelers Insurance into exactly the kind 
of corporation Glass-Steagall was designed to prevent, so it needed 
deregulation to keep the new corporation intact. What is perhaps most 
remarkable about this merger is that Citigroup was so confident that 
it could obtain the required deregulation that it pursued the merger 
with Travelers, despite knowing that the resulting corporate structure 
contravened the existing Act. More generally, banks were concerned 
that corporations were bypassing the traditional avenues of bank 
lending to raise money directly in the financial markets (Kroszner 
& Rajan, 1994). Getting traditional loans from commercial banks 
is only one avenue that firms can choose to pursue when they need 
to raise capital. Banks were eager to participate in these alternative 
measures, but were prohibited from doing so due to the restrictions 
of Glass-Steagall. They further argued that the ancient Glass-
Steagall restrictions disadvantaged US banks and investment firms 
compared to their foreign competitors who were not fettered by the 
same regulatory requirements. Finally, they argued that the legislation 
was completely unnecessary, since competition in the industry would 
ensure that firms would be careful with their clients’ money.
In the push for banking deregulation, the financial sector had a 
number of cards to play. Economic common sense and the general 
policy environment in the 1990s were certainly in favor of deregulation. 
In other industries, from telecommunications to energy, the role of the 
state had been pared back. The banks could also rely on the intellectual 
justification provided by ideas like the EMH. Not leaving favorable 
legislative change to the winds of chance, the financial sector also 
engaged in more direct political activity. Unsurprisingly, Citigroup was 
especially active on this front, spending $9 million on lobbying in 1998 
(Center for Responsive Politics, 2016a), and $2.8 million on political 
donations in the 1998 election cycle (Center for Responsive Politics, 
2016b). Citigroup could also count on some very well-placed support 
in the government. In the days before the merger with Citigroup, 
Travellers head Sandy Weill made phone calls to Summers’ boss, 
Robert Rubin about the deal. (Rubin went on to a very lucrative job at 
Citigroup when he left the Treasury.) Weill also met with Greenspan 
who gave the merger his personal approval (PBS, 2003).
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Both Greenspan and Summers supported the replacement of 
Glass-Steagall with the GLBA. Greenspan personally used his 
influence to advocate for the repeal of Glass-Steagall, arguing that 
financial institutions had strong incentives to protect their shareholders 
and would therefore regulate themselves, and that removing barriers 
imposed by regulation would result in increased efficiency and better 
services for the public (National Commission on the Causes of the 
Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, 2011, pp. 64, 84). 
Speaking when GLBA was passed in 1999, Summers claimed, “This 
historic legislation will better enable American companies to compete 
in the new economy” (Labaton, 1999). The following year, while 
speaking to what was surely a sympathetic audience of the Securities 
Industry Association, Summers first played up the importance of “the 
unparalleled strength and dynamism of our financial markets” as an 
engine of US economic success and then lauded the 1999 deregulation 
as providing “the appropriate balance between high-quality regulation 
and the absence of excessive state interference” (Summers, 2000). It 
was precisely the elimination of the Glass-Steagall restrictions that 
permitted banks to speculate in the mortgage-backed investments that 
were such a crucial feature of the financial crisis. 
The finance industry could also count on Greenspan and Summers 
to fight against any regulation that would limit its use of increasingly 
complex investment instruments, including the mortgage-backed 
derivatives that helped spark the crisis. Summers’ opinions on financial 
regulation were nicely illustrated at a 2005 conference of central 
bankers. IMF economist Raghuram Rajan presented a paper that 
warned that the structure of financial-sector compensation combined 
with newly developed complex financial products, created an incentive 
for bankers to take substantial investment risks. Rajan warned that 
this could create a “full-blown financial crisis.” After he had finished 
his presentation, Summers called Rajan a “Luddite,” dismissing his 
concerns, and cautioning that regulation would harm the financial 
sector (Ferguson, 2010; Hirsch, 2013).
In the late 1990s, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC), a federal agency that regulates options and futures trading, 
grew concerned about the increasingly complex and opaque nature of 
many of the financial instruments being traded. This unease stemmed 
in part from a 1994 General Accounting Office report on the growing 
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use of exotic financial instruments in the US that concluded that 
there were “significant gaps and oversights” in regulation of derivatives 
(GAO, 1994). The head of the CFTC, Brooksley Born, recommended 
legislation calling for more transparent reporting of trades and higher 
reserves. She was opposed vehemently in these proposals by the 
banking industry, which feared that increased regulation would cause 
investors to flee the US for less heavily policed shores. According to 
the New York Times, she was also pilloried by deregulatory enthusiasts 
Greenspan, Rubin and Summers, who argued that the mere passage 
of this regulation could destabilize financial markets that they thought 
were functioning smoothly. Summers testified that regulation was 
unnecessary in the derivatives market as those participating were 
“largely sophisticated financial institutions that would appear to be 
eminently capable of protecting themselves” (Summers, 1998). Taking 
a more direct tack, Summers phoned Born to, in the words of a 
Newsweek article, “dress her down, loudly and rudely,” according to 
Born’s deputy Michael Greenberger, who walked in on the call. Born 
was astonished that Summers could claim that “you shouldn’t even ask 
questions about a market that was many, many trillions of dollars in 
notional value—and that none of us knew anything about” (Hirsch, 
2009). Greenspan, Rubin and Summers successfully convinced 
Congress to freeze the regulatory authority of the CFTC for six 
months. Born quit soon after.
In the years prior to the financial crisis, both Summers and 
Greenspan repeatedly argued that the expanding derivatives market 
did not need regulation. In 2004, Greenspan claimed that as a result 
of this wonderful innovation in finance, “Not only have individual 
financial institutions become less vulnerable to shocks from underlying 
risk factors, but also the financial system as a whole has become more 
resilient” (Greenspan, 2004). He also claimed prior to 2006 that the 
possibility of financial failure was extremely remote, if not impossible: 
“I believe that the general growth in large institutions has occurred in 
the context of an underlying structure of markets in which many of the 
larger risks are dramatically—I should say, fully—hedged” (quoted in 
Goodman, 2008). Blinder offered this opinion of Greenspan following 
the crash: “I think of him as consistently cheerleading on derivatives” 
(quoted in Goodman, 2008). As late as 2007, Summers maintained 
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his confidence in the state of the US financial sector, claiming that 
finance does not “just oil the wheels of economic growth—they are the 
wheels” (quoted in Murray, 2007).
In 1999, after Born’s resignation, Greenspan and Summers were 
members on the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, 
which issued a report urging Congress to further deregulate derivatives 
(Goodman, 2008). This led to the passage of the Commodities 
Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) of 2000, which was Summers’ 
big legislative accomplishment as Treasury secretary (Ferguson, 
2010; Hirsch, 2013). The CFMA effectively deregulated the market 
in derivatives. According to former Born deputy Greenberger, “The 
CFMA did not just stop the CFTC from regulating. It stopped every 
federal regulatory entity from regulating swaps, and even state law was 
also almost completely pre-empted” (Hirsch, 2013). The benefit to 
financial corporations was immediate, as the value of over-the-counter 
derivatives grew from $95.2 trillion in 2000 to $672.6 trillion globally 
by 2008 (National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and 
Economic Crisis in the United States, 2011, p. 77). The Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission of Congress in 2009 placed the failure to 
regulate the derivatives market at “the center of the storm” (National 
Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in 
the United States, 2011, p. 77).
After the crisis, Greenspan and Summers took different approaches 
to the criticisms that inevitably came their way. Greenspan, although 
certainly not admitting to the role that monetary policy played in 
creating the conditions of the crisis, did make a mea culpa of sorts 
about his distrust of regulation: “I made a mistake in presuming that 
the self-interests of organizations, specifically banks and others, were 
such that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders 
and the equity and the firms” (quoted in Clark & Treanor, 2008). 
Summers, on the other hand, was characteristically unrepentant, 
claiming that he was not “a great deregulator,” but that he opposed the 
specifics of the regulations being proposed. According to Summers, he 
“expressed the strong view of Secretary Rubin, chairman Greenspan 
and SEC chief Levitt that the way the CFTC was proposing to go 
about it was likely to be ineffective and itself imposed major risks into 
the market” (Hirsch, 2009).
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Conclusion: Policy and Profits
Surely no recent economist, and possibly no other public figure in the 
US, has fallen as far, from as high, as Greenspan in his Icarus-like 
plummet. At the time of his retirement in 2006, he was feted as the 
greatest Fed chair of all time—a monetary manager without peer, 
who had ushered in a new era of low inflation and unemployment. 
Mankiw’s evaluation of monetary policy during the 1990s claimed 
that the “macroeconomic performance of the 1990s was exceptional, 
especially if judged by the volatility of growth, unemployment, and 
inflation” (Mankiw, 2001, p. 52). A review of two fawning Greenspan 
tributes, including Woodward’s Maestro, concluded: “He doth bestride 
the Fed like a colossus, and if these books are correct, we should hope he 
goes on bestriding” (Kuttner, 2000). In 2007, Republican presidential 
candidate John McCain wanted a recently retired 81-year-old 
Greenspan to oversee an overhaul of the country’s tax code. Such was 
the strength of the Greenspan legacy that McCain joked, whether, 
“he’s alive or dead it doesn’t matter. If he’s dead, just prop him up and 
put some dark glasses on him like, like ‘Weekend at Bernie’s’” (CBS 
News, 2007).
Following the crisis, Greenspan’s legacy took a beating in both 
academic circles and the popular press. Greenspan was criticized for 
both his overly expansionary monetary policy and his deregulatory 
enthusiasm, both of which stemmed, in part, from his belief, reminiscent 
of the EMH, that the housing market could not produce a bubble. 
According to the New York Times’s “reassessment of the Greenspan 
legacy”: “If Mr. Greenspan had acted differently during his tenure 
as Federal Reserve chairman from 1987 to 2006, many economists 
say, the current crisis might have been averted or muted” (Goodman, 
2008). Writing for Forbes, Eamonn Fingleton is less reserved, claiming 
that “It is fair to say that Greenspan emerges as probably the biggest—
and most dangerous—fool in American financial history,” which given 
the history of skullduggery in American finance is a high bar indeed 
(Fingleton, 2013). More academically, EMH critic Robert Shiller 
argued that Greenspan was derelict in his duty as a financial watchdog: 
“A public official who fails to alert investors to such risks is no better 
than a doctor who, having diagnosed high blood pressure in a patient, 
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says nothing because he thinks the patient might be lucky and show 
no ill effects” (quoted in Grieder, 2005).
Because he was seen as more of a supporting member of the 
economic policy cast, rather than its genuine star, Summers was 
not the subject of the same sort of glowing tributes as Greenspan. 
However, along with Greenspan and Rubin, Summers took his fair 
share of blame for the crisis. In fact, it probably cost him the coveted 
position as successor to Bernanke as Fed chair in 2013. Although he 
was reportedly Obama’s first choice, his nomination drew the scorn 
of several liberal Democrats who threatened to oppose his candidacy 
based on his deregulatory zeal during the Clinton years and his 
close relationship with Wall Street (Graham, 2013). A summary of 
Summers’ record in public service in The Atlantic concluded, “As a 
government official, he helped author a series of ultimately disastrous 
or wrongheaded policies” (Hirsch, 2013).
The post-crisis upbraiding of Summers and Greenspan was 
accurate as far as it went. Monetary policy and deregulation did foster 
an increase in consumer debt, the mortgage housing bubble and the 
financial collapse. However, what is less remarked on is that even 
in the supposed good times, when Greenspan especially was being 
applauded for his careful economic stewardship, things were not going 
particularly well for the average American. Greenspan’s continuation 
of the Volcker war against inflation had important redistributive 
consequences. The increased level of unemployment caused by high 
interest rates put downward pressure on wages and improved profits 
during the early 1990s. Greenspan’s explicit concerns about rising 
wages were instructive about where he thought that economic danger 
might come from. Greenspan only opted for a low interest-rate and 
high employment monetary-policy regime when it did not foster 
wage growth. In fact, the low interest rates were necessary to maintain 
profits through debt-fueled consumption precisely due to the limited 
growth of wages during the Greenspan period. His fear of rising wages 
makes an interesting contrast to his exuberance at the growth in asset 
prices. As Greenspan critic Grieder put it: “If working-class wages 
rose smartly, that was a sign of inflation threatening prosperity. If 




Deregulation of the financial sector was also a part of a broader 
transformation of the policy environment that favored firms during 
the 1980s and 1990s. We have seen that the economic theories of the 
EMH, in finance, and public choice, more generally, support the idea 
that government intervention is both unnecessary and harmful. In 
Chapter 3, we showed that the growing debt of American households 
was caused, in part, by stagnant incomes, but, as we demonstrated 
in Chapter 7, the deregulation of the financial sector, especially 
the mortgage and banking sectors, also played an important role. 
The increasing debt payments of American families translated into 
profits for firms extending credit. While most of the criticisms of the 
Summers-Greenspan legacy focus on the instability associated with 
their policies, what this overlooks is that the supposed boom times 




Conclusion: Dissenters and Victors
Faced with the choice between changing one’s mind and proving 
that there is no need to do so, almost everyone gets busy on the 
proof. ( John Kenneth Galbraith, 1971, p. 50)
Capital will always go where it’s welcome and stay where it’s well 
treated. Capital is not just money. It’s also talent and ideas. They, too, 
will go where they’re welcome and stay where they are well treated. 
(Walter Wriston, Citibank CEO, quoted in Karlgaard, 2006)
Economics is not a discipline without debate or controversy. There 
are very real, even vitriolic, disputes about theory and policy. As we 
have seen, the ideas of economists of the neoliberal age have not been 
universally embraced or undisputed. In fact, critics of neoliberal ideas 
such as Franco Modigliani and Robert Shiller can claim their own 
Nobel prizes and are, arguably, every bit as respected in the discipline 
as those we have discussed in this book. Perhaps two of the most 
famous dissenters are Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman.
In 2002, Joseph Stiglitz’s Globalization and its Discontents was 
released and became a bestseller. The book was especially critical of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which advised (or forced, 
depending on your view of the IMF’s relationship as lender of last 
resort to desperately indebted nations) developing countries to follow 
policies along the neoliberal lines described in Chapter 2. Stiglitz 
did not mince words when it came to the IMF and its policies, once 
famously describing its economists as “third-rank” (quoted in The 
Economist, 2006b). Among the IMF’s many rebuttals of Stiglitz’s work 
was a remarkably vitriolic “open letter” from the IMF’s Economic 
Counsellor and Director of Research Kenneth Rogoff.1 Rogoff ’s 
1  Ironically, Rogoff himself was found to be peddling snake oil when 
three University of Massachusetts, Amherst researchers found that the 
conclusion of a famous paper co-authored by Rogoff, which argued that 
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rejoinder included the following choice quotes about Stiglitz: “Your 
ideas are at best highly controversial, at worst, snake oil.” “Do you ever 
lose a night’s sleep thinking that just maybe, Alan Greenspan, Larry 
Summers, (and) Bob Rubin … had it right?” “I don’t have time here to 
do justice to some of your other offbeat policy prescriptions.” “Do you 
ever think that just maybe, Joe Stiglitz might have screwed up? That, 
just maybe, you were part of the problem and not part of the solution?” 
(Rogoff, 2002)
Stiglitz is a professor at Columbia University. Along with George 
Akerlof and Michael Spence, he was the co-winner of the 2001 Nobel 
Prize for “their analyses of markets with asymmetric information.” 
Basically, what Stiglitz argued was that imperfect information is 
pervasive in economies and when it exists, markets do not work well 
and government interventions can improve welfare (Stiglitz, 1975, 
1979; Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980, 1986). Like Summers, Stiglitz held 
some very prominent positions at powerful institutions. Between 1997 
and 2000, he was the senior vice president and chief economist at the 
World Bank. In this position, he was already a vocal critic of what he 
viewed as the IMF’s neoliberal policies around the world. There have 
been allegations that his tenure at the World Bank was shortened due 
to pressure from the IMF and the US Treasury, particularly Summers 
(Wade, 2001). Prior to that, from 1993 to 1997, he served on President 
Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers, first as a member and 
then as the chair. He has also belonged to a wide variety of research 
institutions, from the centrist Brookings Institution to the more 
conservative Hoover Institute at Stanford University. 
Krugman is a professor at the City University of New York, where 
he moved after his tenure at Princeton from 2000 to 2015. He won the 
Nobel Prize in 2008 for “his analysis of trade patterns and location of 
economic activity,” which is an overly brief description of his work that 
uses the idea of economies of scale to predict patterns of trade. While 
the theory of comparative advantage argues that countries will trade 
different goods between each other, Krugman developed a theory that 
higher levels of government debt are associated with lower growth, was 
premised upon some fundamental errors. Rogoff ’s paper “omitted relevant 
data, weighted their calculations in an unusual manner, and made an 
elementary coding blunder,” and when these errors were corrected, its 
conclusions no longer held (Herndon et al., 2013).
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uses the idea of product differentiation to explain why most trade is 
between countries that make different models of the same product. 
He also used economies of scale to show that regions that already 
have large amounts of profitable production will be more likely to 
attract more investment. The implication is that rather than spreading 
out around the globe, production will concentrate in a few regions 
(Krugman, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1991). Interestingly, for someone who 
viewed himself as a staunch defender of the welfare state, Krugman 
worked for Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers in the 1980s, an 
experience that did not last very long and which he described as “first 
thrilling, then disillusioning” (Krugman, n.d.). Although Krugman 
is well respected as an economist, has had positions at the most 
prestigious universities, has written over twenty books and published 
numerous articles, he is probably most famous for his columns in the 
New York Times starting in 1999.
Both Krugman and Stiglitz have been very critical of most 
neoliberal policies and the economic theory that justified them. 
Stiglitz has consistently criticized contractionary macroeconomic 
policy, deregulation and growing income inequality. Despite serving 
in Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers, he distanced himself from 
most of the policies implemented during the 1990s, and is especially 
critical of Greenspan and Rubin, who he sees as the chief economic 
architects of the time. In contrast to Milton Friedman and the Real 
Business Cycle (RBC) school, Stiglitz argues that monetary and fiscal 
policy should be used to achieve high levels of employment. As we 
have done, Stiglitz lamented that although the Federal Reserve is 
supposed to have twin goals of maximizing employment and limiting 
inflation, Greenspan, like Paul Volcker before him, was exclusively 
concerned with the latter, often at the expense of the former. Stiglitz 
also makes the important point that while achieving balanced budgets 
hurt the poor in the 1990s, deficits in the 2000s benefited the rich. 
Stiglitz argues that in the 1990s Clinton was elected, and wanted to 
deliver, on his promise of “for people, for a change,” but was dissuaded 
by Greenspan (despite the fact that as chair of the Fed he was not 
directly responsible for fiscal policy) and Rubin, who were obsessed 
with eliminating the deficit. The result was that social programs that 
were much needed were not implemented and even existing ones 
were cut back in real terms. In the 2000s, the budget was plunged 
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into deficit when George W. Bush implemented massive tax cuts that 
almost exclusively benefitted the rich. Stiglitz makes two important 
points. The first is that Greenspan made a revealing about-face on 
deficit reduction. When budget deficits would have resulted from 
Clinton’s promises to provide assistance to the poor, Greenspan favored 
balanced budgets. Yet Greenspan favored deficits when they resulted 
from Bush’s tax cuts for the rich. Second, the impacts of fiscal policy 
are about more than just deficits and surpluses, although these are 
obviously important in terms of their overall impact on employment 
and output. The manner in which those deficits or surpluses are 
achieved also have crucial distributive consequences (Stiglitz, 2003).
Stiglitz’s concern about the manner in which budget deficits 
are usually tamed has now extended to the austerity policies being 
implemented across Europe. If anything, the spending cuts in Europe 
are even more ill-advised than those in the US during the 1990s, 
because Europe is suffering through an economic crisis. As Stiglitz 
notes, deficit cutting during recessions has a long and troubled history:
Austerity had failed repeatedly, from its early use under President 
Herbert Hoover, which turned the stock-market crash into the 
Great Depression, to the IMF programs imposed on Eastern Asia 
and Latin America [and also Africa] in recent decades. And yet 
when Greece got into trouble, it was tried again. (Stiglitz, 2015)
Eliminating deficits by cutting public services during a downturn is 
twice damned, according to Stiglitz. It is the incorrect counter-cyclical 
stabilization policy, and it cuts programs to those who need them the 
most during the recession.
Stiglitz also opposes Friedman’s claim that the market delivers a fair 
distribution of income. In both a much-discussed article in Vanity Fair 
(Stiglitz, 2011) and his book The Price of Inequality (Stiglitz, 2013), he 
lamented the rising inequality in the US and argued that there is little 
connection between income and merit:
Those who have contributed great positive innovations to our 
society, from the pioneers of genetic understanding to the pioneers 
of the Information Age, have received a pittance compared with 
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those responsible for the financial innovations that brought our 
global economy to the brink of ruin. (Stiglitz, 2011)
Growing inequality has been fostered by deliberate policy decisions 
that favor the wealthy at the expense of the majority of the population, 
from lowering tax rates on capital gains, to lax enforcement of 
anti-trust laws to manipulation of the financial system. According to 
Stiglitz, the will of the rich is translated into policy through influence 
in the political system:
Virtually all U.S. senators, and most of the representatives in the 
House, are members of the top 1 percent when they arrive, are kept 
in office by money from the top 1 percent, and know that if they 
serve the top 1 percent well they will be rewarded by the top 1 
percent when they leave office. (Stiglitz, 2011)
Unlike Greenspan, the RBC economists and Friedman, Stiglitz argues 
in favor of higher taxes, both in order to raise revenue and to decrease 
after-tax income inequality. In a recent paper, Stiglitz proposed 
dramatic changes to the US tax code. In addition to the obvious 
increase in the top marginal income tax rate, he also recommended 
raising tax rates on corporations while reducing their ability to avoid 
taxation, implementing environmental taxes, a financial transaction tax, 
a tax on the bonuses of financial-sector executives, and an inheritance 
tax (Stiglitz, 2014). These policy prescriptions are consistent with 
Stiglitz’s objections to growing inequality and insistence that the 
market distribution of income is not necessarily a reward for merit, 
but they also represent a stark contrast to the recommendations of 
the economists profiled in this book and economic policy trends 
after 1980.
Stiglitz has also consistently opposed the deregulatory moves, 
especially in the financial sector, justified by Friedman and public 
choice scholars, which were implemented by Greenspan and Summers. 
Coming at these matters from the perspective of theory, he argued 
that his own work on “imperfect and asymmetric information in 
markets had undermined every one of the ‘efficient market’ doctrines” 
(Stiglitz, 2010a). For example, the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH) and much RBC macroeconomic theory require that people 
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acquire and correctly use information, but Stiglitz claims that his work 
with Sanford Grossman demonstrated that people won’t actually do 
this (Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980). However, despite its intellectual 
shortcomings, the EMH comforted deregulators, like Greenspan 
and Summers, who stripped away regulatory constraints on financial 
markets. Further, those in positions to implement economic policy 
were not in those roles by chance. They were in those positions 
precisely because they were favored by those who benefitted from 
deregulation in the financial sector. Interestingly, considering that he 
was part of it, Stiglitz was very critical of the Clinton administration’s 
economic agenda, claiming that it was set and implemented by Wall 
Street insiders like Greenspan and Rubin (Stiglitz, 2003). In general, 
“banks had invested well, not in the housing or the real sector, but 
in politics … they had bought deregulation” (Stiglitz, 2010c, p. 326). 
The result, according to Stiglitz, was that the regulatory environment 
in the financial sector created incentives for firms to peddle their 
inefficient and dangerous mortgage products that increased instability 
and household debt (Stiglitz, 2010b).
Krugman shares many of the opinions held by Stiglitz, making them 
something of a dissenters’ one-two punch when it comes to opposing 
neoliberal economic policy. Perhaps the main difference between the 
two is that Krugman is a more recent convert to the opposition. Prior 
to the mid-2000s, Krugman was an avid supporter of the welfare state, 
but also advocated some important neoliberal policies. For example, 
unlike Stiglitz, who was very critical of the Clinton 1990s, Krugman 
was overwhelmingly positive. His book, The Great Unraveling, stated 
that “by decade’s end ‘Rubinomics’ was triumphant,” and that “at the 
beginning of the new millennium, then, it seemed that the United 
States was blessed with mature, skillful economic leaders” (Krugman, 
2003a, pp. xxxi–xxxii). In a triumphal article in 1999, he chose to 
cheerlead for two particularly ill-fated firms, claiming that they 
were on the cutting edge of a new way of doing business that was 
dramatically improving the competitiveness of the economy:
The retreat of business bureaucracy in the face of the market was 
brought home to me recently when I joined the advisory board at 
Enron … It’s sort of like the difference between your father’s bank, 
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which took money from its regular depositors and lent it out to its 
regular customers, and Goldman Sachs. (Krugman, 1999c)
With hindsight, it is difficult to imagine two firms less worthy of this 
praise, but for Krugman the new economy and financial speculation were 
not the only positive attributes of the 1990s. So, too, was Greenspan’s 
use of monetary policy to control the wage demands of the working 
population: “Even liberal economists like myself grudgingly accept the 
conclusion that a responsible Fed must sometimes raise interest rates 
in order to limit the number of jobs and maintain a suitably high rate 
of unemployment.” Greenspan’s error, according to Krugman, was not 
that he engineered sufficient unemployment to ensure that wages did 
not increase faster than labor productivity, but rather that he described 
that policy “so explicitly and so honestly” (Krugman, 1999a).
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Krugman made unfavorable 
comparisons between what he argued was the sluggish European and 
the dynamic US economies. The rise of the Anglo economies was 
due to the rise of smart economists, like Greenspan and Summers, 
to positions of power and the “ideological groundswell in the 
English-speaking world in favor of markets” represented by Thatcher 
in England (Krugman, 1999b). In contrast, in France, policies 
protecting workers, like “generous health and unemployment benefits, 
long mandatory paid vacations, maybe even a limit on individual 
working hours,” created unemployment and sluggish growth, despite 
their seeming appeal: “I’d say that given the alternatives, the American 
system, though not beautiful, still takes the prize” (Krugman, 2000a). 
At this point, Krugman was still arguing that the 1990s were not 
particularly hard on the US worker. In an exchange with economist 
James Galbraith, Krugman claimed that the statement, “workers are 
hurting because labor has failed to share in national productivity 
gains,” was demonstrably false (Krugman, 1996a).
In the early 2000s, when the world was embroiled in a debate over 
the merits of free trade (or more specifically, free trade as operation-
alized by institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO)), 
and protestors were out in the streets of Seattle in running battles 
with security forces, Krugman sided firmly with the WTO. His 
argument had two components. First, free trade had transformed 
the economies of many nations in the developing world and lifted 
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hundreds of millions out of poverty. For example, it was Thailand’s 
“export-led success stories that are the best advertisement for the 
WTO and its free-trade agenda” (Krugman, 2000b). In fact, “global-
ization, driven not by human goodness but by the profit motive, has 
done far more good for far more people than all the foreign aid and 
soft loans ever provided by well-intentioned governments and inter-
national agencies” (Krugman, 2000c). Krugman not only credited free 
trade with improving the economic position of the world’s poor, but 
it also improved their political lives: “When a nation opens to the 
world, its businesses become less dependent on government favor, its 
citizens become more aware of how politics is conducted in advanced 
countries. The result, repeatedly, has been a peaceful transition to true 
democracy” (Krugman, 2000d). It follows that any opposition to free 
trade was opposition to improving the lot of the poorest in the world. 
Krugman argued that the “anti-globalization movement already has a 
remarkable track record of hurting the very people and causes it claims 
to champion,” because their dogmatic and simplistic understanding of 
the world failed to appreciate that “unless they [developing nations] 
are allowed to sell goods produced under conditions that Westerners 
find appalling, by workers who receive very low wages,” those countries 
will not attract investment and will remain poor (Krugman, 2001).
The second component of Krugman’s pro-trade argument was that, 
to the extent that US workers were being left behind in the decades 
following the 1980s, it was the result of deliberate policy choices rather 
than the detrimental effects of international trade. While international 
trade may put some pressure on American workers’ wages and cause 
some corporate downsizing, “it is hardly the most important cause of 
the phenomenon.” It also couldn’t explain the race to the bottom for 
worker protection rules like minimum wages and a social safety net: 
“None of the important constraints on American economic and social 
policy come from abroad … if policies have become increasingly mean 
spirited, that is a political choice” (Krugman, 1997).
During this period, Krugman was careful to distance himself from 
what he considered to be overly radical commentary and commentators. 
For example, he characterized consumer advocate and presidential 
candidate Ralph Nader as having a “general hostility toward 
corporations,” that so clouded his judgment that he was willing to 
“prevent patients from getting drugs that might give them a decent life 
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and prevent a moderate who gets along with business from becoming 
president” (Krugman, 2000e). He made similar disparaging comments 
about think tanks that opposed free trade, like the Economic Policy 
Institute, which he described as “hacks,” in contrast to the reasonable 
opinions held by the honest scholars at “Harvard or the University of 
Chicago” (Krugman, 2000f ).
However, as the 2000s wore on, Krugman became a more consistent 
opponent of the neoliberal economic status quo. Like Stiglitz, he was 
very critical of growing income inequality and stagnant incomes for 
many in the US. Interestingly, this involved a reconsideration of his 
support of the 1990s Clinton era, when he correctly pointed out 
that although corporate profits have boomed, “the stagnation of real 
wages—wages adjusted for inflation—actually goes back more than 
30 years” (Krugman, 2006a; see also Krugman, 2005a, 2008a). He 
described the current US income distribution as the outcome of an 
“oligarchy” in which income and wealth was being concentrated in an 
increasingly narrow and protected privileged elite (Krugman, 2011a). 
The US also failed to live up to its famous slogan about being the 
land of opportunity. Citing research from economist Alan Krueger, 
Krugman argued that compared to other nations, the US had a “more 
static distribution of income across generations with fewer opportuni-
ties for advancement” (Krugman, 2002a).
For the later Krugman, rising inequality was a result of precisely 
the kinds of neoliberal transformations to the labor market that 
we highlighted in Chapters 2 and 3. Krugman argued that obvious 
policies “like tax rates for the rich and the level of the minimum wage” 
were creating inequality, but so, too, were less obvious but important 
changes, “like the shift in Labor Department policy from protection 
of worker rights to tacit support for union-busting” (Krugman, 2006b; 
see also Krugman, 2005b). His concern about the conditions of the 
average US worker also appears to have led to a reconsideration of 
the attractiveness of European-style labor policies. Krugman noted in 
2005 that although GDP per hour worked, a measure of productivity, 
was actually a bit higher in France than the US, French GDP per 
person was lower than the US primarily because French workers put 
in fewer hours on the job and more with their families. Further, it was 
government regulations that “actually allow people to make a desirable 
tradeoff. And whatever else you may say about French economic 
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policies, they seem extremely supportive of the family as an institution” 
(Krugman, 2005c). All of the policies that Krugman has supported are 
precisely the kinds of policies that Friedman opposed because they 
decrease competition in the labor market and increase the non-accel-
erating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU).
Finally, the dire condition of the US worker also caused Krugman 
to take a slightly less dismissive line on the impacts of free trade on 
wages. Although he maintained his support for free trade on the 
basis of its benefits for poorer nations, he conceded that, “fears that 
low-wage competition is driving down U.S. wages have a real basis in 
both theory and fact … And no, cheap consumer goods at Wal-Mart 
aren’t adequate compensation” (Krugman, 2007a). In contrast to 
his earlier claim that those who opposed trade were following their 
hearts but ignoring their heads, by 2007 he also conceded that “those 
who are worried about trade have a point, and deserve some respect” 
(Krugman, 2007b).
Krugman also favors regulation and government intervention, in 
contrast to Friedman and the public choice authors. Unlike capture 
and rent-seeking theories, Krugman argues that strong industry 
regulation in areas as diverse as food and finance are beneficial for 
both consumers and firms. Krugman follows the logic of information 
asymmetry to argue that when it is difficult for consumers to know how 
their food is prepared and how healthy it is, firms that cut corners will 
have a price advantage over those who do not. Quoting the president 
of the United Fresh Produce Association, Krugman argued that the 
safety issues facing the food industry “can’t be solved without strong 
mandatory federal regulations” As a result, both the food industry and 
consumer groups are eager for stronger regulations (Krugman, 2007c; 
see also Krugman, 2008b). Krugman takes a similar line in his strong 
pro-regulatory stance in the financial industry, a position he clearly 
felt was vindicated by the financial collapse of 2007. He warned of the 
dangers of replacing the Glass-Steagall Act with the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (GLBA), and the underfunding of regulatory agencies like 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (“the whole point 
is to prevent the agency from doing its job”: Krugman, 2002b), an 
analysis of the financial crisis very much along the lines described in 
this book, and in opposition to the EMH authors and regulators in the 
previous chapter (Krugman, 2008b, 2009a).
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In addition to regulatory oversight, Krugman has also come out 
in favor of outright government ownership and control of many 
industries. In the wake of the financial crisis, he advocated nation-
alizing the banks (Krugman, 2009b). One of his most controversial 
recommendations is to create a universal public health care system 
in the US. Krugman correctly pointed out that the health of US 
citizens fares poorly compared to people in nations with public health 
insurance like the UK and Canada:
… the richest third of Americans is in worse health than the poorest 
third of the English. It’s possible that Britain’s National Health 
Service, in spite of its limited budget, actually provides better 
all-around medical care than our system because it takes a broader, 
longer-term view than private insurance companies. (Krugman, 
2006c)
He argues that part of the reason that the US system is so expensive 
and delivers such poor results compared to a public system is that “in 
the United States administrative expenses eat up about 15 percent of 
the money paid in premiums to private health insurance companies, 
but only 4 percent of the budgets of public insurance programs” 
(Krugman, 2005d). The inevitable conclusion, according to Krugman? 
“Does this mean that the American way is wrong, and that we should 
switch to a Canadian-style single-payer system? Well, yes” (Krugman, 
2004a). The flip side of Krugman’s policy stance on nationalization is 
that he opposed privatization of services that were being effectively 
provided by the government. Perhaps most vocally, he is a long-term 
opponent of privatizing social security (Krugman, 2002c). As we have 
done in Chapter 2, Krugman attributed the privatization drive to the 
well-funded political activities of companies and the lobby groups to 
which they donate, including the American Legislative Exchange 
Council (ALEC), which he particularly criticized for drafting 
legislation that would turn “the provision of public services, from 
schools to prisons, over to for-profit corporations” (Krugman, 2012a).
Much like Stiglitz, Krugman favors expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policy during downturns. In the aftermath of the 2008 
economic crisis, when unemployment surged to 10 percent, there was 
considerable debate in the US about whether President Obama was 
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correct in running large deficits in an effort to stimulate the economy. 
Krugman was not only on the side of deficit spending, but argued that 
Obama’s stimulus package was both too small and poorly targeted. 
His message to Obama was unequivocal: “you need to get both your 
economic team and your political people working on additional 
stimulus, now” (Krugman, 2009c). He also lamented deficit cutting at 
the state level, which he argued was undercutting the limited federal 
attempts at resurrecting the economy: “The nation will be reeling from 
the actions of 50 Herbert Hoovers—state governors who are slashing 
spending in a time of recession” (Krugman, 2008c).
While Krugman supported deficits during the crisis, he was not as 
enamored about where the money was going. Much of the stimulus 
package went to bail out the insolvent banks that had created the 
financial crisis in the first place, under the assumption that they were 
“too big to fail.” Krugman argued that this amounted to nothing 
more than “lemon socialism: taxpayers bear the cost if things go 
wrong, but stockholders and executives get the benefits if things go 
right” (Krugman, 2009d). The fact that government bailouts were 
going to executive bonuses in failed financial firms may have been 
undesirable, but it was also predictable, given Wall Street’s influence 
over the National Economic Council (NEC), the agency responsible 
for organizing the response to the crisis. The NEC was populated 
with “Wall Street insiders and establishmentarians” like Mike Froman, 
from Citigroup, and Summers (Krugman & Wells, 2012).
Also like Stiglitz, Krugman supported a range of tax increases, 
especially on the rich, to help fund government programs. He has 
repeatedly pointed out the fiscal constraints imposed by tax cuts. 
During the debate about the Bush administration’s tax cuts, he noted 
that “once the new round of cuts takes effect, federal taxes will be 
lower than their average during the Eisenhower administration” 
(Krugman, 2003b). He not only opposed the Bush presidency’s tax 
cuts that favored the rich, but has also been more generally critical 
of the numerous tax evasion and avoidance schemes that allowed the 
rich to pay very little tax, especially the corporate shell game of setting 
up in low tax jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands (Krugman, 2002d, 
2004b). His dismay at the hollowing-out of fiscal capacity during the 
2000s prompted an apology of sorts, when he admitted that Nader 
“wasn’t all wrong” in lumping the Democrats and Republicans together 
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in their subservience to corporations and the wealthy when even the 
supposedly more left-leaning party waffled over whether managers of 
hedge funds should be taxed at the same rate as other income earners 
(Krugman, 2007d). Like Stiglitz, Krugman has been careful to point 
out that taxes and spending impact different groups in the population 
and has been critical of those who advocate balancing budgets on 
the backs of spending cuts. He favorably contrasted France’s budget 
balancing through tax increases to the rest of Europe’s choice of 
cutting social programs, claiming that “France has committed the 
unforgivable sin of being fiscally responsible without inflicting pain 
on the poor and unlucky” (Krugman, 2013).
Stiglitz and Krugman have both been steadfast opponents of the 
neoliberal policies that we have detailed in Chapters 2 and 3. They 
have also been critical of the economics discipline that justified these 
policies. Krugman described the state of macroeconomics in the 
three decades prior to the 2008 crisis as “spectacularly useless at best, 
positively harmful at worst” (quoted in Mirowski, 2013, p. 292). After 
1970, financial economics consisted largely of researchers imitating 
“Voltaire’s Dr. Pangloss, who insisted that we live in the best of all 
possible worlds” (Krugman, 2009e). For his part, Stiglitz argued that 
what he described as the neoclassical paradigm that emphasizes the 
efficiency of markets and market equilibrium, to which most of the 
economists listed in this book subscribe, does not have a great deal 
of theoretical or empirical support. Its continued popularity within 
the economics profession may be, in part, due to its ability to provide 
“insights into many economic phenomena,” but the possibility that 
“belief in that paradigm, and the policy prescriptions, has served 
certain interests” must also be considered (Stiglitz, 2001).
Yet the dissent of even these two critics, whose analysis, in many 
respects, accord with that presented in this book, has some important 
limits. Krugman and Stiglitz are simultaneously very critical of much 
of the work in economics and supportive of the quest for scientific rigor 
that we have identified in Chapter 2 as a hallmark of the post-1970s 
discipline. Stiglitz has claimed that his work stemmed from a belief 
that “the most effective way of attacking the paradigm was to keep 
within the standard frameworks as much as possible” (Stiglitz, 2001, p. 
519). He argued that it was not the traditional tools of economics that 
were to blame for the direction of economics after 1980, but the uses to 
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which these tools were put. In fact, used correctly, the traditional tools 
of maximized modeling actually explain the crisis fairly well: “The 
disaster that grew from these flawed financial incentives can be, to us 
economists, somewhat comforting: our models predicted that there 
would be excessive risk taking and shortsighted behavior… economic 
theory was vindicated” (Stiglitz, 2010b, pp. 150, 153). Perhaps not 
coincidentally, the traditional models that Stiglitz argued explain 
the economic crisis were his own models of asymmetric information, 
in which one party in a transaction has more knowledge about the 
product being sold than the other (Stiglitz, 2003). This interpre-
tation of the crisis focuses on the fact that people were purchasing 
complicated financial investments that they did not fully understand 
and could not properly value.
Krugman has declared himself “basically a maximization-and-equi-
librium kind of guy. Indeed, I am quite fanatical about defending 
the relevance of standard economic models in many situations.” For 
Krugman, an economist like John Kenneth Galbraith, who did not use 
these techniques, “looks to most serious economists like an intellectual 
dilettante who lacks the patience for hard thinking” (Krugman, 
1996b). Krugman’s academic work is in the tradition of Samuelson’s 
Keynesianism, which he admits is “intellectually unstable,” because it 
combines the assumptions of “rational individuals and rapidly clearing 
markets” in its microeconomics and “frictions and ad hoc behavioral 
assumptions” in macro (Krugman, 2010). Krugman argues that 
despite the inconsistency that this version of Keynesianism requires 
of its adherents, it is the correct theoretical framework for analyzing 
macro phenomena, including the 2008 economic crisis: “Basic sensible 
macro—what we learned from Keynes and Hicks—has actually held 
up very well in the crisis.” A fundamental rethinking of how the 
discipline is practiced is not necessary. Rather, the problem with 
economics has been that too many economists rejected the sensible 
approach (Krugman, 2012b). Although both Stiglitz and Krugman 
think that there is a great deal wrong with modern economics, it is not 
the fault of the mainstream theory itself, rather the direction that the 
technique has been taken:
Why, then, do people like Stiglitz or myself so often seem to be 
in the position of defending economic orthodoxy? Because when 
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you enter the real world of policy debates, you find out that the 
great majority of those who attack standard economic prescriptions 
may imagine that they have transcended textbook economics, but, 
in fact, have simply failed to understand it. (Krugman, 1996a)
History of economic thought scholar Philip Mirowski character-
izes the Stiglitz-Krugman position on the state of the discipline as: 
economics has made some unfortunate mistakes, but we’ve sobered up 
and we are working hard to rectify them. However, Mirowski argues 
that this is an overestimation of the extent to which mainstream theory 
of the Stiglitz-Krugman variety can explain the crisis. To illustrate 
this, we can draw on one example each from Stiglitz and Krugman.
Stiglitz argued that the financial crisis can be explained by one of his 
papers (Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980), which analyzes how the problem 
of information acquisition can cause markets to fail. According 
to Mirowski, Stiglitz’s model frames the problem as people being 
unwilling to pay for information when there is risk. Yet the financial 
crisis was characterized by people who were willing to pay receiving 
falsely optimistic information because of the profit-maximizing 
activities of the credit agencies (Mirowski, 2013, p. 273). Stiglitz’s 
analysis, which rests on people’s lack of information about asset values, 
is an inadequate explanation of the financial crisis and an even more 
incomplete explanation of the ensuing economic crisis.
Mirowski also argues that Stiglitz conflates welfare loss with system 
breakdown and crisis. Stiglitz’s work highlights the fact that individual 
markets can function poorly or even break down in situations where 
information asymmetry exists. Even if information problems were 
a complete explanation of the financial crisis, although we have just 
suggested this is not the case, there is still a considerable jump from 
a failure of one market, even the financial market, to a full-blown 
economic crisis (Mirowski, 2013, p. 274). After all, the S&L and dot.
com financial busts failed to spark entire system failure of the kind 
experienced in 2008. What Stiglitz’s information theory leaves out is 
that workers were not in a position to demand higher wages. This 
permitted the low interest-rate policies that reduced unemployment 
and increased indebtedness. In his review of Stiglitz’s The Roaring 
Nineties, Robert Pollin connects the dots, arguing that when people’s 
wealth increases, as it did when stock markets and housing values hit 
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record highs, people will increase their consumption. Pollin estimated 
that between 1995 and 1999, the increases of wealth resulted in 
consumption increases “injecting between $275–$460 billion, or 
roughly 2–4 percent more spending into the economy” (Pollin, 2004). 
An economy built on debt-fueled consumption was both possible and 
necessary because of the limited income gains of workers after 1980, 
but this more complete explanation is hidden, if one focuses on models 
of information asymmetry.
The limits of Krugman’s analysis can be highlighted by recalling 
our discussion of Hyman Minsky, who argued that finance will 
create an inevitable source of instability in an economy. Although 
Krugman has some sympathy for Minsky’s work, he criticized 
Minsky for rejecting the micro theory that Krugman argues is part 
of good, although inconsistent, macroeconomics. Krugman especially 
objects to Minsky’s rejection of the marginal productivity theory of 
distribution (Krugman, 2009f, 2014), which states that “factors of 
production,” like workers, get paid the value of what they produce in a 
competitive market. Even fellow dissenter Stiglitz argued that it is an 
ideologically useful but theoretically and empirically bankrupt means 
to explain income distribution in capitalist society (Stiglitz, 2011). 
This theory implies that as the productivity of workers increases, 
their wages should increase at the same rate. However, as we pointed 
out in Chapter 3, although this did happen in the decades prior to 
1980, wage gains have lagged behind productivity in the post-1980 
years. The problem with marginal productivity theory is that workers’ 
income does not only rely on their productivity, but also on their 
ability to capture the gains from that productivity, which depends on 
their power in the labor market. Marginal productivity theory does 
not, in fact, explain worker incomes in the post-1980 economy, due 
to labor market policies that have turned against workers, a fact that 
Krugman acknowledges in some of his New York Times articles. Yet he 
still cannot reject marginal productivity theory, since it forms such a 
common linchpin of his standard economic theory (Mirowski, 2013, 
p. 292). This is important because it is precisely those labor market 
policies, and the fact that labor income lagged behind productivity, 
which crucially contributed to the large inequality that characterizes 
the US economy and was an important factor in the build-up of debt.
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Despite these misgivings, Krugman attempted to incorporate some 
Minsky, at least in name (a Fisher-Minsky-Koo approach), into the 
usual Keynesian model. Krugman’s “Minsky moment” occurs when 
there is reconsideration in society about how much debt is safe, forcing 
indebted households to pay off their debts. In order to pay off debts, 
households will cut back their spending, creating a recession that even 
a very expansionary zero-interest-rate monetary policy may not solve. 
Expansionary, deficit-inducing, fiscal policy, on the other hand, is 
effective in ending the recession by compensating for the temporary 
decrease in spending (Eggertsson & Krugman, 2012). According to 
Mirowski, despite the title, Krugman’s model fails to incorporate the 
most important of Minsky’s insights. Minsky’s primary focus was to 
show how finance creates a systematic source of instability (Mirowski, 
2013, p. 294). Krugman’s analysis does not do this. There is no source 
of inherent instability built into the working of Krugman’s economic 
system. Rather, it comes from a sudden change in how much debt is 
acceptable. How that debt came to be also remains an unexplored issue 
for Krugman.
The reason that the academic work of both Krugman and Stiglitz 
ignores crucial components of both the economic crisis, in particular, 
and the problematic economic trends in the post-1980 economy, 
in general, is that the structural features of a capitalist economy are 
absent from their analysis. Specifically, the power wielded by firms due 
to the importance of a policy environment that maintains their profit-
ability is not included. For Stiglitz, information asymmetry is inherent 
in certain industries. It is either present or not. But as we saw in the 
credit market, who has the most influence over information is rooted 
in the same power relations that have determined the policy outcomes 
characteristic of neoliberal capitalism. Naturalizing asymmetric 
information makes it possible to ignore the capitalist character of the 
crisis. Similarly, Krugman’s insistence on relevance of the marginal 
productivity theory removes the issue of power relationships in the 
labor market. In addition, his sanitized version of a “Minsky moment” 
cleanses the term of its implications for capitalism’s dynamics, which 
suggest that crisis is an inherent part of the workings of the economic 
system. In Chapter 2, we discussed the controversy about the extent 
to which scientific pretension, the use of mathematical modeling and 
statistical empiricism, aided the rise of neoliberal economics. Stiglitz 
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and Krugman are both economists committed to this type of analytical 
rigor and their academic work leads to conclusions about market 
failure necessitating government intervention, so there is nothing 
inevitable connecting scientific pretension and neoliberal ideas. Yet 
their theories are also limited because of their failure to tether those 
models to structural features of a capitalist economy.
The point here is not to argue that Krugman and Stiglitz’s economic 
policy prescriptions are incorrect. The vast majority of them are actually 
very reasonable. Rather, the point is that Krugman and Stiglitz suffer 
from the weakness of which Krugman accused Friedman. Recall that 
Krugman argued that there were two Friedmans, the careful economist 
of adaptive expectations and the irresponsible free market policy 
advocate. We have argued that this dichotomy is, in fact, a mirage, and 
that Friedman’s academic work contains the same pro-business biases 
as his policy stances. Krugman and Stiglitz, however, do suffer from 
this dichotomy. Their progressive policy stances cannot be justified by 
their academic work.
Even if the policy advice of inside-the-mainstream dissenters 
like Krugman and Stiglitz does present some possible answers, their 
preferred policies have not been enacted during this period. This is a 
bit more of an issue for Stiglitz because, as part of Clinton’s economic 
advisory team, he was in a position to actually influence events. It 
may be true, as Stiglitz suggests, that he was simply overruled by the 
Greenspan-Rubin-Summers trio. However, Pollin points out that 
the 1996 Economic Report of the President, written under Stiglitz’s 
supervision, generally approved of lowering regulatory standards, 
including the electric power industry that created the Enron scandal 
that devastated California in 2002 (Pollin, 2004). While one could 
debate the extent to which they are dissenters from the economic 
mainstream, what is absolutely true is that the kinds of policies that 
Stiglitz and Krugman publically advocated were largely ignored, leaving 
them increasingly frustrated with the direction of economic policy.
Conclusion
Rather than the more egalitarian, regulatory, high-employment 
Krugman-Stiglitz prescriptions, the post-1980s US economy has been 
characterized by policy that has created inequality, deregulation and 
conclusion: dissenters and victors
185
higher unemployment in the service of combating inflation. These 
policies, not coincidentally, tilted the economic policy landscape 
toward the profits of firms and away from the rest of the population. In 
contrast to Krugman and Stiglitz, who looked on the economic policy 
landscape with increasing anger and dismay, the other economists 
featured in these pages must have experienced a sense of triumph at 
the growing influence of their ideas.
For much of Friedman’s young career, he must have felt like a voice 
crying out in the wilderness. In an era wedded to Keynesian macro 
policy and an acceptance of government intervention, Friedman 
was calling for a withdrawal of the state. By the time of his death in 
2006, he could look on the transformation of economic policy with 
no small satisfaction. In the world of macroeconomics, his theories 
of adaptive expectations, NAIRU and monetary rule unraveled the 
Keynesian consensus that governments and central banks should 
follow full-employment macro-stabilization policy. Further, his macro 
theory suggested that the economy would perform at its low-inflation, 
high-employment best when labor markets were at their most price 
flexible, by which he meant that unions were weak, unemployment 
benefits were low and workers’ wage gains were modest. His micro-
economic policy work was less original but no less influential. His 
insistence that competition in the free market would deliver the best 
products for the consumer and the best conditions for the worker, 
while government intervention would result in higher prices, fewer 
goods and more unemployment, became established wisdom and 
actual policy. While evidence for Friedman’s contention that more 
government leads to a worse economy is falsified by history, the dis-
tributional consequences of his policies are clear-cut. Reducing the 
power of workers in the labor market, privatization and deregulation 
all improve the profitability of business.
The rational choice approach to politics, a cornerstone of public 
choice, ran with Friedman’s ideas about the harm done by government. 
The innovation of public choice was to apply to politics the standard 
economic tools that were applied to markets. Its most famous pioneers 
argued that following this method permits a more rigorous, scientific 
examination of outcomes of the state. However, public choice has been 
accused of containing an anti-government bias. Certainly, the scholars 
investigated in this book (Buchanan, Stigler, Peltzman, Becker and 
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Tullock) view government intervention in the economy as damaging. 
Unsurprisingly, their positive approaches yield results that all but 
uniformly find evidence of government failure. If government failure 
creates rent seeking and capture, the policy solution is straightforward: 
less government.
The ideas of capture and rent seeking may actually describe a small 
subsection of government activity, in which firms use legislation to 
create an advantage over their competitors, but the concepts are more 
problematic when addressing the vast majority of regulations. Public 
choice predicts that firms should favor regulation, while consumers 
should be opposed. Yet, in reality, companies have spent considerable 
sums lobbying for either outright deregulation or gutting regulatory 
institutions’ ability to fulfill their mandate, mostly against the wishes 
of the public. While public choice authors portray consumer support 
of regulation as the rational ignorance of voters misled by information 
bias created by interest groups that benefit from regulation, it is 
possible that the public actually understands the costs and benefits. 
People are often better protected with regulation than without, 
while the activity of firms is often constrained. Although some of 
the pioneers of public choice explicitly claim that it is a superior 
explanation for government activity than more radical, class-based 
explanations, in fact a class-based explanation offers a better account. 
It is the structural power of business in a capitalist economy rather 
than the different costs and benefits of interest groups that can best 
explain government outcomes like the deregulatory trend since the 
1970s. As was the case with Friedman’s deregulatory ideas, rational 
choice in politics may not be accurate but it is attractive, at least to a 
business community desperate to reduce what it considered to be the 
burden of an encroaching state in the 1970s. It is surely no coincidence 
that much of the funding for the centers of public choice comes from 
the corporate world.
Real Business Cycle theory did for Friedman’s macroeconomic 
ideas what public choice did in micro. Although, in contrast to public 
choice, RBC theory took Friedman’s ideas to such an extreme that 
they ended up actually dismissing his idea of adaptive expectations. 
The hallmarks of RBC theory are that prices and wages adjust quickly, 
information is quickly incorporated into decisions, and markets are 
in equilibrium. With these starting assumptions, RBC authors assert 
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that economic fluctuations are caused by random productivity shocks 
to which employees optimally respond by altering the amount that 
they will work. This theory has some very important and controversial 
implications for macroeconomic policy. It implies that unemployment 
is not caused by tight monetary policy, which helps justify using high 
interest rates to control inflation. It also has a curious interpretation 
of unemployment, which is not seen as a case of firms shedding their 
labor force during economic downturns, but rather as voluntary quits 
in response to declining real wages caused by adverse productivity 
shocks. RBC theory suggests that, while avoiding negative productivity 
shocks, if possible, is desirable government policy, counter-cyclical 
policy like low interest rates and social insurance to ease the income 
shock of unemployment are to be avoided. Finally, as RBC theory 
moved away from narrow definitions of productivity shocks, which 
were not empirically justifiable, and turned to a broader definition, its 
list of productivity-damaging policies included protective regulation, 
like environmental or worker safety, and corporate taxation.
RBC theorists make a number of highly counter-intuitive claims (for 
example, that workers quit more frequently during recessions) which 
fail to hold up to even casual observation, but its policy conclusions 
definitely favor the interests of business. Corporate America was 
very concerned that US labor was overpaid and underproductive in 
the 1970s. An economic theory that claimed full employment policy 
was ineffective, that high interest-rate policies would not create 
unemployment, and that unemployment was in some ways optimal, was 
ideologically very useful for business. It created an intellectual justifica-
tion for high interest-rate policy that did, despite RBC claims, create 
unemployment which dramatically reduced workers’ power in the labor 
market during the 1980s and 1990s. It also implied that policies like 
social insurance for the unemployed, regulations on worker safety and 
corporate taxation either create or lengthen productivity shocks. As was 
the case with public choice, it is no coincidence that RBC-style theory 
rose to prominence in the 1980s when macroeconomic policy turned 
away from a focus on full employment, and labor market policy reduced 
its protection for unemployed workers. Both of these policies were 
crucial in creating a labor force that worked harder for stagnant wages.
The authors who rose to prominence in financial economics did 
so by inventing a formula that created large profits for firms in the 
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finance industry and then shielded those profits from regulatory 
oversight. The Black-Merton-Scholes formula for option pricing 
opened up a largely undiscovered market in new financial instruments. 
As the market for options and derivatives expanded exponentially, 
the share of total profits in the US going to the financial industry 
increased. However, it also changed the incentive structure in the 
housing mortgage market. When banks earn money on the sale 
price of the bundle of mortgages in a derivative rather than by the 
homeowners paying back the mortgage, the incentive for the bank is 
to sign as many families up for mortgages as possible since that creates 
more derivatives for it to sell. The predictable result of this incentive 
structure is that increasingly large loans were given to increasingly 
marginal lenders. The murky complexity of the derivative market 
created growing concern among some in policy circles, like Brooksley 
Born, that asset bubbles were forming and regulation was needed. 
However, in the battle to get out from the regulatory restrictions 
of the Glass-Steagall Act and avoid any alternative oversight, the 
financial industry and its anti-intervention defenders could lean on 
the intellectual justification of Eugene Fama’s EMH, which suggested 
that asset prices were generally priced accurately, and bubbles were 
therefore unlikely. The post-1980 economic policy environment was 
very lucrative for the financial industry. Yet these profits contributed to 
increasing indebtedness of homeowners and the 2008 economic crisis. 
The finance economists examined in the pages of this book were not 
directly responsible for the growth of the mortgage derivatives market 
that increased the debt of Americans, nor were they responsible for 
the deregulatory zeal that permitted the financial industry a free hand 
with its speculative adventuring. However, the authors did provide the 
intellectual ammunition for the expansion of the derivatives market 
and the academic shield from regulation.
Greenspan and Summers were among those high-placed economists 
who were directly responsible for the deregulatory zeal. After the 2008 
crisis, both Summers and Greenspan were on the receiving end of a 
justifiable upbraiding for their contribution to the monetary policy 
and deregulation that fostered an increase in consumer debt, the 
mortgage housing bubble and the financial collapse. However, even 
had there not been a crisis, the economy fostered by Greenspan and 
Summers created a hostile environment for most Americans while 
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being generous to firms. Greenspan’s continuation of Paul Volcker’s 
war against inflation increased unemployment, putting downward 
pressure on wages and improving profits during the early 1990s. 
His policy shift to a lower interest-rate environment only occurred 
once Greenspan was confident that workers were so traumatized that 
low unemployment would not create wage gains. The low interest-
rate policy was important because growing household debt helped 
firms maintain their sales despite limited wage gains. Summers and 
Greenspan’s deregulatory policy advocacy was part of a broader move 
to remove government obstacles to profitability in the post-1980 
economic transformation. In the financial sector, this not only created 
instability but also increasing household debt, that transferred income 
from families to creditor firms. The supposed good times of the 1990s 
and early 2000s created by Greenspan and Summers were not only 
unstable, they were also a boom for only a very small minority of the 
population.
Some were anticipating that the 2008 crisis would do to neoliberal 
economics what the 1970s did to Keynesianism. Surely, this line of 
thought went, a crisis largely put down to lax regulation in subservience 
of corporate profits leading to widespread malfeasance and economic 
collapse would cause a profound rethinking of the economics discipline. 
While it is still not completely out of the realm of possibility, this 
outcome now seems extremely unlikely. If we return to the three 
factors that we identified in the rise of neoliberal economics after the 
1970s (scientific pretension, economic conditions, and institutional 
support), it is only the change in economic conditions that might 
provide any cause for optimism among those looking for a transfor-
mation in economics. But even here, we have argued that it is not only 
the march of major economic events that helps to determine which 
theories rise to prominence and which are discarded. Who benefits 
from those economic events is also crucially important. The collapse 
of the Keynesian consensus and the rise of neoliberal policy did not 
occur only because Keynesian analysis could not explain the inflation 
unemployment trade-off. It happened because Keynesian analysis 
favored government intervention, that was seen as harming the profit-
ability of business. The solutions offered by neoliberal economists were 
not only opposed to the Keynesian post-war doctrine; their particular 
form of opposition involved policies that were beneficial to the 
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corporate world. The 2008 crisis did not lead to a comparable crisis for 
the business community, which weathered the storm remarkably well. 
As a result, although the march of events may yet create problems for 
neoliberal economics, the entrenched interests that benefit from those 
policy ideas remain the same. There are plenty of economic theories 
being put forward that run counter to the neoliberal ideas in this book, 
from the more moderate opinions of Krugman and Stiglitz to the more 
radical theories of prominent scholars such as Brenner, Duménil and 
Levy, Minsky, Pollin and Shaikh, yet they will only ever see the light 
of day as economic policy if the structural political influence currently 
wielded by the business class can be countered.
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